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T HIS article discusses more than 100 of the real property cases reported
during the survey period.' Although many of these cases provide little
more than a review of basic real property law, significant and exciting new
developments did occur in such areas as title insurance, slander of title,
contracts, brokerage, mortgages, usury, and mechanics' and materialmen's
liens. The basic format established in the Survey articles for the previous
three years has been followed. 2 Topics such as homestead and community
property, oil and gas, and ad valorem taxation, which constitute major
portions of other articles in this Survey issue, are omitted from this article. 3
Further, due to the wealth of significant discussion topics, and in keeping with
the previously established format, no discussion of cases concerning con-
demnation or eminent domain is included.
I. The Board of Editors of the Journal has designated cases reported in South Western
Reporter and Federal Second advance sheets received by Oct. 12, 1976, as the end of the survey
period for purposes of this Article. A few noteworthy cases reported subsequent to that date are,
however, discussed in this Article.
2. Wallenstein & St. Claire, Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 28 (1976)
[hereinafter referred to in the text as the 1976 Property Article and in subsequent footnotes as
Wallenstein & St. Claire (1976)]; Wallenstein, Property, AnnualSurvey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J.
29 (1975) [hereinafter referred to in the text as the 1975 Property Article and in subsequent
footnotes as Wallenstein (1975)]; Wallenstein, Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw.
L.J. 27 (1974) [hereinafter referred to in the text as the 1974 Property Article and in subsequent
footnotes as Wallenstein (1974)].
3. See, e.g., homestead and community property, McKnight, Family Law-Husband and




A. Ownership and Boundary Disputes
1. Title by Limitations.'
As in previous years, proof of title by adverse possession received substan-
tial attention in litigation during the survey periodi In Calfee v. Duke6 the
plaintiffs and defendant- Calfee were descendants of J. H. Duke, who had
recovered title by limitations to the tract in question in 1935. Calfee acquired a
deed and went into possession of the property in July 1946; however, part of
the claimed tract was not covered by the description in the deed. The other
Duke heirs brought this action, claiming that as to the tract not described in
the 1946 deed to Calfee, limitations could not run against them since Calfee
became a cotenant with the other Duke heirs upon the death of Calfee's
father.7 The trial court held for Calfee, but the court of civil appeals reversed
and held that Calfee and the other Duke heirs were co-tenants, and therefore
that limitations could not run against the other Duke heirs.' The Texas
Supreme Court reversed the court of civil appeals, holding that Calfee's claim
of right, coupled with actual and visible possession and use, satisfied the ten
year statute9 and could not be defeated merely because of a defect in his
record title or because he was unaware of other claimants to the land. The
court did not reach the issue of the existence of a co-tenancy. Rather, the
court held that Calfee had acquired title to the tract by limitations prior to the
death of his father, and, therefore, before any co-tenancy could have arisen.
In Chapman v. Moser"° the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs and their
grandparents had peaceably and adversely possessed the disputed lands
continuously for at least 25 years under a "claim of right," and, thereby, had
established title by limitations under article 5519. " The court defined "claim
of right" as used in article 5519 as "a bold and open, a downright and
persistent claim asserted not furtively by stealth and artifice, but openly,
notoriously, unequivocally, adversely and continuously." '2 The Fifth Circuit
also held that the district court properly apportioned between the two
adjoining land owners one tract of accreted land. 13
4. Texas has several statutes which specifically provide that compliance with the require-
ments prescribed for adverse possession results in vesting of title in the adverse claimant. See
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5507-5523a (Vernon 1958). See generally Note, Adverse
Possession: The Three, Five, and Ten Year Statutes of Limitation, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 78 (1975).
5. In addition to the cases discussed in the text see McMahon v. Texas Bank & Trust Co.,
535 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ).
6. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 62 (Dec. 4, 1976).
7. Generally, possession by a tenant in common will be presumed to be in right of the
common title. It must clearly appear that the co-tenant has repudiated the title of the others and
holds adversely to them. The acts necessary to establish an adverse claim must be more certain
and unequivocal than in ordinary cases. Moreover, notice of the adverse claim must be brought
home to the other co-tenants. See Poenisch v. Quarnstrom, 361 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1962);
Phillipson v. Flynns, 83 Tex. 580, 19 S.W. 136 (1892).
8. Duke v. Calfee, 533 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976), rev'd, 20 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 62 (Dec. 4, 1976).
9. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5510 (Vernon 1958). For other cases decided under the
ten-year statute see Collins v. Ivey, 531 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Meyer v. Worden, 530 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Gandy v. Culpepper, 528 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, no writ).
10. 532 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1976).
II. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5519 (Vernon 1958).
12. 532 F.2d at 430, citing Delaney v. Padgett, 193 F.2d 806, 810 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 825 (1952).
13. See Johnston v. Jones, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 209 (1861).
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A purchaser who takes possession under a contract of sale, as in Fant v.
Howell, 14 holds equitable title to the property. He therefore has the right to
support or defend an action in trespass to try title involving third persons who
were not parties to the contract of sale. Any loss occurring by reason of
adverse possession or outstanding title by limitations must thus be borne by
the purchaser as holder of equitable title.
2. Boundary Line Agreements; Boundary by Acquiescence.
When there is uncertainty as to the true dividing line between two adjoining
tracts, the boundary line may be established by an oral agreement between the
respective owners.' 5 The court in Doria v. Suchowolskil6 held that without
evidence of a dispute concerning the true boundary, there can be no valid
boundary line agreement. The plaintiff argued alternatively that the boundary
in question had been established by acquiescence. Boundary by acquiesc-
ence, according to the court, is also dependent upon the existence of doubt or
uncertainty.17 Thus, the mere erection of a fence which was located off the
true boundary line was not in itself sufficient to establish a boundary by
acquiescence. 18
Another case involving a disputed boundary was United States v. Denby,19
where the Government claimed that a certain parcel of land was located
within the boundaries of the Sabine National Forest.20 Under Texas law the
true location of a disputed boundary line may be proved by retracing, as
nearly as possible, the footsteps of the original surveyor. 2' Here the Govern-
ment offered the testimony of two registered surveyors who retraced the
original surveyor's steps. The court found this evidence conclusive in estab-
lishing the boundary line alleged by the Government.22
3. Subsidence; Water Rights.
The land surface in the Texas Gulf Coast Area has been slowly subsiding
during the last several decades, primarily caused by the removal of under-
14. 537 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ granted). The Texas Supreme Court
granted writ of error on two points: (1) whether the performance of the contract could be excused
by a foreseeable impossibility (adverse possession); (2) whether an undertaking to bring about a
condition is an implied condition precedent. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 5 (Oct. 9, 1976). [Editor's Note:
Since this Article was written this case has recently been reversed and remanded by the Texas
Supreme Court. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 179 (Feb. 12, 1977).]
15. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 137 Tex. 59, 152 S.W.2d 711(1941); Davis
v. Miers, 308 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland, 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Voight v. Hunt, 167
S.W. 745 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1914, writ dism'd).
16. 531 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
17. Id. at 364.
18. See Boothe v. Fuentes, 262 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1953, no writ).
19. 522 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1975).
20. The Government instituted suit in trespass to try title in the district court.
21. Mortgage Inv. Co. v. Bauer, 493 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
22. 522 F.2d at 1364. Another case decided during the survey period concerning a disputed
boundary also involved some interesting questions about the use of laypersons as "surveyors."
See Hampton v. McCaig, 537 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ). The case
also points out some problems in mislabeling a case as an action in trespass to try title. Id. at 529.
For a discussion of some procedural aspects of trespass to try title actions see Tompkins v.
Holman, 537 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
[Vol. 31
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ground water for industrial and municipal purposes.23 The question of owner-
ship of riparian land which has subsided beneath the water level was before
the Texas Supreme Court in Coastal Industrial Water Authority v. York.2 4
The land in question had become submerged below the water level of the
Houston Ship Channel, the bed of which is owned by the City of Houston.
The water level on the York land, however, did not fluctuate with the ebb and
flow of the tides.25 The court held that mere submersion of land does not
necessarily destroy the title of the landowner. 26 Since there had been no
erosion of the soil, title to the submerged land remained in York.
27
A well established rule of law declares that an owner of land owns "all
ordinary springs and waters arising thereon."128 This rule stems from the
general proposition that the surface owner also owns water beneath the
surface. These principals, however, are not applicable to water flowing in
subterranean streams or to the overflow of rivers. 29 In Bartley v. Sone30 the
court held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary it is to be presumed
that a landowner owns all water flowing from springs upon his land.
B. Easements
1. Easements by Operation of Law.
As an interest in land, an easement is subject to the Statute of Frauds and
the Statute of Conveyances; thus, an express easement must be conveyed in
writing. 31 Easements may however be created in several ways by operation of
law without the necessity of a writing. An easement by prescription exists
where the claimant shows that the use of the alleged servient estate was open,
notorious, hostile, adverse, uninterrupted, and exclusive for a period of more
than ten years. 2 An implied easement may be shown if the dominant and
servient estates were at some time under a common ownership, the use was
apparent at the time of the grant to the dominant estate, the use of easement
was continuous, and the easement is reasonably necessary to the use and
enjoyment of the dominant estate. 33 Additionally, in some circumstances an
23. See generally Steelhammer & Garland, Subsidence Resulting From the Removal of
Ground Waters, 12 S. TEX. L.J. 201 (1971).
24. 532 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. 1976), noted in 30 Sw. L.J. 943 (1976); see Wallenstein & St. Claire
(1976), supra note 2, at 31.
25. This fact was crucial to the court's holding. See 532 S.W.2d at 951-52 n.I.
26. See City of Galveston v. Menard, 23 Tex. 349 (1859); State v. Aransas Dock & Channel
Co., 365 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966, writ ref'd). See also Tapoco, Inc. v.
Peterson, 213 Tenn. 335, 373 S.W.2d 605 (1962).
27. The general rule is that a riparian owner acquires or loses title to land gradually added or
taken from his shoreline. Giles v. Bashore, 154 Tex. 366, 378 S.W.2d 830 (1955). A different rule
is applied in cases of sudden, rapid changes. See 5A G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 2561
(Grimes ed. 1957). In York there was no "transportation of the land beyond the owner's
boundary" so as to destroy the owner's title. 532 S.W.2d at 954. See 5A G. THOMPSON, supra, §
2562.
28. Toyaho Creek Irrigation Co. v. Hutchins, 52 S.W. 101, 105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, writ
ref'd).
29. Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16, 296 S.W. 273 (1927).
30. 527 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
31. Anderson v. Tall Timbers Corp., 378 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. 1964).
32. Dailey v. Alarid, 486 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also
Steahr v. Clark, 535 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ).
33. Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. 1962). See also Estate of
Waggoner v. Gleghorn, 378 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. 1964). See generally M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND
CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY § 13.1 (2d ed. 1963).
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easement may be created by estoppel where in a conveyance of land there is a
representation communicated by the vendor to the vendee which the vendee
believes and relies upon. 34 Finally, an implied dedication to the public may be
established by showing that the road in question was expressly or impliedly
thrown open to the public, that the public accepted the dedication by general
and customary use, and that the public will lose valuable rights if the road is
closed. 5 Two cases decided during this survey period provide a virtual
guidebook to these theories.
In Davis v. Carriker,36 although the court held that the plaintiff failed to
establish an easement under theories of prescription, express easement,
implied easement or way of necessity, or implied public dedication, its
analysis in arriving at its holding embodies a review of each theory and its
characteristics. The theory of easement by implication was discussed in
Exxon Corp. v. Schutzmaier,37 where the court concluded that strict adher-
ence to the four requirements discussed above38 is essential to the creation of
an implied easement. In Schutzmaier the lack of a common grantor prevented
the application of this doctrine.39 The court also considered the creation of an
easement by estoppel. Recognizing that the "exact nature and extent of the
doctrine of estoppel in pais have not been clearly defined," 40 the court held
that where the desired easement was the only means of ingress and egress to
the plaintiffs' tract, the plaintiffs' predecessor in title had received permis-
sion to use the road from the defendant and this access had been used for 22
years, and the plaintiffs had made improvements and had expended money on
their property without objection by the defendant, an easement by estoppel
was created. 4' Finally, the court held that a party who obtains an easement by
operation of law is not entitled to use all means of access to the property. Use
must be limited to those means which are reasonably necessary and which
cause the least burden to the servient estate. 42
2. Construction of Express Easements.
The construction of language in express easements gave rise to some
34. Doss v. Blackstock, 466 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In
Doss a plat inscription stated that two lakefront lots were reserved for subdivision property
owners. This was communicated to the purchasers who bought partly in reliance on this
representation. The court held that an easement by estoppel existed in favor of the purchasers
permitting them to use the two lakefront lots. See generally W. BURBY, REAL PROPERTY § 30, at 76
(3d ed. 1965).
35. O'Connor v. Gragg, 161 Tex. 273, 339 S.W.2d 878 (1960).
36. 536 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Aransas
County v. Reif, 532 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
37. 537 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ).
38. The four requirements are set forth in the text accompanying note 33 supra. See also
Bickler v. Bickler, 403 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. 1966).
39. See also First Nat'l Bank v. Amarillo Nat'l Bank, 531 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1975, no writ) (life estate in servient estate insufficient to establish unity of title
necessary to support an implied easement).
40. Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 196, 209 (Tex. 1962).
41. The court stated that a landowner may create an easement by oral agreement or
representation which has been acted on by others. 537 S.W.2d at 286.
42. See, e.g., Parshall v. Crabtree, 516 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). See also Forister v. Coleman, 538 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ




interesting decisions during the survey period. In Mapco, Inc. v. Ratliff43 an
express pipeline easement required the pipeline owner to maintain the pipe at
a sufficient depth to permit cultivation. The court held that where the pipe
was not at such a depth, the pipeline owner could not recover on the basis of
trespass for damage to the pipeline caused by a plowing contractor.
In Lower Colorado River Authority v. Ashby" the easement provided for a
right-of-way along a strip of land 100 feet wide for an "electric transmission
and/or distribution line, consisting of variable number of wires, and all
necessary or desirable appurtenances (including towers, H-Frames or poles
made of wood, metal or other materials, telephone and telegraph wire, props
and guys). 45 The court held that this language was sufficiently broad to give
the River Authority the right to substitute steel towers for wooden H-Frames
and to add additional wires. 46
The question of damages recoverable within the language of certain ease-
ment deeds was considered in Melder v. Phillips Pipe Line C0.47 The express
pipeline easements in question provided that the grantee was obligated "to
pay any damages which may arise to crops, timber, fences or buildings ' 48
because of the use of the easement by the grantee. Citing the rule that words in
a contract are to be given their ordinary and accepted meanings, 49 the court
held that natural grasses, ground cover and shrubs were not "crops," trees
which afforded shade and ornamentation were not "timber," and that a rock
wall was not a "fence" within the meaning of those terms as used in the
easement deeds.50
43. 528 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
44. 530 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
45. Id. at 632.
46. The result in this case must be contrasted with those cases involving easements which
merely permit the construction of some facility or laying of a line. In such cases, after the facility
or line has been located, what was general and indefinite becomes fixed and certain and thereafter
cannot be changed by the grantee. See, e.g., Houston Pipeline Co. v. Dwyer, 374 S.W.2d 662,666
(Tex. 1964). The opinion of the court in Ashby clearly indicates a finding that the easement
originally granted was sufficient in scope to encompass the new metal towers and the additional
wires. Unfortunately, however, the court states that a servitude originally granted may be
somehow enlarged, citing Knox v. Pioneer Natural Gas Co., 321 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI
Paso 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The Knox case holds only that where an easement grants rights in
excess of those actually used, such greater rights exist notwithstanding the exercise of a lesser
privilege. Ashby should not be regarded as authority for the rather novel proposition that an
easement may be enlarged merely to satisfy the grantee. Additionally, another case involving the
Lower Colorado River Authority makes it clear that no interest in property or other rights pass by
implication as incidental to the grant of an express easement, except that the grantee of an
easement will be permitted to do what is reasonably necessary for the fair enjoyment of the
easement itself. Wall v. Lower Colorado River Authority, 536 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin, 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Compare the corresponding rule with respect to implied
easements stated in the text accompanying note 40 supra. See also Gheen v. Diamond Shamrock
Corp., 529 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ), where the court upheld an express
easement providing for ingress and egress. The court also held that a payment to extend an
easement which was mailed one day too late was nevertheless sufficient to keep the easement in
force and effect.
47. 539 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
48. Id. at 210.
49. Id. The court cited Fox v. Thoreson, 398 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. 1966), and Lilac Variety, Inc.
v. Dallas Texas Co., 383 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
50. 539 S.W.2d at 210-11.
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C. Effect of Conveyances
1. Construction of Deeds.
A conditional limitation exists when the duration of an estate is limited by
the happening of an event which, when it occurs, terminates the estate
without the necessity of reentry by the grantor.5' On the other hand, a
condition subsequent gives the grantor the right to terminate the estate by
reentry. 52 In Field v. Shaw" the court held that the following language in a
deed created a condition subsequent and not a conditional limitation:
the land . . . is expressly restricted in use to that of the operation of a
Cotton Gin and that no other business shall ever be operated thereon and
in the event this restriction is violated, the land herein conveyed shall
revert to the grantor herein.54
The court noted that the usual language for creating a limitation are the terms
"so long as," "until" and "during." Terms such as "if," "but if," "on
condition that," and "provided however" constitute the classic language for
the creation of a condition subsequent. 55 Moreover, language in a deed is
generally construed against the grantor, 56 and in cases of doubt, a construc-
tion giving rise to a condition subsequent will be favored as less burdensome
upon the grantee than a conditional limitation. 57 Since affirmative assertion of
reentry was found to be necessary for a condition subsequent to exist, the
court examined the actions of the grantor and found that the right of reentry
was now barred by the three year statute of limitations involving suits to
recover title and possession of real property. 58
2. Execution and Delivery of Deeds.
It is a rather common practice in this state for a certificate of a corporate
resolution to be presented to the title company in order to verify the corporate
agent's authority to execute closing papers on behalf of a corporation. One
case decided during the survey period hints at some of the potential ramifica-
tions which could flow from an abuse of this practice. In Nobles v. Marcus59
51. The estate is known as a fee simple determinable. That is, a fee simple created to
continue until the happening of a stated event. The grantor retains an interest known as a
possibility of reverter. See generally W. BURBY, supra note 34, § 91.
52. The grantee's interest is referred to as a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent.
The grantor has a right of reentry which must be exercised within a reasonable time. Zambrano v.
Olivas, 490 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Limitations may bar an
action to enforce a right of reentry. City of Dallas v. Etheridge, 152 Tex. 9,253 S.W.2d 640 (1952).
53. 535 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ).
54. Id. at 4.
55. Id. at 5-6; see Lawyers Trust Co. v. City of Houston, 359 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. 1962).
56. Couch v. Southern Methodist Univ., 10 S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, jdgmt
adopted).
57. Lawyers Trust Co. v. City of Houston, 359 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. 1962).
58. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5507 (Vernon 1958). For other cases involving the
construction of language in deeds see Boyd v. Welch, 539 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (when deed is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show intent);
Wylie v. Reed, 538 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ granted) (mineral reservation
does not reserve coal and lignite which must be removed by open pit or strip-mining); DuBois v.
Jacobs, 533 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ) (mineral reservation not
ambiguous); Pearson-Sibert Oil Co. v. Burney, 531 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976,
no writ) (when deed required grantors to maintain cattle guards at most commonly used entrances
to property, grantee could not recover costs of rounding up stock which came through open gate
not commonly used as an entrance).
59. 533 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. 1976).
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the plaintiffs, judgment creditors of the corporation, brought suit to set aside
a deed from the corporation to a third party which had been executed and
delivered prior to the date of the plaintiffs' judgment. The plaintiffs argued
that the deed was void as a matter of law because the individual executing the
deed as vice-president on behalf of the corporation had not been elected to
that position by the board of directors. Further, the corporate resolution
delivered at the closing was executed by an employee of the corporation who
was not an assistant secretary of the corporation as recited in the certificate.
The court held that the signing of the deed did not amount to a forgery, but
rather constituted at most a fraud upon the corporation, of which the
plaintiffs had no standing to complain. 6° Another case concerning the execu-
tion of a deed by a corporate agent is Sheldon v. Farinacci.
61
In Neel v. Fuller62 suit was brought to cancel a mineral deed given by the
trustee of the owners while the property was in a receivership. The court of
civil appeals held that the sale by the property owner during a receivership did
not interfere with the receivership, but was subject to it. The Texas Supreme
Court reversed, however, holding that the deed was void because the interest
conveyed was in custodia legis.
There were several cases during the survey period involving the question of
what constitutes delivery of a deed. 63 For example, in Hart v. Rogers64 the
court held that in order to accomplish delivery it is not necessary that the deed
be manually transmitted to the grantee, nor even placed out of the grantor's
physical possession. The key factor is that the grantor relinquishes dominion
and control over the deed. Further, the court held that evidence of general
reputation of ownership may not be used as proof of ownership. On the issue
of the grantor's intent to deliver a deed, the court in Bennett v. Mings
65
sustained the jury's finding that the ninety-one-year-old grantor did not
intend the deed to her nephew to become operative as the conveyance of her
property.
60. The court also distinguished an action for fraudulent conveyance from an action for
fraud. The plaintiffs did not plead a fraudulent conveyance, and since they had no standing to
complain of any fraud committed against the corporation, relief was denied. Id. at 926-27.
61. 535 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ). In this case the deed had
been executed by an individual on behalf of a corporation, and the acknowledgment was
complete and correct except that the name of the individual was left blank. The court construed
the acknowledgment in light of the instrument itself and held that the acknowledgment was not
defective. See Williams v. Cruse, 130 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1939, writ ref'd).
62. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 120 (Dec. 25, 1976), rev'g Fuller v. Neel, 535 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1976). The supreme court relied on the doctrine of custodia legis recently
enunciated in First Southern Properties, Inc. v. Vallone, 533 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1976), which is
discussed in notes 239-42 infra and accompanying text. On the procedure for appointing a
receiver see generally Continental Homes Co. v. Hilltown Property Owners Ass'n, Inc., 529
S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ). See also Best Investment Co. v.
Whirley, 536 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
63. In addition to the cases discussed in the text see Bell v. Smith, 532 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ), in which the court held that when the evidence shows that the
grantee has possession of a duly executed deed, a presumption arises that the deed was delivered
and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a deed is presumed to have been delivered at the
time of its execution and not on the date of the acknowledgment. For other issues in this case see
notes 69-76 infra and accompanying text. See also Jones v. Young, 539 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); DeGrassi v. DeGrassi, 533 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed further in note 68 infra.
64. 527 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
65. 535 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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In Fuqua v. Fuqua66 the heirs of the grantor brought suit to set aside a deed
which had been executed by the grantor and placed in escrow six days before
his death. Subsequently, the purchaser under the contract complied with the
terms of the escrow and obtained delivery of the deed from the escrow agent.
The court refused to set aside the deed, holding that the grantor's death did
not invalidate the deed, and upon performance of the conditions of the escrow
agreement, the grantee became entitled to delivery of the deed. 67 The grant-
ee's title, the court said, related back to the date of the original deposit of the
instrument in escrow.
D. Fraud; Duress; Undue Influence and Equitable Remedies68
Bell v. Smith69 presents an interesting illustration of the doctrine of
resulting trusts as well as the rules associated with the rights of parties in
possession. Lonnie Smith was the son of Gene Smith and the former Lucille
Smith, now Lucille Bell, the plaintiff. After Gene and Lucille were divorced,
Gene married Christine Smith, the defendant. When Christine and Gene
purchased their home, Gene had the title placed in the name of Lonnie Smith,
his son by the prior marriage. This home was purchased with community
funds. In October 1973 Lonnie died intestate, with his father and mother
(plaintiff Lucille Bell) as his only heirs. Shortly thereafter, Gene and Chris-
tine Smith were divorced. In the divorce proceeding Gene was ordered to
execute a quitclaim deed in favor of Christine conveying his interest in the
home.
Lucille Bell then filed suit, claiming a one-half interest in the property
through intestate succession from her son, Lonnie. The court, however,
rejected this claim, and held that Christine Smith was the owner of the entire
fee simple, 70 reasoning that under the doctrine of resulting trusts7' Lonnie
merely held title to the property in trust for the benefit of the community
66. 528 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
67. When there is nothing left for the grantor to do under an executory land contract other
than convey title upon tender of the full purchase price, and the grantor dies before conveying
legal title, his personal representative can be compelled to perform the contract and convey title.
See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 27 (Vernon 1956). See generally 52 TEX. JUR. 2d Specific
Performance §§ 14, 163 (1964).
68. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, there were several decisions concerning the
topics covered in this section of the Article. Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. 1976),
distinguishes an action for fraudulent conveyance from an action for fraud. See notes 59, 60
supra and accompanying text. With regard to undue influence, the court in Stieler v. Stieler, 537
S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), held that the mere opportunity to
exercise undue influence will not support a jury finding of undue influence. In DeGrassi v.
DeGrassi, 533 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), a jury finding of no
undue influence was upheld. The court found that the burden of proof had been properly placed
on the wife of the grantor-husband where the wife also joined in the deed. Moreover, the court
stated that a presumption of unfairness is not present in a husband-wife relationship where the
wife has independent legal advice from an attorney. See also Bradshaw v. Naumann, 528 S.W.2d
869 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ).
69. 532 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
70. Id. at 685.
71. A resulting trust may arise when a party purchases land but takes title in the name of
another. A trust results in favor of the party whose money was used to make the purchase. When
community funds are used, a trust results in favor of the community. First State Bank v.
Thurman, 12 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, jdgmt adopted). Resulting trusts may also
arise in other circumstances. See generally G. BOGERT, TRUSTS §§ 71-76 (1963); 89 C.J.S. Trusts §
98-138 (1955); 57 TEX. JUR. 2d Trusts §§ 40-53 (1964). See also Comment, Parol Evidence to Prove
Resulting Trusts, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 165 (1975).
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estate. Thus, prior to the divorce Christine and Gene Smith each owned an
undivided one-half interest in the home, 7 2 and Lucille Bell acquired no
interest through intestate succession. The court held that Christine acquired
the other one-half interest in the property by quitclaim deed from Gene in the
divorce proceedings.
Another issue in the case concerned the fact that after Gene had executed
the quitclaim deed to Christine, he then gave a warranty deed for the same
property to Lucille Bell.7 3 The warranty deed was recorded prior to the
recording of the quitclaim deed, but at a time when Christine Smith was
occupying the property. Lucille contended that her deed, being recorded
before the quitclaim deed, cut off all rights of Christine Smith. The court
stated that it is not necessary that a deed be recorded in order to be effective
as a conveyance of title,74 and reasoned that the notice of title given by
possession is equivalent to the constructive notice afforded by the registra-
tion statutes. 75 Therefore, since Lucille Bell's deed was obtained while
Christine Smith was in possession of the property, Lucille was charged with
notice of all the rights and title of the possessor to such property.76
In contrast to the above, all unrecorded conveyances are void as to
creditors and subsequent purchasers for value without notice. 77 In a some-
what confusing opinion the Amarillo court of civil appeals in North East
Independent School District v. Aldridge71 held that a judgment creditor's lien
was superior to the interest of a holder of equitable title to a tract of land
which was inadvertently omitted from a prior unrecorded deed. 79
E. Title Insurance
One of the most interesting cases decided during the survey period is Stone
v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp.8" The purchaser of a tract of land sued the
title insurer, the title insurance agency, its president, and the real estate agent,
72. In the Smith divorce the court ordered Gene to convey his interest in the house to
Christine. If community property is not partitioned or disposed of pursuant to a divorce, the
former spouses will become tenants in common, and thereafter neither spouse can sell or
-nortgage more than an undivided one-half interest. See Starkey v. Holoye, 536 S.W.2d 438 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
73. A further issue concerned the delivery of the quitclaim deed. See note 63 supra.
74. 532 S.W.2d at 685. See Lichtenstein v. F & M Nat'l Bank, 372 S.W.2d 716,718 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1963, no writ). But see North East Ind. School Dist. v. Aldridge, 528 S.W.2d 341(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in notes 78-79 infra and accom-
panying text.
75. See Mainwarring v. Templeman, 51 Tex. 205 (1879).
76. 532 S.W.2d at 686. See Triangle Supply Co. v. Fletcher, 408 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
77. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6627 (Vernon 1969).
78. 528 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
79. The court relied on Henderson v. Odessa Bldg. & Fin. Co., 24 S.W.2d 393 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1930, jdgmt adopted). However, the court embarked on a confusing discussion of
the rights of equitable title holders vis-A-vis lien creditors based on Roeser & Pendleton, Inc. v.
Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 138 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1940, writ ref'd), which
held that a grantee under a deed which left out the grantee's name possessed an equitable title
superior to the lien of a judgment creditor of the grantor. Note, however, that an equitable lien,
including an equitable purchase money lien, may be cut off by a bona fide purchaser without
notice (including a creditor). See Manz v. Johnson, 531 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1976, no writ).
80. 537 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ granted). Writ was granted on




but not the grantor, to recover damages arising from certain gas pipeline
easements which, although listed as exceptions in the title report prepared for
the title insurance agency, were not listed as exceptions in the owner's policy
of title insurance issued by Lawyers Title. 8' Subsequent to the purchase of the
tract, the purchaser secured a commitment from the Federal Housing Ad-
ministration to insure a loan upon the completion of a 147 space mobile home
park. Upon discovery of the pipelines, certain FHA regulations regarding the
location of residential structures relative to pipelines forced a redesign of the
park. The new plan contained only 129 spaces, which reduced the amount of
financing available under the FHA commitment.
The court noted that title insurance is a contract of indemnity, and as such,
the insured party is entitled to recover only a portion of the whole liability of
the insurance company based on the ratio which the adverse claim bears to the
whole estate.82 For example, if the amount of the policy equals the value of
title insured, the loss recoverable is simply the value of the outstanding
interest. Accordingly, the court held that under the provisions of the owner's
policy of title insurance, testimony concerning reduction of the value of the
original FHA commitment, loss of income from the redesigned mobile home
park and the cost of the redesign work was properly excluded by the trial
court as immaterial. Moreover, expert testimony concerning the diminished
value of the tract based upon projected rental income, management fees and
expenses was found to be too speculative. A $2,879.00 judgment against the
title insurer, based on the value of the outstanding interest, was therefore
affirmed.
The purchaser also claimed that the failure by the agency and its president
to inform the purchaser of the contents of the title report was both negligent
and fraudulent. The court held that a title insurance company is not a title
abstractor and owes no duty with regard to the examination of title.83 Thus,
any recovery for negligence84 was precluded by the nature of the parties'
relationship. With regard to the claim of fraud, the court held that the
purchaser's pleadings failed to state a cause of action. There were no
allegations showing a duty to disclose the contents of the report or showing
that the agency's president made false representations concerning the ease-
ments with the intent that the purchaser rely upon them to his detriment.
81. The tract was conveyed by general warranty deed with no exceptions or reservations
with respect to the easements.
82. 537 S.W.2d at 60. See Southern Title Guar. Co. v. Prendergast, 494 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.
1973). The court also denied a recovery of attorneys' fees stating that it was incumbent on the
claimant to allege and prove the reasonable value of the legal services rendered in enforcing the
terms of the title policy against the insurer. 537 S.W.2d at 63-64.
83. 537 S.W.2d at 65. In this connection the court noted that the purchaser, under the
contract of sale, could have elected to order an abstract of title for examination by his own
counsel, or he could have, as he did, elected to rely upon title insurance. While this statement is
hardly surprising, the court added that "the title opinion which was written by the Agency's
attorney to the Agency was personal to the Agency and was prepared for its exclusive use and
benefit. It did not inure to the benefit of [the purchaser], a complete stranger to that transaction."
Id. at 73. While not mentioned by the court, many, if not most, title reports contain a printed
disclaimer to the effect that the report is intended for in-house use only, and any outside reliance
shall be without liability on the part of the title company. This aspect of the case should be of
interest to those lawyers who are accustomed to contracts of sale which require that the seller
provide a title report to the purchaser for his review and approval prior to the closing.
84. Id. at 65.
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Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court that the pur-
chaser take nothing from the title insurance agency or its president. Curious-
ly, the court in Stone indicated by way of dicta that there was nothing in the
record which would have legally excused the purchaser's refusal to close the
transaction. This statement is presumably subject to provisions in a contract
of sale which require the seller to furnish a title report prior to the closing and
which specify the encumbrances, exceptions and reservations which will be
acceptable to the purchaser."
In Clements v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co.86 the plaintiff purchased two
tracts of land which were separated from a public road by a third tract. The
sellers of one of the tracts represented that an easement existed across the
third tract, and the deed purported to convey such an easement. After the
closing, the plaintiffs discovered that no such easement existed.
The owner's title insurance policy provided in part that it guaranteed a
'good and indefeasible title to the estate or interest in the land described or
referred to in this policy."187 The land was described therein as follows:
FIRST TRACT: 1.395 acres of land, more or less, out of the JOSEPH D.
RICE Survey NO. 10, in Hays County, Texas, and being the same
property conveyed by deed dated July 1, 1971 from J.A. Caballero and
wife, Rose B. Caballero, to Manning C. Clements and wife, Winn M.
Clements, said deed having been filed for record in the office of the
County Clerk of Hays County, Texas, on July 23, 1971, under Clerk's file
No. 72736.88
The policy further specified the exceptions from coverage and did not
mention the purported easement which was described in the Caballero deed.
The trial court entered judgment for $2,000.00 against the sellers, but
provided that the plaintiffs take nothing from the title insurance company. On
appeal the title insurer argued that the easement was not described as part of
the insured estate and that the insurer had no contractual liability with respect
to title to the easement. The court of civil appeals reversed, holding that since
the description in the title policy referred to the Caballero deed which
purported to convey the easement, and since the policy contained no excep-
tion with respect to the easement, the title insurance policy therefore insured
against any loss suffered because of the failure of the easement purportedly
conveyed by the sellers. The court noted that as a contract of indemnity, an
owner's policy of title insurance provided coverage against all losses of title,
and, except for certain designated risks, included loss from any cause not
expressly excepted. 9
At the annual meeting of the State Board of Insurance in November 1976,
several new procedural and rate rule changes concerning title insurance were
adopted. Most of the changes were of a technical nature and are discussed in
85. With respect to the real estate agent, the court remanded the case for a jury determina-
tion on the issues as to whether he recklessly represented to the purchaser that no pipeline
easements existed and whether such representation, if made, was made with the intent that the
purchaser rely thereon. Id. at 74-75.
86. 537 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
87. Id. at 127-28.
88. Id. at 128.
89. Id. See San Jacinto Title Guar. Co. v. Lemmon, 417 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the footnotes (for the full text of all changes, consult the Basic Manual of
Rules, Rates and Forms for the Writing of Title Insurance in the State of
Texas).9° Most notably, the Board announced an overall rate increase of ten
percent for the 1976 Schedule of Base Premium Rates. The Board also
considered, but did not adopt, a change which would have prohibited the
deletion of the standard printed exception as to area and boundaries from all
future policies of title insurance issued in the State of Texas.9 1
F. Miscellaneous Title Cases
1. Covenants Running with the Land.
Several interesting questions were presented in Clear Lake Apartments,
Inc. v. Clear Lake Utilities Co.,92 a case which concerned covenants running
with the land in the context of exclusive contract rights to furnish water and
sewer services. A contract between the utility company (Utilities) and the
predecessor in title of Clear Lake Apartments (Apartments) granted Utilities
"the exclusive right to furnish water and sewer service" to a certain tract of
land 'and the apartment project thereon. When Apartments purchased the
project, however, it informed Utilities that the contract was being terminated.
Utilities then brought suit for declaratory judgment, contending that its
contract rights constituted a covenant running with the land and thereby
bound Apartments to perform pursuant to the contract. The court rejected
this contention, finding the necessary privity of estate to be lacking. 93 Utilities
also argued that the contract should be enforced in equity because it was on
record at the time of the conveyance to Apartments. The purchaser, it was
argued, therefore had at least constructive notice of the provisions of the
contract. The court held that while a purchaser is on notice of all recorded
instruments within his chain of title, he is only bound by those instruments
90. The Basic Manual contains all procedural and rate rules, as well as the official forms
promulgated by the State Board of Insurance and the Texas Title Insurance Act, TEX. INS. CODE
ANN. arts. 9.05-.56 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77). Highlights of the more pertinent changes include
additional endorsement instructions for the "Down Date Endorsement" and a premium of $50
for each such endorsement issued as provided in Procedural Rule P-9d. Rate Rule R-8 was
amended to extend the periods of renewed credits from six months to one year, to extend the total
period of renewal credits from two years to four years and to allow an additional renewal credit to
cover phase development programs. The "Direct Access Agreement" form was eliminated from
the Basic Manual. Rate Rule 12-1i, concerning mortgagee policy endorsements, was amended.
Procedural Rule P-16 was amended to change the procedure for the issuance of a mortgagee title
policy binder on interim construction loans (interim binder). Now, an interim binder shall be
issued only when it is contemplated in good faith that the issuing company will be asked to issue
its mortgagee policy, issued simultaneously with an owner's policy or at the basic rate, on a
permanent loan covering the identical property. The foreclosure information letter and foreclo-
sure binder, formerly provided for in Rate Rule R-15 and Procedural Rule P-17, was eliminated,
and Rate Rule R-14, which allows a rate credit of $15 when property which has been directly
acquired through foreclosure involving an insured mortgagee policy is being sold and an owner's
policy or a mortgagee's policy on a lien retained in the deed of conveyance is being issued in
connection with the transaction, was amended to delete reference to former Rate Rule R-15.
Finally, the board added language to the endorsement instruction for endorsement of a mortgagee
policy at the time of periodic construction advances. The Basic Manual is available from Hart
Graphics, P.O. Box 968, Austin, Texas 78767. For a recent general discussion of title insurance
see Curtis, Title Assurance in Sales of California Residential Realty: A Critique of Title Insurance
and Title Covenants With Suggested Reforms, 7 PAC. L.J. 1 (1976).
91. See Procedural Rule P-2 which permits the deletion of the areas and boundaries
exception upon an acceptable survey and the payment of a higher premium.
92. 537 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ granted).
93. 1d. at 51.
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which affect his title. In so holding, the court indicated that an equitable
interest cannot be created merely by the recordation of an instrument which
itself provides for no such interest. 94
Another issue in the case concerned the effect of a second contract
between Utilities and the Clear Lake Water Authority providing that Utilities
had the exclusive right to provide water and sewer service within a certain
tract of land. Clear Lake Water Authority had entered into a waste disposal
agreement with the City of Pasadena. On appeal, it was held that the trial
court had lacked jurisdiction to decide this issue because certain indispensible
parties were absent from the case. The disposition of this case by the Texas
Supreme Court should be watched with interest.
2. Slander of Title.
A significant case of great interest and even greater importance is Walker v.
Ruggles95 which involved a suit to remove cloud on title coupled with an
action for slander of title. The Ruggles had refused to sign an earnest money
contract for the sale of their home presented to them by the Walkers, brokers
under a listing agreement with the Ruggles, because the contract did not
contain a description of a certain encroachment by the Ruggles' property onto
an adjacent tract. The Walkers filed the unexecuted earnest money contract
in the Harris County deed records, and later sent a letter to all real estate
agents and title companies active in the area, including the agency then listing
the Ruggles' home, inferring that the Walkers had a "standing judgment"
against the Ruggles and their home.
The court held that in order for a party to recover in Texas on an action for
slander of title, he must allege and prove that false, disparaging words were
uttered against him and published with malice, that he sustained special
damages, and that he possessed an interest in the property disparaged.
96
Deliberate and false claims by the Walkers of a standing judgment, made
without reasonable cause, were sufficient evidence of malice to sustain an
award of actual damages. 97 Moreover, the court found the mailing of the
letters to be as follows:
a blatant attempt. . . to interfere with [Ruggles'] economic relations, as
well as with [Ruggles'] existing contractual relations. The letter could not
have served to protect any legitimate interest of [the Walkers] in a
commission, because they had none. The purpose was to prevent [the
Ruggles] from selling their house and to force them to pay an unearned
commission. We hold that there was sufficient evidence of ill will, spite,
and reckless disregard for the rights of others to support an award of
punitive damages against [the Walkers]. 98
The issue of the necessity of proving loss of a specific sale as a result of the
disparaging utterance was considered by the court. Several Texas cases have
94. Id. Writ of error was granted on this point. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 3, 4 (Oct. 9, 1976).
95. 540 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ).
96. Id. at 473.
97. Id. at 473-74.
98. Id. at 474.
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held that a plaintiff must plead and prove a lost sale to satisfy the special
damages element in slander of title cases. 99 The court in Walker v. Ruggles,
however, rejected these earlier decisions, finding that the trend in the law is
not to rigidly circumscribe special damages in actions such as slander of
title. 100 Inviting further clarification from the Texas Supreme Court, the court
of civil appeals stated that it did not believe the supreme court would adhere
to the rule requiring a plaintiff to prove loss of a specific pending sale in order
to recover in a slander of title action.' 0 1
Finally, the court set forth the items of damage recoverable as actual
damages in a disparagement action. Financial loss such as loss of sales or
leases, including any decrease in the salable value of property along with
reasonable expenses incurred in maintaining the property during the time its
vendibility is impaired, constitutes the basic measure of damages. 102 Signifi-
cantly, the court also held that the reasonable expenses of litigation necessary
to remove the cloud from the title to the property are recoverable. 1
03
The decision of the court is sound in its recognition of the difficulty of
proving the loss of an actual sale. Moreover, the potential for recovery of
attorneys' fees and other litigation expenses which this decision makes
available should provide an incentive for the execution of releases with
respect to recorded instruments possessing no validity, but which, absent a
release, constitute a cloud on title.
3. Mistaken Improver.
Traditionally, one who in good faith entered upon land and built on it had no
affirmative remedy if his title later proved defective. 1' 4 He could not sue
either at law or in equity to recover the value of his improvements from the
true owner. 05 Recently, however, the trend has been to permit relief not only
where elements of estoppel are present, 106 but also where the true owner has
no knowledge of the activity. 7 Additionally, many states have adopted so
called "betterments statutes" which allow recovery to mistaken im-
provers.' 8 Many of these statutes, 109 including those in Texas, 10 require the
mistaken improver to claim the property under color of title.", In Texas,
however, the right to recover the value of improvements made in good faith is
99. Shell Oil Co. v. Howth, 159 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. 1942); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Luckel,
171 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.); Houston Chronicle
Publishing Co. v. Martin, 5 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1928, writ dism'd).
100. 540 S.W.2d at 474.
101. Id. For authority, the court relied on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 633, 624(1965).
102. 540 S.W.2d at 476.
103. Id.
104. See generally 30 TEX. JUR. 2d Improvements-Private § 2 (1962).
105. See Casad, The Mistaken Improver-A Comparative Study, 19 HAST. L.J. 1039 (1968).
106. See, e.g., Toalson v. Madison, 307 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. App. 1957).
107. See, e.g., Beacon Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 266 N.C. 467, 146 S.E.2d 434 (1966); D. DOBBS,
REMEDIES § 5.8, at 368-69 (1973).
108. See D. DOBBS, supra note 107, § 5.8, at 369.
109. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5303.8 (Page 1970); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1330 (1955);
WYO. STAT. § 1-964 (1959).
110. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 7393-7401 (Vernon 1960).
111. See Producers Lumber & Supply Co. v. Olney Bldg. Co., 333 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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not limited to persons suing in trespass to try title under the statutes as
recovery may also be had under principles of equity. 12
In Whelan v. KillingsworthII3 the court recognized that the general rule in
Texas permits one who improves real estate under an erroneous but good
faith belief that he owns the land to recover the cost of the improvements to
the extent that such improvements have enhanced the value of the land. The
court held, however, that when the entry and improvements are made during
the pendency of litigation involving the validity of the improver's claim of
title, such improvements are made at the peril of the improver, and no
recovery will be allowed. The court also held that improvements made after a
favorable trial court judgment but before the time for appeal has expired will
be considered as made during the pendency of litigation and therefore not
made in good faith.
II. PURCHASES AND OTHER TRANSACTIONS
A. Contract Validity and Interpretation
A number of cases which involve the enforceability and construction of
contracts of sale are discussed in this article under the topic of Seller's and
Purchaser's Remedies. I4 The few remaining cases dealing with this topic are
discussed in this section.
In Harris v. Potts "5 the court was asked to enforce an oral agreement to sell
an undivided interest in real property. The Texas Statute of Frauds,'" 6 of
course, requires that a contract to sell real property be in writing in order to be
enforceable. The statute is not without exceptions, however. If certain
conditions have been met, the courts have been willing to enforce an oral
contract. These conditions, as stated in Hooks v. Bridgewater,"7 are: (1) the
consideration must have been paid; (2) the seller must have surrendered
possession to the purchaser; and (3) the purchaser must have made valuable
and permanent improvements upon the land. The purchaser in Harris tes-
tified that he had paid the consideration, helped make some minor improve-
ments on the land, and had signed and helped repay a promissory note which
financed other improvements. The court of civil appeals held that even if the
purchaser had satisfied two of these conditions, he had failed to show he had
taken possession of the land. Apparently, the purchaser and seller were
developing the property to be sold for residential lots and the purchaser
argued that under the circumstances he had done all he could to take
possession. The court, on the authority of Bridgewater, disagreed and found
the contract within the Statute of Frauds. The Texas Supreme Court has
granted writ of error.
112. See, e.g., Gause v. Gause, 430 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1968, no writ).
113. 537 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ). Another remedy allows the
removal of any improvements which can be removed without damage to the land. See Leggio v.
Bradley Land & Dev. Co., 398 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1965, no writ); Merryman,
Improving the Lot of the Trespassing Improver, II STAN. L. REV. 456, 483 (1959).
114. See discussion beginning with text accompanying note 123 infra.
115. 528 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975), aff'd, 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 95 (Dec. 8,
1976).
116. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1968).
117. 111 Tex. 122, 229 S.W. 1114 (1921).
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If a contract of sale simply makes reference to a recorded deed for a
description of the property "for full description and all purposes" and
provides that the seller will convey the property by general warranty deed
"free and clear of all encumbrances except those named herein," must the
purchaser accept title burdened with any encumbrances listed or referred to
in that deed? The court of civil appeals thought not in Fajkus v. Bland."8 The
court seems to have been primarily concerned with the sufficiency of the
notice given to the purchaser finding that a mere reference for "all purposes"
to a recorded deed was not sufficient to alert him to encumbrances listed in
the deed. On the other hand, a statement in the contract that the conveyance
would be subject to all encumbrances listed in the recorded deed probably
would have been sufficient notice. 119 The court concluded as follows: "The
simple rule, which we are laying down in a contract of sale case, is that a seller
must set forth any mineral or other interest which is outstanding, or at least let
the description show specifically that the conveyance will be subject to an
exception or reservation."' 20 A purchaser would be wise not to rely too
heavily on the court's decision, especially if the contract incorporates a
recorded instrument by reference, or, as is often the case, the contract states
that the conveyance will be subject to all easements, reservations, and other
encumbrances of record.
In Wirtz v. Orr'2' the court of civil appeals reversed and remanded a
judgment that the parties were entitled to certain adjustments on the ex-
change of properties. Two of the special issues submitted asked whether the
jury found from the evidence that certain obligations arose "under the
contract between the parties." These issues were held to have asked the jury
to construe the meaning of the contract, which was a question of law for the
court.
B. Seller's and Purchaser's Remedies Under Contracts of Sale
The various remedies available to a party to a contract of sale of real
property upon the default of the other party include the following: (1)
avoidance or annulment of the contract through rescission by mutual agree-
ment; (2) the right to treat the default as an offer of rescission; (3) quiet title,
ejectment and similar actions to terminate the contract and any obligation for
future performance; (4) specific performance or an action for damages; and
118. 535 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
119. The court stated: "Where, as here, reference is made to deeds or other instruments only
generally, we decline to require the purchaser to be charged with notice of the reservations
contained in those instruments, unless the earnest money contract itself speaks of them." Id. at
400.
120. Id. The court refused to extend to a contract of sale the rule that references made in
deeds to other instruments put the grantee on notice of title exceptions disclosed in those
instruments, as set forth in Harris v. Windsor, 156 Tex. 324, 294 S.W.2d 798 (1956), and Remuda
Oil Co. v. Wilson, 264 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The
court's holding is one of fairness, but the reason for not extending the deed cases is wrong-the
court said that to extend the Harris rule to a contract would require a title search prior to
execution. Of course, so would a provision, which the court apparently would approve, that the
conveyance would be subject to encumbrances listed in the recorded instruments. The court
further stated that the purchaser could not have determined the extent of the minerals reserved by
an examination of the recorded deeds, one of which deeds merely stated that the conveyance was
subject to all recorded encumbrances.
121. 533 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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(5) forfeiture and liquidated damages.' The availability of a number of these
remedies has been the subject of several decisions pertinent to this Survey.
1. Rescission and Specific Performance.
A suit brought by the sellers for rescission of a contract ended in an award
of specific performance for the purchasers in Grundmeyer v. McFadin. 123 The
sellers apparently were advised by their attorney that the contract provided
for payment of the purchase price within sixty to ninety days. When they later
learned this statement was incorrect, the sellers sought to have the contract
rescinded on the basis that they were misled into entering into the contract.
The court of civil appeals, however, held that since the jury had found that the
market value of the property was the same as the contract price, the sellers
had failed to show they had sustained any injury or damage.' 24 The sellers
argued that the purchasers were not entitled to specific performance because
the purchasers were guilty of tortious interference with a pre-existing con-
tract and did not, therefore, have "clean hands." The court rejected this
argument and granted specific performance on the basis that the pre-existing
contract was unenforceable, 125 the sellers could not show any damages from
the interference, 26 and because the sellers were not parties to the prior
contract. 127
122. 8A G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY §§ 4464,4475 (repl. 1963); 59TEx. JUR. 2d Vendorand
Purchaser §§ 462-481 (1964).
123. 537 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
124. The court relied upon the following pronouncement in Bryant v. Vaughn, 33 S.W.2d 729,
730 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930, opinion adopted):
The rule in this state is settled that the equitable remedy of cancellation is not
available because of fraudulent representation made to induce the execution of a
contract unless it be shown in connection therewith that some injury or damage
has resulted to the party claiming to be aggrieved. The rule announced in the
above case [Russell v. Industrial Transp. Co., 113 Tex. 441,251 S.W. 1034 (1923)]
bars defendants in error's right to rescission of the trade in view of the jury's
finding that the value of the property received by them was equal to that with
which they parted possession.
125. This issue had been litigated and resulted in a judgment in the sellers' favor in Walzem
Dev. Co. v. Gerfers, 487 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
126. The sale price in the prior contract was for $1,700 an acre, while the second contract was
for $2,500 an acre.
127. A cause of action for wrongful interference with a contract requires, among other
elements, actual damage to the complaining party. Tippett v. Hart, 497 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 501 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. 1973). Inducing a party to
breach'a contract to the damage of another party to the contract is an actionable wrong. Brown
Hardware Co. v. Indiana Stoveworks, 96 Tex. 453, 73 S.W. 800 (1903); Raymond v. Yarrington,
96 Tex. 443, 73 S.W. 800 (1903). A party who accuses another party of having "unclean hands"
must show he has been injured by that party's conduct. Omohundro v. Matthews, 161 Tex. 367,
341 S.W.2d 401 (1960).
The sellers in Grundmeyer also challenged the purchaser's right to specific performance on the
ground that, because the contract incorrectly named a party to the contract as guardian for
another party, the purchases were seeking to bind the judicial process. The court held that even if
this allegation were true, it was not a defense to specific performance because the purchasers "do
not require any aid from the illegal act to maintain their action." 537 S.W.2d at 771, citing
Morrison v. City of Fort Worth, 138 Tex. 10, 155 S.W.2d 908 (1941), and other Texas cases. The
court coupled this rule with the rule that where a contract is void or illegal in part, a cause of action
may be maintained under the valid part, citing Hazzard v. Morrison, 104 Tex. 589, 143 S.W. 142
(1912).
The sellers further attacked the conduct of the attorney who represented them in the contract
negotiations, because of his representations concerning the contract and his relationship with the
purchasers. The court found there to be some evidence to indicate the attorney was an agent for
the purchasers, but refused to find any conflict of interest. 537 S.W.2d at 769, 772.
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N.R.C., Inc. v. Huckabee'28 represents an unsuccessful effort on the part
of a purchaser of a Lake Travis subdivision lot to rescind his contract for deed
on the basis of fraud and a violation of the Interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act.' 29 The jury had found that representations made by the
salesman as to the suitability for a particular type of housing were false. The
court of civil appeals, however, viewed these representations as promises of
future action which lacked the requisite present intention not to perform. 130
The allegation of a violation of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act
was premised upon a statement in the property report that no "special
foundation work" would be required to build a house on the lot. The court
held that special foundation work referred to "some unusual soil condition
not apparent to the viewer . . . rather than merely to a hillside lot.' 131 A
judgment for rescission entered by the trial court was therefore reversed and
rendered.
In McDaniel v. Pettigrew13 1 the purchasers sought cancellation and rescis-
sion of a contract to purchase residential lots, as well as cancellation of the
notes, deeds of trust, and lien agreement executed in connection with the
contract. Cancellation was sought under the Home Solicitation Act. 133 One of
the purchasers further alleged misrepresentation and failure to perform the
contract on the part of the seller. The trial court entered a summary judgment
denying the purchasers any relief. The court of civil appeals held that, since
the transaction was for the sale of realty and conducted by a licensed real
estate broker it was expressly excluded from coverage under the Act. 34 It was
further held that summary judgment was properly rendered on the issue of
misrepresentation because the evidence failed to establish a genuine issue of
fact as to the essential element of lack of intent on the part of the sellers to
perform any promise that might have been made by them at the time of the
128. 539 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ).
129. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720(1970). For a comprehensive discussion of rescission based upon
fraud see 8A G. THOMPSON, supra note 122, §§ 4468-4469, 4472-4473. See also 59 TEX. JUR. 2d
Vendor and Purchaser § 531 (1964).
130. Stanfield v. O'Boyle, 462 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1971); Chicago, T. & M.C. Ry. v. Tittering-
ton, 84 Tex. 218, 19 S.W. 472 (1892). Is a false representation that a lot is suitable for a modular
residence a promise of future action? This is the representation the jury found to be false, but the
court refers to the representation as being "that appellants could, and would, build a granada
model house on the desired location." 539 S.W.2d at 377. See McDaniel v. Pettigrew, 536 S.W.2d
611 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in notes 132-36 infra and
accompanying text, for another unsuccessful allegation of the seller's misrepresentation.
131. 539 S.W.2d at 378. The court's opinion does not indicate what sort of foundation work
would have been required on the lot.
132. 536 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
133. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-13.01 to .06 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
134. Id. art. 5069-13.01(5)(B) excludes from the definition of "home solicitation transaction"
any sale of realty where "the purchaser is represented by a licensed attorney or in which the
transaction is being negotiated by a licensed real estate broker or in which the transaction is being
negotiated by the person who owns the realty not at the residence of the consumer." The court
noted that in order to bring the transaction within the exclusion the attorney must be representing
the purchaser, but the broker need not be representing the purchaser. 536 S.W.2d at 615. The
purchasers argued that the contracts were not for the sale of realty, within the meaning of the
statutory exception, but were agreements for services, i.e., the construction of a house on the
lots. The court disagreed with this argument, however, but in any event the court concluded that
this was not a "solicitation" by the seller within the meaning of the act, because the purchaser
had sought out the broker who negotiated the transaction. Id. at 615-16.
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execution of the instruments in question.' 35 In response to the purchaser's
argument that the seller breached the contract by failing to build the house in a
good and workmanlike manner, the appellate court noted that while the
appellants did not seek damages or correctly plead breach of warranty or
failure of performance of the contract at the trial court level, the appellants
did present summary judgment proof which would create an issue of fact if
pleaded. The court held that in such a situation summary judgment would be
improper. 136
The essential terms of a contract of sale must be ascertainable with
reasonable certainty in order to entitle a party to specific performance. 37 Gne
of these essential terms is a sufficient description of the property. Due to the
absence of readily available information, lawyers, or their clients, often must
improvise in describing real property for purposes of a contract of sale. In
several cases decided during the survey period these efforts failed. One such
case is U.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. Dauley, 138 a suit which was filed to enforce
specific performance of a contract to sell 600 acres of land. Only thirty acres
of the 600 acres in question were at issue before the Texas Supreme Court. 39
This thirty acres was in a survey neither mentioned in the contract nor on the
map attached to the contract. 40 By a five to four decision the court held that
the failure to name the survey in which the thirty-acre tract was located was
fatal,' 4' but that even if the survey had been named, the thirty-acre triangular
135. See also N.R.C., Inc. v. Huckabee, 539 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no
writ), discussed in notes 128-31 supra and accompanying text. The alleged misrepresentation in
McDaniel was said to have been the seller's promise not to enforce the renewal note and security
instruments.
136. The appellate court stated the rule that while a contract remains wholly executory, a
partial breach of a material part of the contract is enough to allow rescission, even though
rescission ordinarily will be denied when there is an adequate remedy at law, citing Hausler v.
Harsing-Gill Co., 15 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, jdgmt adopted); the "purchaser" has
the option of requesting rescission or holding the builder to the contract and requesting damages,
citing Greenwall Theatrical Circuit Co. v. Markowitz, 97 Tex. 479, 481, 79 S.W. 1069, 1071
(1904), and Cantu v. Bage, 467 S.W.2d 680, 682 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971, no writ). In
McDaniel, however, the court said that the house had been completed, with a few minor
exceptions, at the time the purchaser refused to accept the house, and, therefore, the contract
was not wholly executory. The builder had performed to the extent that rescission would have
been inequitable. 536 S.W.2d at 617. See generally McNamara, The Implied Warranty in
New-House Construction: Has the Doctrine of Caveat Emptor Been Abolished?, I REAL EST.
L.J. 43 (1972).
137. Bryant v. Clark, 358 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Tex. 1962). Specific performance is an equitable
remedy which is generally available to enforce a contract of sale, unless to do so would be
substantially inequitable or unconscionable. Kress v. Soules, 261 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. 1953);
Bennett v. Copeland, 235 S.W.2d 605, 609 (Tex. 1951). The right to the remedy of specific
performance depends upon certain conditions: "(a) The contract must be reasonably certain,
unambiguous and based upon valuable consideration; (b) it must be fair in all its parts, free from
misinterpretation, misapprehension, fraud, mistake, imposition or surprise; (c) the situation of
the parties must be such that specific performance will not be harsh or oppressive; and (d) the one
seeking the remedy must come into court with clean hands." Nash v. Conatser, 410 S.W.2d 512,
519 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966, no writ). See generally 8A G. THOMPSON, supra note 122, §§
4479-4481; 59 TEx. JUR. 2d Vendor and Purchaser §§ 510-516 (1964).
138. 535 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. 1976).
139. U.S. Enterprises, Inc. sued to specifically enforce the total contract, but while the suit
was pending, the owner sold approximately thirty acres to Dauley. Dauley, after being inter-
pleaded in the suit, moved for summary judgment on the basis that the contract failed to describe
sufficiently his thirty-acre tract.
140. Three other surveys were listed as encompassing all of the 600 acres. A map which is a
part of the contract can supplement an inadequate property description, provided the map
contains sufficient information. 535 S.W.2d at 628; Pritchard v. Burnside, 140 Tex. 212, 167
S.W.2d 159 (1943); Lewis v. East Tex. Fin. Co., 136 Tex. 149, 146 S.W.2d 977 (1941),
141. Although the court cited several examples where descriptions had been upheld without
reference to a survey, it stated that "our cases have stressed the importance of identifying land as
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tract, although bounded on all three sides by identifiable streets and high-
ways, still would not have been sufficiently described. 14  The disturbing
aspect of the court's opinion is that there is a suggestion, at least under the
facts before the court, that the enforceability of the contract with respect to a
portion of the property may be challenged even though the description of the
whole of the tract covered by the contract is sufficient.
Another purchaser's effort to specifically enforce a contract fell short for
lack of a sufficient legal description in Guenther v. Amer-Tex Construction
Co. 143 The contract did not show the length of the boundary lines, the size of
the tract, nor the name of the owner of the tract. Further, it failed to refer to a
recorded deed or other instrument from which the land might be identified,
and did not otherwise sufficiently identify the property. The careful lawyer
should, therefore, collect all available information before attempting to
describe the property. Helpful documentation would include the following:
the deed conveying the property to the seller (but only if all of the same
property is to be conveyed); a deed of trust covering the property;' 44 a
statement that the seller owns the property; the survey or surveys in which the
property is located; reference to a recorded map or plat; street address, city,
county and state; any boundary line references (streets, highways, ease-
ments, waterways, other surveys or property owners, and the like); and
survey plats, maps or sketches. If the sufficiency of the legal description
remains in doubt and litigation ensues, the party seeking to enforce the
contract should consider having the contract reformed to cure the deficiency,
if reformation is available for this purpose. 145
being within a certain league, labor, or survey." 535 S.W.2d at 629. The opinion contains a
text-book discussion of the requisites for a legally sufficient description of property, beginning
with the requirement that the contract "furnish within itself, or by reference to some other
existing writing, the means or data by which the particular land to be conveyed may be identified
with reasonable certainty," as set forth in Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53, 188 S.W,2d 150 (1945).
The court said that there was no question that the parties intended the thirty-acre tract to be
included in the contract, but that "the knowledge and intent of the parties will not give validity to
the contract .... " 535 S.W.2d at 628, citing Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. 1972);
Rowson v. Rowson, 154 Tex. 216, 218, 275 S.W.2d 468, 470 (1955).
142. See generally Annot., Sufficiency, Under Statute of Frauds, of Description orDesigna-
tion of Property in Real-Estate Brokerage Contracts, 30 A.L.R.3d 935 (1970); 58 TEX. JUR. 2d
Vendor and Purchaser §§ 44-47 (1964). See 6A G. THOMPSON, supra note 122, §§ 3020-3086 for a
discussion of deed descriptions and boundaries.
143. 534 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ).
144. In American Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Musick, 531 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. 1975), discussed in
Wallenstein & St. Claire (1976), supra note 2, at 50, the deed referred to 618.7 acres more or less
out of a particular survey "more particularly described by metes and bounds" in a certain
pre-existing deed of trust. The deed of trust covered the 618.7-acre tract and two smaller tracts.
The purchaser's mortgagee argued that the deed, and thus its deed of trust, covered all three
tracts. The court disagreed, and held that although the deed referred to the prior deed of trust for a
more particular description, it was only for the purpose of giving a more particular metes and
bounds description of the 618.7-acre tract, and that the deed did not purport to convey all of the
tracts described in that deed of trust. Id. at 585.
145. The court noted in U.S. Enterprises, Inc. that the plaintiff had not moved to reform the
contract to correct a mutual mistake as to the name of the surveys or other descriptive
deficiencies. 535 S.W.2d at 630. In National Resort Communities, Inc. v. Cain, 526 S.W.2d 510,
513 (Tex. 1975), the Texas Supreme Court said that the two requirements for reformation are: (1)
proof of the true agreement of the parties (a mistake about some aspect of the agreement may
justify rescission, but not reformation), and (2) proof that the provision that was erroneously
included in or omitted from the agreement was a mutual mistake; that is, reformation is to make
the agreement say what the parties wished it to say. See also Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538
(Tex. 1972).
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Schwope v. Kiesling146 involved an appeal from a summary judgment
entered against the purchaser who was seeking specific performance of a
contract for sale of a large parcel of land. The court reversed and remanded,
holding that the purchaser was entitled to specific performance because he
had timely accepted the seller's offer by signing the contract of sale on the
date on which the offer was to expire. The fact that the seller may have owned
only one-half of the minerals was not held to be material to the enforceability
of the contract. 147 The court further held that the purchaser's deletion of two
contingencies, which had been inserted for his benefit, at the time he signed
the contract was not a rejection of the seller's offer. 148
2. Recovery of Escrow Deposit. 49
During the recent real estate boom it has not been at all uncommon for a
purchaser to enter into a contract to acquire property and then to attempt to
sell his contract to another. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with a person
selling property before he obtains legal title. 50 The seller's inability later to
acquire title to property he had contracted to sell, however, was fatal to his
effort to recover his purchaser's escrow deposit in Bradley v. Apel.
15 1
Although the contract stated that closing would occur ninety days after the
date of the contract, the court of civil appeals held that the seller was unable to
show that there was a date certain set for the closing, at which the purchaser
had breached the contract. Concerning the forfeiture of the purchaser's
escrow deposit, the court stated "that in the absence of language plainly
dispensing therewith the vendor must, as a rule, give notice of forfeiture or a
notice of intention to forfeit within a specified time unless in the meantime the
default is made good."1 52 The purchaser successfully stalled Apel beyond the
146. 538 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ).
147. The contract made no mention of the seller's mineral ownership. The seller alleged that
the contract could not be enforced, because he owned only one-half of the minerals and could not
convey all the minerals. The result reached by the court in response to the seller's argument is
correct, but the reasoning of the court is faulty. The court stated that, since it was not established
that the purchaser wanted or expected to receive all of the materials, it was not shown that the
seller was unable to perform. The inability of the seller to convey all of the minerals would not
have excused the seller, even if the purchaser had been unwilling to accept less than all minerals.
The seller, by making no exception in the contract for outstanding minerals, agreed to convey all
of the minerals. Reville v. Poe, 249 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1952, writ dism'd
jdgmt cor.); Sibley v. Pickens, 273 S.W. 897, 898 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1925, no writ); 58
TEX. JUR. 2d Vendor and Purchaser § 141 (1964). The seller in this situation, or in any situation
where the extent of mineral ownership is unknown or uncertain, should have provided in the
contract that he would convey only the minerals he owned, or that the conveyance was subject to
outstanding mineral interests, and that if the title report or abstract reflected that he owned a
lesser mineral estate, the purchaser could either terminate the contract or accept title subject to
the additional encumbrances.
148. The court cited United Concrete Pipe Corp. v. Spin-Line Co., 430 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.
1968), in which the Texas Supreme Court held that an alteration of an instrument which could
only benefit the surety did not discharge the surety from its obligations.
.149. See generally 8A G. THOMPSON, supra note 122, §§ 4476-4477; 59 TEX. JUR. 2d Vendor
and Purchaser §§ 556-601 (1964).
150. A contract of sale is not invalid because the seller does not have title on the date the
contract is signed. However, the seller's inability to convey title would subject him to a suit for
damages; and in Irwin v. Whirley, 538 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ), the
purchaser of a lot under a contract for deed recovered the price of the lot, the value of the
improvements, and punitive damages from a seller who had no title and knew he could not obtain
title.
151. 531 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
152. Id. at 681. The court said that it did not construe the contract to provide for forfeiture of
1977]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
ninety day closing date, and Apel never gave Bradley notice setting a closing
date. On June 13, about two weeks after the ninety day period had expired,
Apel's right to acquire the property from the owner was forfeited because he
failed to close on the specified closing date. 53 Time not being of the essence,5 4
for the closing of the sale to Bradley, and Apel not having given Bradley
notice of a closing date, the court held that Bradley was not in default under
the contract on the date Apel lost his right to acquire title under his contract
with the owner. Thereafter, the court stated that Apel had no title or means of
procuring title to convey to Bradley and, thus, he was not ready, willing, and
able to perform his part of the contract. The trial court's judgment awarding
the escrow deposit to Apel was therefore reversed and judgment rendered for
Bradley. 155
The seller fared better in Dunham & Ross Co. v. Stevens ,' 56 where the seller
was held to be entitled to the escrow deposit after the purchaser refused to
close. The title objections 157 raised by the purchaser as the basis for refusing
to close were, in the court's view, without merit. Moreover, the purchaser's
repudiation of the contract was held to have excused the seller from fulfilling
his obligations under the contract.158
In Innes v. Webb' 59 it was held that between two "apparently inconsistent
the purchaser's earnest money if closing did not occur within the 90-day period, but even if so
construed, any forfeiture had been waived by the seller. Id. at 682.
153. The owner had given Apel notice of the date for closing the contract, which Apel was
unwilling or unable to meet. In fact Apel released his rights under that contract and forfeited his
earnest money.
154. Ordinarily time is not of the essence in a contract of sale of real property, unless the
contract so provides, Tabor v. Ragle, 526 S.W.2d 670,675 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), or unless the terms of the contract show a clear intent that time is of the essence.
Smith v. Warth, 483 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, no writ). See 8A G.
THOMPSON, supra note 122, § 4460. If time is of the essence, then the performance of the contract
within the specified time is essential to the right to require performance by the other party.
McKnight v. Renfro, 371 S.W.2d 740, 745 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The
opposite rule applies to option contracts, in which time is of the essence unless the parties
otherwise agree. See White v. Miller, 518 S.W.2d 383, 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ
dism'd), which also demonstrates that it may not always be easy to distinguish between the
contract and an option. Because the purchaser's obligation to close the contract was conditioned
upon his obtaining financing, the court found the contract to be an option. See also Tabor v.
Ragle, supra, where the court, after discussing the tests for determining if a contract is an option,
held that there was a contract.
155. The court, on the authority of Brown v. Lee, 192 F. 817 (5th Cir. 1911), said that Apel
could not, under these circumstances, either enforce specific performance or recover the escrow
deposit. The party seeking specific performance of a contract of sale must show that he is ready,
willing, and able to perform his part of the contract. See Hendershot v. Amarillo Nat'l Bank, 476
S.W.2d 919 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972, no writ); Beck v. South, 423 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (purchaser failed to prove he had purchase money on
date for closing).
156. 538 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
157. The title objections were (i) the seller's ownership of only one-half the minerals (the
contract only required the seller to convey the minerals he owned), (2) certain easements (which
the court found to be within the permitted exception for utility easements), and (3) a mortgage lien
which was broader than as described in the contract (of which the court said the purchaser was on
constructive or actual notice, because the deed of trust was recorded).
158. The court cited as authority, among others, Universal Life & Accident Co. v. Sander,
129 Tex. 344, 102 S.W.2d 405 (1937); Miller v. Puritan Fashions Corp., 516 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
159. 538 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court of
civil appeals relied upon the authority of Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Daniel, 150 Tex. 513,
243 S.W.2d 154 (1951), for the rule that a typed provision controls over a printed provision in
deciding which of two conflicting provisions will be applied; and, furthermore, that this rule of
construction is to be applied instead of the rule that a contract will be construed against the person
who prepared it (the realtor). 538 S.W.2d at 239.
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provisions in a contract of sale, the typed provision (which required the
broker to deliver the purchaser's escrow deposit to the seller for initial deposit
for materials and administrative cost) controlled over a printed provision
(which entitled the purchaser to the return of his deposit if the seller failed to
perform). Accordingly, the trial court's judgment that the purchaser recover
his escrow deposit from the broker was reversed. 16 Actually, the two
contract provisions were not inconsistent, but the court reached a correct
result on the facts stated in the opinion. The purchaser's cause of action
would have been more successful had it been directed against the seller.'
61
3. Risk of Loss and Damages.
The execution of a contract to purchase real estate passes the risk of loss to
the purchaser unless the contract stipulates to the contrary.162 This rule was
applied in Fant v. Howell 63 to place the risk of loss on the purchaser due to the
ripening of adverse possession after the date the contract was signed and the
purchaser took possession. The court, therefore, affirmed the trial court's
judgment that the purchaser was not entitled to a general warranty deed
covering that portion of the property which had been lost to the adverse
possessor. The Texas Supreme Court has granted writ of error.164
In Littleton v. Woods 65 the purchaser of a house filed suit for breach of
warranty to construct the house in a good and workmanlike manner and for
relief under the Texas Consumer Protection Act.' 66 The jury found that the
160. It is not clear from the opinion why suit was brought against the realtor instead of the
seller, although the following statement in the opinion may be a hint: "The next day Innes [the
realtor] endorsed the check over to Huller [the seller]. Subsequently, Huller left town and no
further action was taken on the contract." 538 S.W.2d at 239. Clearly, the realtor was within his
authority to deliver the escrow deposit to the seller.
161. The two contract provisions would be inconsistent only if the seller had the right to use
the escrow deposit for the stated purposes, whether or not the seller later defaulted under the
contract. A more logical interpretation is that the escrow deposit, if used as an initial deposit for
materials and administrative costs, had to be returned to the purchaser if the seller defaulted.
Thus, the two provisions were not inconsistent. The opinion does not state whether or not the
seller used the escrow deposit for the authorized purpose.
162. Whittenburg v. Miller, 139 Tex. 586, 164 S.W.2d 497 (1942); Northern Tex. Realty &
Constr. Co. v. Lary, 136 S.W. 843 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911, writ ref'd). This statement of the rule
assumes that any loss suffered by damage to the property is not the fault of the seller. Between
the seller's insurer and the purchaser's insurer, the purchaser's insurer must shoulder the loss.
Paramount Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 353 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1962). Could the
purchaser recover on the seller's insurance policy if the purchaser has no insurance? The court in
Paramount Fire Ins. Co. left this question unanswered, by stating: "[W]e leave open the question
of whether, where the vendee has no insurance, there can be a recovery on the vendor's policy
subject to a constructive trust for the vendee, who is often ignorant of his legal liability in such a
situation." Id. at 845. If, in a situation unlike Paramount Fire Ins. Co. the seller has no right of
specific performance, or the contract of sale for some other reason is found to be an option, who
bears risk of loss? A contract of sale was held to be an option in Tabor v. Ragle, 526 S.W.2d 670,
675 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also White v. Miller, 518 S.W.2d
383 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ); Gala Homes, Inc. v. Fritz, 393 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); 8A G. THOMPSON, supra note 122, § 4443, at 258. The careful
drafter will consider both risk of loss and right to insurance proceeds in his contract.
163. 537 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ granted), also discussed in note 14
supra and accompanying text.
164. Writ was granted to consider two points: (1) whether performance of the contract was
excused by a foreseeable impossibility; (2) whether an undertaking to bring about a condition is
an implied condition precedent. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 5 (Oct. 9, 1976).
165. 538 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
166. Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN.
§§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
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builder had breached the warranty, but the court of civil appeals held that the
measure of damages applied by the jury was improper. 167 The court further
found, following Cape Conroe, Ltd. v. Specht, 168 that since the sale took place
in 1972, the Texas Consumer Protection Act was not applicable. The act was
amended effective September 1, 1975 to include "real property purchased or
leased for use" within the definition of "goods" under section 12.45(1) of the
Act. 169 Finally, in Irwin v. Whirley 70 the purchaser of a lot under a contract for
deed recovered the price paid for the lot, the value of the improvements, and
punitive damages from a seller who had no title when he signed the contract
and who then knew he would be unable to deliver title to the purchaser.
C. Brokerage
1. Real Estate Brokerage Commissions.
Every year disputes involving the payment of real estate commissions
produce a great deal of litigation, and this survey period was no exception. On
the whole, brokers were not very successful at selling the courts on their
claims. In Del Andersen & Associates v. Jones 171 the broker sued to recover a
commission under an exclusive agency listing agreement. The broker alleged
that it had procured a ready, willing, and able purchaser who signed a contract
with the owner to purchase a motel, but the owner refused to pay the
brokerage commission. The defendant contended that no commission was
owed because (1) the broker failed to advise the purchaser to have an abstract
of title examined by an attorney or to obtain title insurance, as required under
section 28 of article 6573a,172 (2) the description of the property in the listing
agreement was legally insufficient, and (3) the contract signed by the pur-
chaser and owner was not an enforceable contract.
The court of civil appeals referred to West Realty & Investment Co. v.
Hite ' and Cooper v. Wildman171 for the general rule that a broker earns his
commission when he procures a ready, willing, and able purchaser on the
terms specified in the listing agreement, even though the contract is not closed
167. The court refers io Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968), for a discussion of
the warranty implied in the sale of a new house.
168. 525 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ).
169. Wallenstein & St. Claire (1976), supra note 2, at 44.
170. 538 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
171. 531 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975), rev'd, 539 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1976).
172. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77) provides in part as
follows:
At the time of the execution of any contract of sale of any real estate in this state,
the Real Estate Salesman, Real Estate Broker, Real Estate Agent or Realtor shall
advise the purchaser or purchasers, in writing, that such purchaser or purchasers
should have the abstract covering the real estate which is the subject of the
contract examined by an attorney of the purchaser's own selection, or that such,
purchaser or purchasers should be furnished with or obtain a policy of title
insurance; and provided further, that failure to so advise as hereinabove set out
shall preclude the payment of or recovery of any commission agreed to be paid on
such sale.
Article 6573a was amended in 1975, and substantially the same provision is now contained in TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
173. 283 S.W. 481 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, jdgmt adopted). Henry v. Schweitzer, 435
S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Kendrick v. Boon, 254
S.W.2d 1016 (Tex. Civ. App.-San'Antonio 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.), also were cited by the court.
174. 528 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no writ).
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because of some fault or inability of the seller. In response to the owner's
third defense the court of civil appeals held that the plaintiff, upon procuring a
ready, willing, and able purchaser, was entitled to a commission under the
listing agreement whether or not there was an enforceable contract to
purchase the property.' 75 Defendant's second defense was also rejected by
the court which found that the notation in the listing agreement that the
defendant was the owner, coupled with evidence that the defendant owned no
other property in Comanche County, was a sufficient description of the
property.176 Finally, the court of civil appeals held that the broker was not
required to comply with article 6573a, section 28, in order to earn his
commission under the listing agreement. All he was required to do was
procure a ready, willing, and able purchaser for the property.
On appeal, however, the Texas Supreme Court refused to give article 6573a
such a narrow interpretation, reversed the court of civil appeals, and affirmed
the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the seller. 77 Article 6573a,
section 28, the court held, was intended to apply in all situations, whether or
not there was a separate listing agreement and whether or not the seller or the
purchaser was paying the commission.'7 8 The Texas Supreme Court stated
that the only exception to the broker's obligation to comply with this
requirement of article 6573a occurs when the broker is wrongfully deprived of
the opportunity to comply.179
V. W. Realty Sales Agency v. Long Meadow Country Club, Inc. 80 repre-
sents another effort by a broker to recover a commission for negotiating a sale
that was never completed. The contract for the sale of a country club which
was signed by the broker provided for the seller to pay the broker a
commission of six percent of the sale price. It also provided that if the
purchaser failed to complete the sale, the seller had the right to retain the
purchaser's $10,000.00 deposit as liquidated damages and to pay the broker
175. McNeny v. Radford, 70 S:W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1934), rev'd, 129 Tex.
568, 104 S.W.2d 472 (1939); Schmidt v. Willmann, 235 S.W. 629 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1921, no writ), and other cases, were cited by the court in support of the holding. See generally 9
TEX. JUR. 2d Brokers § 50 (1969).
176. See Pickett v. Bishop, 148 Tex. 207,208,223 S.W.2d 222,223 (1949). The property in Del
Andersen was described as the Deluxe Motel, 1302 E. Central, Comanche, Comanche County,
Texas. The court also found the street address coupled with the "owner" designated to be
sufficient, citing Parks v. Underwood, 280 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). See generally Annot., supra note 142. The broker, however, had the same difficulty
convincing the court of civil appeals that summary judgment should have been rendered in its
favor. The court found that a fact issue existed as to whether the purchaser was ready, willing,
and able. The broker argued that the owner, by her execution of the contract of sale, was
estopped to deny that the purchaser was ready, willing and able; but the court held that this rule
was inapplicable in this case, because the contract of sale which the broker alleged to be the basis
of this estoppel was unenforceable because of an insufficient legal description of the property.
The description used in the contract is not set forth in the court's opinion.
177. Jones v. Del Andersen & Associates, 539 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. 1976).
178. Nor did it matter that the purchaser had in fact consulted with his attorney concerning the
seller's title. Id. at 351.
179. Id. In Knight v. Hicks, 505 S.W.2d 638,644 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), cited by the court, the court stated that the requirement of written notice under article
6573a, § 28 applies "where the broker charged with the-obligation to give such notice has an
opportunity to participate in or be present at the execution of the contract of sale;" but he will not
be denied recovery of his commission "if he is precluded from doing so by the act of the seller in
dealing directly with the buyer."
180. 537 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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$5,000.00 of that deposit, or enforce specific performance. The purchaser,
John Jamail, defaulted and subsequently instituted proceedings under Chap-
ter XI of the Federal Bankruptcy Act.'' The defendant dismissed a suit for
specific performance against Jamail, and elected to retain the escrow deposit.
The broker, however, refused to accept $5,000.00 in full payment of its
commission, and filed this suit to recover the $90,000.00 commission which
he would have been entitled to had the sale been completed. The court limited
the broker's recovery to $5,000.00, stating that
if the contract provides that upon the failure of the purchaser to comply,
the owner has the option of retaining the earnest money as liquidated
damages, and is required to divide it with the agent, then if the owner
exercises that option, the agent is limited to his share of the earnest
money and he may not recover a commission based on a percentage of
the purchase price. 82
The court acknowledged the general principles discussed in Del Andersen &
Associates v. Jones 83 that the broker earns his commission when he procures
a ready, willing, and able purchaser, at least if the completion of the sale is
prevented by the seller's default. Thus, the result in V. W. Realty would
undoubtedly have been different had the consummation of the sale been
prevented by the seller's default. Furthermore, if the broker in V. W. Realty
had not signed the contract of sale and had an enforceable listing agreement
on the property, it probably would not have been limited by the provision in
the contract of sale but could have recovered its commission under the listing
agreement. Provisions such as the one at issue in V. W. Realty are common,
especially in short-form printed contracts. The broker or his attorney should
carefully review the commission provision before executing a contract of sale
in order to avoid an unexpected result or inconsistency with the listing
agreement.
Hard trading by the purchaser of real property sometimes leaves the seller
with a smaller down payment than he had hoped for and than will be necessary
if the deal is to be completed. When this occurs the parties, in order to make
the deal, may ask the real estate broker to defer a portion (and often a large
portion) of his commission for several years after the closing. The seller also
may insist that the broker share in his risk that the deferred portion of the sales
price may not be paid. This is especially true where the purchaser makes a
small down payment and is not personally liable on the promissory note, and
particularly so if the broker also is a participant in the purchase of the
property. Storey v. Dick Matz Agency"84 should serve as a warning to brokers
who expect to earn interest on the deferred portion of the commission. The
contract in Storey stated that the commission would be equal to six percent of
the sale price and that the broker would receive the commission in increments
of six percent of each payment made by the purchaser to the seller. The court
held that the broker was entitled to receive only six percent of the sale price,
181. II U.S.C. §§ 701-799 (1970).
182. 537 S.W.2d at 536.
183. See notes 171-76 supra.
184. 537 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
[Vol. 31
PROPERTY
without interest, even though a part of his commission would be paid out of
interest installments made on the sale price by the purchaser.'8
The right of a licensed real estate salesman to sue for and recover a real
estate commission was the key issue in Justice v. Willard.186 The bank, as
purchaser of a large ranch, agreed to pay plaintiff a commission of $37,800.00,
less certain deductions including fees payable to the attorneys representing
the salesman and the bank. The bank paid the commission to the salesman but
only after deducting an attorney's fee of $18,700.00, which prompted the
salesman to file this suit. The salesman sought to avoid the restrictive
commission requirements of section 26 of the Real Estate License Act'87 by
arguing that the suit was one to recover an unreasonable attorney's fee
wrongfully paid. The court disagreed and held that the suit was for the
recovery of the real estate commission, brought by a licensed real estate
salesman against someone other than the broker under whom he was licensed,
which the salesman could not maintain under the provisions of section 26 of
the Real Estate License Act. Summary judgment entered in favor of the
defendant, therefore, was affirmed. The plaintiff-salesman, the court said,
was required either to be a licensed real estate broker at the time the
commission was earned, or to have the suit brought by the broker under
whom he was licensed.
In Elrod v. Becker'88 the plaintiff, who did not have a real estate broker's
license, failed to qualify for the exemptions from the licensing requirement
provided in the Real Estate License Act'89 under section 6(3) for a person
acting for the owner under a duly executed power of attorney, or section 6(4)
for an owner or his employees if the owner is not engaged in whole or in part in
the business of selling real estate. The plaintiff, therefore, was denied the
recovery of a commission. The plaintiff's action was unsuccessful because he
did not have a written power of attorney, as required by section 6(3).
Furthermore, since the owners of the property, by buying, developing, and
185. If the payment of the balance of the commission is to be made only if and when the seller
receives payments on the deferred portion of the sale price, and only out of these payments (as
may very well have been the agreement in Storey), then the broker's receipt of payment is
conditioned upon the seller's receipt of payment. This would not be the case if the broker's
commission is merely made payable at future intervals, with no requirement that the seller
receive payments from the purchaser. In either event, however, the broker should have the
deferred portion of his commission represented by a promissory note, providing for the payment
of interest, attorney's fees, and containing other standard note provisions. The promissory note
should also provide that the note is not payment of the commission, but only evidences the
indebtedness, and, if this is the case, that the payment of the note is conditioned upon the
purchaser's performance of his obligation, in an effort to avoid the note's being treated for tax
purposes as the payment of the full commission in the year the note is delivered. See Jay A.
Williams, 28 T.C. 1000 (1957); Robert J. Dial, 24 T.C. 117 (1955). See generally Brandes, Is the
Receipt of a Promissory Note the Same as Cash for Federal Income Tax Purposes ?, 3 TAXATION
FOR LAWYERS 8 (1974). If the payment to the broker is conditioned upon receipt of payment from
the purchaser, the broker may want some assurance that the seller will use reasonable efforts to
collect payments from the purchaser and will not change the manner of these payments. See
Groot, Equitable Enforcement of Deferred Brokerage Commissions, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 76 (1972),
which focuses upon deferred commissions on leasing of real property, but is also of general
interest.
186. 538 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ).
187. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, §26(Vernon 1969) provides in part that -[N]o Real
Estate Salesman shall be employed by or accept compensation from any person other than the
Broker under whom he is at the time licensed .... "
188. 537 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
189. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, §§ 6(3), 6(4) (Vernon 1969).
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subdividing the property, were in the business of selling real estate, he was
not entitled to the exemption under section 6(4), even though the owner
personally may never have sold a lot.
The availability of the exemption under section 6(1) of the Real Estate
License Act was an issue in Lehman Brothers Inc. v. Sugarland Industries,
Inc."9 Section 6(1) exempts from the licensing requirement of the act certain
activities in the sale or exchange of real property, if those activities are
conducted by a person who does not engage in the activities of a real estate
broker "as an occupation, business or profession on a full or part-time basis."
The prefatory issues involved in the case were whether Lehman Brothers was
employed to find a buyer for Sugarland's stock or realty, and whether
Lehman Brothers acted as a finder in the sale of realty, and if so, whether it
was exempt from the licensing requirements of the Real Estate License Act.
The court of civil appeals held that these issues were disputed fact issues and
reversed the trial court's summary judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff.
Lehman Brothers had located a purchaser for most of Sugarland's stock, but
after suit was filed by the minority shareholders of Sugarland to block the
sale, the agreement between Sugarland and the purchaser was restructured to
provide instead for the sale of Sugarland's realty, which was its principal
asset. Sugarland had been instructed by the court hearing the shareholders'
suit to offer the property for sale on competitive bids. Sugarland subsequent-
ly sold its realty to a different purchaser. 9 It was observed that Texas courts
have recognized a distinction between finders and brokers,'92 but declined to
decide whether section 4(l)(j) of the Real Estate License Act precludes an
unlicensed person from recovering a finder's fee on the sale of realty. 93 The
court stated that whether Lehman Brothers was employed to find a buyer for
stock or realty depended upon the nature of the contract and not the form
which the principal's transaction ultimately takes. 94
Walters v. Thomas 95 concerned the amount of commission a broker is
entitled to receive after a contract of sale is rescinded by agreement of the
seller and purchaser. The broker was to be paid a real estate commission of
190. 537 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
191. The court's opinion does not state how the ultimate purchaser was found; thus, it is
unclear on what theory Lehman Bros. was seeking to recover the finder's fee. It could have been
on the basis that it had procured a purchaser in accordance with its finder's agreement, although
that purchaser did not ultimately buy the property. It could also have been on the basis that a sale
was made during the time covered by its finder's agreement, or it might have been that it claimed
to have found the ultimate purchaser.
192. The court cited Rogers v. Ellsworth, 501 S.W.2d 756, 757 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The struggle faced by brokers in an effort to recover a
commission on a sale involving both securities (thus requiring a license to sell securities) and
realty (thus requiring a license to sell realty) is illustrated in Taylor Communications, Inc. v.
Harte-Hanks Newspapers, Inc., 447 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. 1969), and in Hall v. Hard, 160 Tex. 565,
335 S.W.2d 584 (1960), and in many other Texas decisions.
193. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 4(l)(j) (Vernon 1969) definesa real estate broker
as one who "procures or assists in procuring of prospects, calculated to result in the sale,
exchange, leasing or rental of real estate." Sugarland argued that the definition encompasses a
finder, and requires licensing in order for a finder to recover a real estate commission.
194. The court cited Thywissen v. FTI Corp., 518 S.W.2d 947,950 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[Ist Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), which is discussed in Wallenstein & St. Claire (1976), supra
note 2, at 41-42.
195. 535 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
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$5,000.00 "at time sale is consummated." After the rescission the broker
retained $5,000.00 of the purchaser's escrow deposit which he held. After
reimbursing the purchaser, the seller sued the broker. The court, upon the
authority of West Realty & Investment Co. v. Hite,' held that where a
contract of sale is not closed due to the fault of the seller, the broker is entitled
to his commission, even though the contract contemplated that the commis-
sion was to be paid at the time the sale was consummated. 197 Finally, in Porter
v. Striegler198 the broker who had accepted a reduced commission from the
purchaser was precluded from thereafter recovering any additional commis-
sion from the seller under his listing agreement with the seller. The court
reiterated the well-established rule that a broker cannot recover a real estate
commission from both the seller and the purchaser unless, with full knowl-
edge, they have consented to such an arrangement.199
2. Liability of Brokers Arising from Sales.
Two cases dealing with the liability of brokers for acts arising out of the sale
of realty reached decisions during this survey period. In Walker v. Ruggles2°°
actual and punitive damages were awarded against the real estate brokers and
in favor of the owner of residential property because of false claims made by
the brokers that they had a standing judgment for a real estate commission
against the owner. 20 1 Stone v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp.20 2 involved a suit
brought by the purchaser of property against the real estate agent for damages
alleged to have arisen out of the agent's misrepresentations regarding the
location of a pipeline easement. The court found that there was at least some
evidence of the agent's liability, and therefore reversed an instructed verdict
in favor of the agent and remanded the action for a new trial.
196. 283 S.W. 481 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, jdgmt adopted); see note 173 supra and
accompanying text.
197. The stipulation in the "listing" agreement that a commission would be paid "at time sale
is consummated" may not have required that the sale actually be consummated as a condition
precedent to the earning of the commission. A provision for the payment of a commission "at
closing" was held not to make the commission contingent upon consummation of the contract in
McPherson v. Osborn, 475 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, no writ). There is a
growing minority view that would require consummation of the sale, according to Tristam's
Landing, Inc. v. Wait, 327 N.E.2d 727 (Mass. 1975). See also Henry v. Schweitzer, 435 S.W.2d
941, 945 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Golden v. Halliday, 339 S.W.2d
715, 717-18 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1960, writ dism'd).
198. 533 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ).
199. See Armstrong v. O'Brien, 83 Tex. 635, 19 S.W. 268 (1892). See also Phillips v.
Campbell, 480 S.W.2d 250, 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.). A
correlative rule is that the broker cannot recover a commission if, without disclosing the fact, he
participates in the purchase of the property. Anderson v. Griffith, 501 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
200. 540 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ). For further
discussion of this case see text accompanying notes 95-103 supra.
201. Although a real estate broker who has earned a commission may have a lien against
earnest money held by him, or against funds withheld at the closing for the purpose of paying his
commission, the broker has no lien against the property itself, unless (1) the contract so provides,
or (2) he obtains a lien through a judgment entered against the owner of the property. Minchen v.
Kimmel, 210 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1948, no writ). See generally 9 TEX.
JUR. 2d Brokers § 87 (1969).
202. 537 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ granted). The Texas Supreme
Court agreed to hear arguments in this case on January 5, 1977. For further discussion of Stone





In Collum v. DeLoughter2 3 a sale of real property under a writ of execution
on a judgment was set aside because of the inadequacy of the bid price 204
coupled with the following irregularities in the sale which contributed to the
inadequacy of price: (1) mistake in the description of the property in the
published notice of sale, which would have adversely affected an ordinary
person's ability to locate the property, and (2) failure of the officers to give the
owner an opportunity to designate property which he desired to be levied
upon first, as required by rule 637.25 Furthermore, the court held that the sale
could also be set aside because of the inadequacy of the sale price, when, as
here, the judgment debtor had made a prompt offer to make the purchaser
whole by returning his investment in the property and paying all costs.2"
2. Promissory Estoppel.
Southwest Water Services, Inc. v. Cope20 7 concerned the employment of
the doctrine of promissory estoppel to enjoin the developer of lake subdivi-
sion lots from raising the rate charged for water services to lot owners.
Representations had been made during the sale of the lots that the rate to be
charged lot owners during the time they owned their lots would be the same as
that charged to residents living inside the city limits of a neighboring city. The
court held that these representations had been substantially carried forward
in contracts for the water services. It was thus held that this was a proper case
for applying the doctrine of promissory estoppel:
Language in what has been written upon the doctrine of promissory
estoppel might mislead and cause one to believe that its use must be
purely defensive. Here we have stated that the plaintiffs are benefitted
and are entitled to prevail thereby under the fact finding of the trial court.
It is now settled that there may be appropriate use of the doctrine by a
plaintiff as a ground of entitlement to relief. 21
III. REAL ESTATE FINANCING
A. Mortgages
1. Enforceability of Loan Commitment and Mortgage.
A commitment to make a loan secured by a mortgage on real property was
held to be subject to the Statute of Frauds2°9 in Edward Scharf Associates,
203. 535 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
204. Gross inadequacy of the bid price on an execution sale, as in a sale under a deed of trust,
does not justify setting the sale aside, unless there were other irregularities in the sale, or as some
cases have held, unless the debtor makes a prompt offer to reimburse the purchaser.
205. TEX. R. Civ. P. 637.
206. 535 S.W.2d at 393, citing Prudential Corp. v. Bazaman, 512 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ); Moore v. Miller, 155 S.W. 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1913, writ ref'd); and other cases. There is no correlative rule applicable to a foreclosure
under a deed of trust.
207. 531 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
208. Id. at 877, citing "Moore" Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934 (Tex.
1972); Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965).
209. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1968).
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Inc. v. Skiba.210 Thus, unless the commitment is in writing it is neither
enforceable nor the basis for a suit for damages for breach. In First Savings &
Loan Association v. AvilaI1 the extent to which a mortgagee must inquire
into the rights of a prior owner and present occupant of property being
mortgaged was considered. The court of appeals, in reversing the trial court,
held that the mortgagee was entitled to rely upon a recorded deed from the
prior owner to the mortgagor 2 2 in the absence of any evidence that the
mortgagee actually knew that the deed to the mortgagor was only intended as
a mortgage or security agreement.
213
2. Mortgagee's Duty to Insure; Right to Insurance Proceeds.
The typical deed of trust requires the mortgagor to maintain casualty
insurance on all improvements on the property, with loss payable to the
mortgagee in an amount as required by the mortgagee (not to exceed the
mortgage balance or insurable value), and gives the mortgagee the right to
obtain the insurance if the mortgagor fails to do so. Such a provision was
before the court in Colonial Savings Association v. Taylor.2 4 The mortgagee
had agreed to obtain fire insurance coverage on property covered by a deed of
trust under which it was the beneficiary. Apparently by mistake, the mort-
gagee obtained coverage on only one of two houses on the property, and, of
course, the uninsured house burned. The owner of the property filed suit to
recover the loss, on the ground that the mortgagee's negligence in failing to
insure all of the improvements had caused his loss. The insured admitted that
the insurance policy, which indicated that only one house was covered, had
been delivered to him, but stated that he did not examine it carefully and
assumed that the mortgagee had obtained adequate insurance on his behalf.
The court of civil appeals held that while the mortgagee had no obligation
under the deed of trust to secure the insurance, after it undertook the duty the
mortgagee was liable for its failure to exercise reasonable care to keep all
210. 538 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ). See generally 26 TEX. JUR. 2d
Frauds, Statute of § 73 (1961). But an oral promise to give a lien on real property to secure the
payment of money loaned on the purchase price will give the lender an equitable mortgage.
Woods v. West, 37 S.W.2d 129, 132 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, holding approved).
211. 538 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ).
212. The court extended to mortgages the same rule that has been applied to grantees under a
deed, with regard to the notice imparted to the purchaser by the possession of the property by a
prior owner. If the recorded deed is an absolute conveyance of title, absent any knowledge to the
contrary, the purchaser is entitled to rely upon the recorded deed to his seller and is not required
to inquire of the prior-owner-in-possession as to what rights he holds. See Eylar v. Eylar, 60 Tex.
315 (1883); Graves v. Guaranty Bond State Bank, 161 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1942, no writ); Dallas Trust & Sav. Bank v. Pickett, 59 S.W.2d 1090 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1933,
writ dism'd).
213. The court, however, recognized the exception to this rule made in Anderson v. Barnwell,
52 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1932), aff'd, 126Tex. 182, 86 S.W.2d 41 (1935), where
a purchaser was required to make inquiry beyond the recorded deed, because the prior owner had
continued in possession for six years after the conveyance, and other evidence indicated
ownership rights in the prior owner.
If a deed is intended as a mortgage, the mortgagor-grantor has an equity of redemption after the
debt is paid, at least in the absence of intervening rights of innocent third parties. See Humble Oil
& Ref. Co. v. Atwood, 150 Tex. 617, 244 S.W.2d 637 (195 1); Bradshaw v. McDonald, 147 Tex.
455, 216 S.W.2d 972 (1949). See generally 39 TEX. JUR. 2d Mortgages and Trust Deeds §§ 26-33
(1976).




improvements insured against fire loss.2 15 The Texas Supreme Court, how-
ever, reversed the appellate court, instructed the trial court to make a finding
as to whether Taylor relied upon Colonial Savings' undertaking to obtain the
insurance, and held that "Colonial cannot be liable for Taylor's loss unless
Taylor forbore from obtaining his own insurance in reliance upon Colonial's
undertaking to obtain it for him.' '216 Neither the Texas Supreme Court nor the
appellate court discussed whether this award, which in effect was a substitute
for insurance proceeds, would constitute insurance proceeds payable to the
mortgagee under the loss payable clause of the deed of trust. 217 Presumably,
under such a clause, which is common in deeds of trust, 218 the mortgagee
could require the owner to apply this award to the restoration of the improve-
ments and the mortgagee's security.
Who is entitled to insurance proceeds paid after the mortgagor has used his
own funds to repair the damage to the improvements on which the insurance
is payable? The answer is the mortgagee, at least under the deed of trust
provision before the court in Zidell v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.219
The deed of trust required the mortgagor to keep the improvements in good
repair, to replace any improvements which were lost or destroyed, and to
215. The following authorities were cited by the court of civil appeals for the principle that
one who gratuitously undertakes to render a service to another, which is necessary for the other
person's protection, is subject to liability for his failure to exercise reasonable care in the
performance of the task: Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co., Ill Tex. 461, 240 S.W. 517 (1922); Reeves
County Gas Co. v. Church, 464 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1971, no writ); 2
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965). See also 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 328b, at 449-50
(1949). The result reached by the court of civil appeals in Taylor is logical, but it would seem more
appropriate to base it upon negligence under a principal-agent relationship rather than under a
mortgagor-mortgagee relationship, since the procurement of insurance by the mortgagee under
the deed of trust would have arisen upon the failure of the mortgagor to obtain the insurance. See,
e.g., Barile v. Wright, 256 N.Y. 1, 175 N.E. 351 (1931), where the mortgagee was found to be
acting as the owner's agent in failing to obtain valid insurance after undertaking to do so (when
owner notified it she was financially unable at that time to obtain the insurance).
The Texas Supreme Court in ColonialSavings agreed that Colonial Savings' duty to Taylor did
not arise under the deed of trust, but on the basis that Taylor did not assume the deed of trust and,
therefore, was not a party to the deed of trust. Mr. Taylor had acquired the property subject to the
deed of trust lien, and simply followed the practice of the former owner in having the lender
obtain the insurance and then submitting the bill to the owner for payment. First Nat'l Bank v.
Dowdell, 275 Ala. 622, 157 So. 2d 221 (1963), is a case much like Taylor, where the mortgagee
agreed from the inception to procure the insurance required under the mortgage (recovery to
mortgagor based upon fraud by mortgagee's failing to procure the insurance). But see Hampton
v. Gulf Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 287 Ala. 172,249 So. 2d 829 (1971), notedin 8 REAL PROP., PROB.
& TR. J. 190 (1973), where the mortgagee was held not to be liable for failing to renew fire
insurance coverage, although payments for the premiums had been paid into escrow by the
mortgagor.
216. 544 S.W.2d at 119. The court stated that the presumption that an insured knows the
contents of an insurance policy can be overcome by proof to the contrary, such as proof he put it
away without examining it, citing Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Boyle Gen. Tire Co., 392
S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1965) (a suit brought by an insured for reformation of a fidelity bond). It was
then the mortgagee's burden, the court held, to prove Taylor was negligent in failing to examine
the policy, which it had failed to do.
217. Seegenerally 59C.J.S. Mortgages §328d (1949). In Barile v. Wright, 256 N.Y.1, 175 N.E.
351, 352 (1931), the court said that the mortgagee was required to credit the note balance or deliver
the appropriate amount for insurance proceeds to the mortgagor to restore the property. The
court of civil appeals further held that if the insurance policy had covered the other house (which
it did not), the policy would have limited the owner's recovery to the relative value of the garage
apartment, and, therefore, he could not recover an amount from the mortgagee that was greater
than he could have recovered under the policy had the improvements been insured.
218. See, for example, the clause recited in Zidell v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 539
S.W.2d 162, 163 n. I (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ), which is the next case discussed in
this Survey.
219. 539 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
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maintain insurance on the improvements. The deed of trust further provided
that all insurance policies were for the mortgagee's benefit, and that all
insurance proceeds were assigned to the mortgagee, who then had the option
of applying those proceeds to the indebtedness or to the restoration of the
property. The mortgagor had made the repairs caused by the loss out of his
own funds, but by the time the insurance company made payment on the loss
the mortgagee had foreclosed against the property on account of subsequent
failures to make installments on the secured indebtedness. The mortgagee,
for obvious reasons, chose to apply those proceeds to the deficiency remain-
ing on the debt after the foreclosure sale. The mortgagor claimed that he was
entitled to the insurance proceeds because he had used his own funds to repair
the damage, and because the mortgagee had failed to exercise formally its
option to apply the insurance proceeds to the indebtedness. The court of civil
appeals, however, affirmed the trial court's holding and held that the assign-
ment of the insurance proceeds to the mortgagee under the deed of trust was
absolute, and that the mortgagee was entitled to use those proceeds in any
manner authorized under the deed of trust. 20 The court, in so holding, refused
to follow Huey v. Ewell.22' Faced with such a deed of trust provision, a
mortgagor, before investing his own funds in repairs, should seek to obtain
approval of the use of the insurance proceeds for this purpose, and notify the
insurer of the decision in order to avoid the result in Zidell.
3. Other Indebtedness and Other Security.
In Airline Commercial Bank v. Commercial Credit Corp. 2 2 the mortgagee
was allowed to retain an amount of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale
sufficient to pay reasonable attorney's fees 223 and the contractually stipulated
five percent trustee's fee, 224 but the court refused to allow the mortgagee to
deduct the amount owed on an indebtedness other than the one described in
the deed of trust. The deed of trust contained a "dragnet" or "other
indebtedness" clause providing that the lien also applied to existing and
220. The mortgagee was not, the court said, required to make its election immediately or lose
its election to the mortgagor. Id. at 164. The court also noted that the plaintiff had made no
argument that the lender was estopped or otherwise precluded from making its choice. Id. at 164.
The court found there to be no inequity in allowing the mortgagee to apply the insurance proceeds
to the indebtedness after the mortgagor had used his own funds to make the repairs, for the
reduction of the amount of the indebtedness (and in this case the amount of the deficiency)
benefitted the mortgagor.
221. 55 S.W. 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1900, no writ) (holding that the mortgagees were
not entitled to the insurance money).
222. 531 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
223. If the deed of trust so provides,
Texas law allows retention of attorney's fees out of the proceeds of a trustee's
sale if it is shown that 'the amount was reasonable and that the services of the
attorney were necessary to enable the trustee to properly execute the power, and
that he actually rendered services to the company in the matter.'
531 S.W.2d at 176, citing American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Schenck, 85 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1935, no writ), but rejecting the inference in Schenck that the recovery of
attorney's fees is limited to judicial foreclosures. Attorney's fees are not recoverable under a
deed of trust unless there is a specific provision in the instrument. Jolly v. Fidelity Union Trust
Co., 15 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1929, writ ref'd).
224. The United States, one of the parties to the suit, unsuccessfully argued that the trustee's
fee could not be recovered because there was no evidence that the fee was actually incurred. 531
S.W.2d at 176.
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future indebtedness not described in the deed of trust. The court, however,
held that the other indebtedness, consisting of a renewal note signed by a
partnership (only guaranteed by the same debtors) and originally executed
before the deed of trust, was not "reasonably within the contemplation of the
parties to the mortgage at the time it was made." 225
Does a deed of trust provision which, upon the occurrence of default,
assigns "all rents, profits and income from the property covered by this deed
of trust" extend to accounts receivable of a business operated on the
property? The Bankruptcy Court held that it did in In Re: Space Center
Memorial Hospital Foundation, Bankrupt.226 A clause such as the one
involved in this case is very common to deeds of trust and, undoubtedly,
many would expect it to cover tenant rentals, revenues from oil and gas leases
and operations, and similar income produced by the property, but not income
generated by a commercial business located on the property.227 Surely the
court's opinion would not extend to income from a business operated on the
property by a tenant, other than the mortgagor, whose lease is subject to such
a deed of trust.22 The court further held that the mortgagee was required to
file a financing statement under the Uniform Commercial Code in order to
establish its priority as to profits and income,22 9 and since it did not, its lien
225. Id. at 175, citing and quoting from Moss v. Hipp, 387 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1965). See also
Vaughn v. Crown Plumbing & Sewer Serv., Inc., 523 S.W.2d 72, 76 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[ist Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Finger Furniture Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 413 S.W.2d
131 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The danger of a dragnet clause to an
unsuspecting purchaser of property subject to a deed of trust is well illustrated in Estes v.
Republic Nat'l Bank, 462 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. 1970), and its impact on a materialman is demon-
strated in Justice Mortgage Investors v. C.B. Thompson Constr. Co., 533 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in notes 325-40 infra and accompanying text.
The mortgagor's attorney should attempt to have such a clause deleted, and the mortgagee's
attorney should list any existing indebtedness which is not already described and which his client
expects to be covered by the deed of trust, as well as the identity of persons other than the
mortgagors whose debts are to be covered. Actually, in Airline Commerce Bank the court could
have found that the dragnet clause did not extend to the other indebtedness of a different person.
226. Technology Inc. v. Space Center Memorial Hosp. Foundation, Bk. No. 74-HP-808 (S.D.
Tex., Nov. 16, 1976), is a severed portion of the adversary proceeding filed in this bankruptcy
proceeding. The court said: "The Court has concluded that the contract assignment of rents,
profits and income is broad enough to cover accounts receivable regardless of the source of the
money." Although this opinion was issued after the end of this survey period, it is included in this
Survey because of its significance and because of the obscurity often enjoyed by bankruptcy
court decisions. By way of fair disclosure, the authors' firm represents the plaintiff in the
adversary proceeding, although the deed of trust involved in the proceeding is held by the Federal
Housing Administration.
227. See, e.g., Detroit Trust Co. v. Detroit City Serv. Co., 262 Mich. 14,23,247 N.W. 76, 85
(1933), where the court said: "Under the common law, the word 'profits,' when used in
connection with rents, meant the usufruct of the land." The Michigan Supreme Court then
interpreted its statute which authorized the assignment of rents and profits under a mortgage as
follows: "We do not believe that the word 'profits' as used in Act No. 228, supra, means business
profits arising out of the operation of mortgaged premises not rented to others but occupied and
used by the mortgagor," and, thus, the court reversed the lower court's holding that the
mortgagee was entitled to profits made by the receiver through operation of the mortgaged
premises and business (mortgage allowed mortgagee's trustee to collect "rents, income, issues
and profits" of the mortgaged property after default). See also 31 MICH. L. REV. 1124, 1129
(1935).
228. A tenant's lease is subject to an existing mortgage, unless the mortgage otherwise
provides or the mortgagee later subordinates to the lease. See I M. FRIEDMAN, LEASES § 8.1
(1974); 36 TEX. JUR. 2d Landlord & Tenant § 262 (1962); discussion in note 419 infra.
229. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE. ANN. art 9.104(10) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77), exempts from the
coverage of that article "the creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real estate, including a
lease or rents thereunder." Thus, an assignment of leases and rents is enforceable without filing
under the Uniform Commercial Code. In re Bristol Assocs. v. Girard Trust Bank, 505 F.2d 1056
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with respect to the accounts receivable was not perfected until it took
possession as mortgagee in possession under the deed of trust.230 The court
held that the mortgagee is entitled to accounts receivable which accrue, are
made, and are generated after the mortgagee takes possession.
23
'
4. Due on Sale Clause.
A "due on sale" clause generally gives the noteholder an option either to
accelerate the maturity of the note if the property covered by the deed of trust
is sold, or to deal with the new purchaser without releasing the original maker
of the note. 232 In Ashley v. Leitch233 the maker of the note unsuccessfully
(3d Cir. 1974). The court, however, in Space Center Memorial Hospital Foundation, held that
"profits and income" is not exempt from the Uniform Commercial Code filing requirements,
citing United States v. PS Hotel Corp., 404 F. Supp. 1188, 1192 (E.D. Mo.), affd, 527 F.2d 500
(8th Cir. 1975).
230. The mortgagee took possession prior to the filing of the bankruptcy proceeding, and,
with the consent of the court, foreclosed against the property afterwards. The court cited as
authority for the right of a mortgagee-in-possession to rents, profits, and income: Groves v.
Fresno Guarantee Say. and Loan Ass'n, 373 F.2d 440(9th Cir. 1967); Central States Life Ins. Co.
v. Carlson, 98 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1938); Simon v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 126 S.W.2d 682
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1939, writ ref'd). See generally G. OSBORNE. MORTGAGES § 150(1970); 59
C.J.S. Mortgages §§ 316-321 (1949).
231. The court states in the opinion that the mortgagee "became entitled only to rents, profits
and income which accrued thereafter, i.e., monies for services, charges, etc. which were from
that date forward made by the hospital," citing F. Groos & Co. v. Chittim, 100 S.W. 1006 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1907, no writ), and 59C.J.S. Mortgages § 317 (1949). In F. Groos & Co.,
supra, the court discussed the relative rights between the mortgagor and mortgagee to receive
rents from leases on the property under a deed of trust which specifically assigned rents from
leases to the mortgagee. The court said that the one who has the right of possession "at the time
the rents fall due" is entitled to the rents, and then continues by saying: "And a general rule is that
an apportionment of rents is never made under the common law in reference to the length of time
of occupation; but whoever owns the reversion at the time the rent falls due is entitled to the
entire sum due at that time." 100 S.W. at 1010. The following comment appears in 59 C.J.S.
Mortgages § 317, at 426 (1949): "Ordinarily when the mortgagee takes possession or otherwise
asserts his right to the rents he is not entitled to claim rents accrued prior thereto but unpaid, but it
has been held that rents due but unpaid at the time of default may be included in an assignment of
rents." The deed of trust being interpreted in Space Center Memorial Hospital Foundation is
FHA Form No. 4181-B, which simply provides:
That all rents, profits and income from the property covered by this Deed of Trust
are hereby assigned to the holder of the Note for the purpose of discharging the
debt hereby secured. Permission is hereby given to Grantor, so long as no default
exists hereunder, to collect such rents, profits and income for use in accordance
with the provisions of the Regulatory Agreement.
Whether the deed of trust entitles the mortgagee to rents, profits, and income collected after it
takes possession, or only those which accrue or are attributable to operations after possession
will depend upon an interpretation of the particular deed of trust provision. It probably does not
matter, practically speaking, if the deed of trust also commits the mortgagor to use all rents to pay
the mortgage; in such a case it would seem that the mortgagee who collects rentals attributable to
pre-possession periods could apply those rentals to the indebtedness. Most comprehensive
assignments of rental agreements (usually an agreement separate and in addition to the deed of
trust) provide how rents or income collected from the property, whether accruing before or after
possession, by the mortgagee will be applied.
232. A provision prohibiting sale without the mortgagee's consent may be an invalid restraint
on alienation; but a provision that the mortgagee may accelerate the mortgage in the event the
property is sold without its consent probably is valid. Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 509 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Colo. 1973); Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529(Tenn. 1973); Mutual
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 58 Wis. 2d 99, 205 N.W.2d 762 (1973).
Compare A.R. Clark Inv. Co. v. Green, 375 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. 1964), and Sanders v. Hicks, 317
So. 2d 61 (Miss. 1975), with Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. American Medical Serv., Inc., 66
Wis. 2d 210, 223 N.W.2d 921 (1974) (invocation of due on sale clause is governed by equitable
principles, primarily whether sale impairs mortgagee's security-here it did not). Contra, Tucker
v. Pulaski Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972). See also Tucker v.
Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974) (foreclosure
denied lender on basis that sale under contract for deed did not impair the first lien). See generally
Goldberg, What to Do About Mortgages in the Sale of Real Property, 17 PRAc. LAW., Nov. 1971,
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challenged the noteholder's right to accelerate after a sale of the property.
The court rejected the maker's argument that the clause applied only in the
event of a sale to a purchaser who assumed the payment of the note.
5. Presumptions in Trustee's Deed.
Deeds of trust generally provide that in the event of a foreclosure sale, the
recitals contained in the trustee's deed are conclusive evidence that those
recitals are true and that all prerequisites to a valid sale have been per-
formed. 234 The weight such a provision carries in a motion for summary
judgment is demonstrated in Pachter v. Woodman.235 The owner of the
property, who acquired it subject to the mortgage, contended that the
foreclosure sale was void because the notices of sale had not been posted for
three weeks, as required by statute,236 and because the mortgagee's attorney
had promised to notify him if the foreclosure sale was going forward. The
court of civil appeals held that the affidavit of the mortgagor's attorney which
stated that he did not see any foreclosure notice posted at the time he posted
another notice, and failed to state that the mortgagee's attorney had not
notified him of the sale, was insufficient to overcome the presumption of
regularity that attached to the trustee's deed. The court also held that the
plaintiff failed to prove fraud 237 on the part of the mortgagee's attorney or to
show there was a genuine issue of fact with respect to the allegation of fraud.
The court then observed that the plaintiff was seeking to set aside the
trustee's sale to bona fide purchasers without offering to place the purchasers
in status quo, as he is required to do.238 Writ of error has been granted by the
Texas Supreme Court.
at 13; Volkmer, The Application of the Restraints on Alienation Doctrine to Real Property
Security Interests, 58 IOWA L. REV. 747 (1973); Comment, Debt Acceleration on Transfer of
Mortgaged Property, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 584(1975); 39 TEX. JUR. 2D Mortgages and Trust Deeds§§ 62-74 (1962); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 389 (1949).
233. 533 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The provision in the
promissory note stated: "[Iln the event of sale or transfer of the herein described property, the
payee reserves the right to approve the purchaser, or of declaring this note due and payable in
full."
234. This provision is valid, although it will not be inferred in the absence of such a provision.
See Koehler v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 425 S.W.2d 889,892 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, no
writ).
235. 534 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ granted).
236. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3810 (Vernon 1966).
237. The elements of fraud that would have to be proved, the court stated, were the following:[T]hat Woodman's [mortgagee's attorney] alleged promise not to proceed with
the foreclosure sale was false in that Woodman failed to notify him; that the
promise was made for the purpose of keeping appellant from attending the sale;
that appellant relied thereon and had no actual knowledge of the sale; that had
Woodman notified him that he intended to proceed with the foreclosure sale, he
would have been in a position to have protected his interest in the land by payment
of the amount due upon Woodman's vendor's lien note and that he was damaged
thereby.
534 S.W.2d at 945.
[Editor's Note: Since this Article was written the Texas Supreme Court has recently reversed this
decision and held that the affidavit of the mortgagor's attorney presented questions of fact as to
whether notice of the foreclosure sale was posted at the specified locations and whether the
mortgagee's attorney notified the mortgagor's attorney of the sale. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 186 (Feb.
19, 1977).]
238. The court cited two Texas cases as authority for this holding: Price v. Reeves, 91 S.W.2d
862 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1936, writ dism'd); Chase v. First Nat'l Bank, 20 S.W. 1027(Tex. Civ. App. 1892, no writ). See also Jasper State Bank v. Braswell, 130 Tex. 549, 554, 11i
S.W.2d 1079, 1084 (1938), where the court said:
The Texas decisions extend equitable rights to third persons, as well as to
mortgagees. who purchase at void foreclosure proceedings, by treating the
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6. Wrongful Foreclosure Under Deed of Trust.
In First Southern Properties, Inc. v. Vallone239 the receiver appointed by a
domestic relations court filed suit to set aside a conveyance under a trustee's
deed, alleging, among other irregularities, that the sale was void because the
property was in custodia legis at the time of the foreclosure sale. The Texas
Supreme Court held that the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, First Southern
Properties, Inc., could only obtain the title the trustee had authority to
convey.21 Since the trustee had no authority to sell the property while it was
held by the receiver in custodia legis without the court's authorization, the
sale was invalid. 21 The failure of the receiver to file a notice of lis pendens did
not, in the court's opinion, estop the receiver in this action, for there is
nothing for a receiver to file under Article 6640.242 The court, however,
invited the legislature to consider legislation requiring receivers to file a
notice of the receivership proceedings in the deed records or lis pendens
records. The purchaser at the foreclosure sale was held by the court to be
entitled to recover its purchase money.
In Owens v. Grimes243 the mortgagors filed suit to set aside a non-judicial
foreclosure sale and, in the alternative, sought damages for wrongful foreclo-
sure. The basis for the mortgagee's foreclosure was the mortgagors' breach of
covenants in the deed of trust not to remove improvements and not to allow a
lien of any kind to be placed against the property. 244 The trial court, however,
found that the mortgagee had consented both to the removal of the improve-
ments (which were replaced with new improvements) and to the creation of
mortgage as still in effect and subrogating the purchaser to the rights of the
mortgagee to the extent of the purchase money paid at the foreclosure sale.
See also Loomis Land & Cattle Co. v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 533 S.W.2d 420,424 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in notes 256-62 infra and accompanying text.
See generally 39 TEX. JUR. 2D Mortgages and Trust Deeds § 196, at 257 (1976). [Editor's Note:
Since this Article was written the Texas Supreme Court has recently reversed this decision and
held that the affidavit of the mortgagor's attorney presented questions of fact as to whether
notice of the foreclosure sale was posted at the specified locations and whether the mortgagee's
attorney notified the mortgagor's attorney of the sale. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 186 (Feb. 19, 1977).]
239. 533 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1976).
240. Id. at 341, citing Slaughter v. Quails, 139 Tex. 340, 162 S.W.2d 671 (1942), and other
Texas authority.
241. 533 S.W.2d at 341, citing Ellis v. Vernon Ice, Light & Water Co., 86Tex. 109, 23 S.W.
858 (1893), and numerous other decisions. For a related case see Fuller v. Neel, 535 S.W.2d 719
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976), rev'd, 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 120 (Dec. 25, 1976), discussed in note
62 supra and accompanying text.
242. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6640 (Vernon 1969) (the lis pendens statute). The
evidence showed that the mortgagee and her attorney had notice of the receivership, but that the
purchaser at the sale did not have notice. In another case involving First Southern Properties,
Inc., and concerning purchase at an execution sale arising out of a different divorce proceeding,
the court held that the mere pendency of a divorce proceeding is not constructive notice to a bona
fide purchaser of the rights of the wife. First Southern Properties, Inc. v. Gregory, 538 S.W.2d
454,458 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ). The court in Gregory observed that
the Texas Supreme Court has not yet decided whether TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.57 (Vernon 1975)
serves as a lis pendens notice, citing McKnight, Matrimonial Propery, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 129, 138 (1968), and other articles.
243. 539 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
244. These are two common deed of trust covenants, except that the covenant against other
liens generally is limited to a lien equal to or superior than the deed of trust lien, such as a statutory
lien for nonpayment of property taxes. A covenant against permitting any lien against the
property, even an inferior lien, may, however, be useful, especially on income property, where
the first lienholder is concerned that further indebtedness against the property may impair the
mortgagor's ability to pay the first lien indebtedness.
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the second lien. The court found that the foreclosure sale was conducted for
the purpose of defrauding the mortgagors of their money and property and
awarded the mortgagors $29,600.00 in damages for the wrongful foreclo-
sure.245 The court further held that since the mortgagors had abandoned their
action to set aside the foreclosure sale, the trustee's deed vested title in the
purchaser at the sale and the mortgagors could not later attack the trustee's
deed.246
B. Usury
Article 1302-2.09247 provides an exception to the maximum lawful rate of
interest of ten percent, 24 and allows corporations to agree to pay interest not
to exceed one and one-half percent per month on any bond, note, debt,
contract, or other obligation exceeding $5,000. The article also prohibits "the
claim or defense of usury by such corporation, its successors, guarantors,
assigns or anyone on its behalf . .. ."
It has become a rather common practice for individual borrowers during
periods when loans to many borrowers are available only at rates of interest in
excess of ten percent a year to obtain loans through a corporate nominee. The
corporate nominee may have no assets beyond those which are security for
the loan and, thus, the lender requires the principal stockholders or other
persons with more extensive assets to guarantee the loan. While the decision
in Collins v. United States249 makes the use of a corporate nominee unattrac-
tive from a tax standpoint by recognizing nominee corporations as taxable
entities and thereby precluding guarantors from deducting loan charges paid
through the nominee corporation, the practical necessity of using the corpo-
rate vehicle nevertheless remains.
Most lawyers began the survey period thinking that the rules were fairly
well established under article 1302-2.09, but on March 10, 1976, this confi-
dence was shattered by the Texas Supreme Court's first opinion in Universal
Metals & Machinery, Inc. v. Bohart.2 5° In Bohart the court first held that the
guarantors, who signed the instrument as "primary obligor(s)," and who
"jointly and severally unconditionally" guaranteed the prompt payment of
the promissory note, were co-makers, and because the note executed by the
245. As authority for the award of damages the court cited: League City State Bank v. Mares,
427 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Howard, 85 S.W.2d 986 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1935, writ ref'd), and other
cases.
246. 539 S.W.2d at 390, citing Peterson v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 Mo. 700, 705, 98
S.W.2d 770, 775 (1936). The court went even further, on the authority of Estelle v. Hart, 55
S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, jdgmt adopted), to state that only the mortgagor or his
privities can challenge the regularity of a foreclosure sale, insofar as the divesting of the
mortgagor's title and investing of title in the purchaser are concerned. This could mean that a
guarantor who is not given notice of the sale under TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3810 (Vernon
Supp. 1976-77), or a materialmen's lien claimant, if they are not in privity with the mortgagor,
could challenge an invalid foreclosure sale only to the extent that, as to the guarantor, the invalid
sale discharged him, and, as to the materialman, that the purchaser took subject to his lien.
247. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
248. Id. art. 5069-1.04 (Vernon 1971).
249. 514 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1975).
250. 19 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 212 (March 10, 1976). Upon rehearing the court reversed itself. The
second Bohart opinion is in 539 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. 1976).
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corporation provided for interest at a rate in excess of ten percent a year, 25'
were entitled to the defense of usury. The factual setting in Bohart, however,
was unique. Unknown to the plaintiff, the signature of the president of the
corporation on the $225,000 note had been forged. Unable to recover against
the maker of the note, the plaintiff elected to sue only the guarantors, who, as
primary obligors, could not escape liability because of the forgery.
252
The Texas Supreme Court was deluged with amicus curiae briefs from
lenders' counsel across the state, who had more than a passing interest in the
outcome.253 On motion for rehearing the supreme court withdrew its first
opinion, and held that the term "guarantors" as used in article 1302-2.09
includes payment guarantors such as the Boharts, and, accordingly, that the
Boharts were prohibited by that statute from using the claim or defense of
usury. 254 The court's second opinion was followed in Hartnett v. Adams &
Holmes Mortgage Co. ,25S a case involving a mortgage, and the second Bohart
opinion was anticipated in several decisions reached before the first Bohart
opinion was rendered.
Loomis Land & Cattle Co. v. Diversified Mortgage Investors256 represents
another unsuccessful attempt by a corporate borrower to prove that a loan
made in its name with a rate of interest in excess of ten percent was actually
made to an individual and, therefore, usurious. 257 The evidence showed that
the corporation was not a sham, had been doing business for almost two
years, had a large net worth, and that the money was borrowed to allow the
corporation to continue to operate and to expand the operation of the
shopping center owned by it. The court concluded as follows:
While the corporate entity may in some instances be disregarded where it
is utilized as a cloak for fraud or illegality, such is not the situation here.
There is no summary judgment proof suggesting fraud or illegality. The
mere fact that Diversified refused to make the loan to Loomis Company
unless Richard F. Loomis, Jr., agreed to act as guarantor does not render
the loan transaction void or illegal. As we view the record the loan was
made to Loomis Company and not to Richard F. Loomis, individually. 25
8
251. The court, in its first opinion, divided guarantors into two groups-they either were
"payment" guarantors or "collection" guarantors. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE. ANN. § 3.416
(Vernon 1968). If they were payment guarantors (i.e., the holder of the note was not required first
to pursue the maker), as are most guarantors in modern loan guarantees, then the court had said
they could assert the defense of usury if the rate of interest on the note exceeded the lawful rate
that could be charged to the guarantor.
252. 539 S.W.2d at 877-78, citing Ganado Land Co. v. Smith, 290 S.W. 920 (Tex. Civ.
App-Galveston 1927, writ ref'd); El Paso Bank & Trust Co. v. First State Bank, 202 S.W. 522
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1918, no writ), and other cases in the second Bohart opinion.
253. Although their efforts were rewarded in the court's second opinion, many of these
lawyers had scurried to change their guaranty forms, and the authors understand that some of
these changes remain intact even after the court's second opinion.
254. 539 S.W.2d at 879.
255. 539 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ). The court's first opinion,
rendered on May 4, 1976, followed the first Bohart opinion and allowed the guarantor's estate to
recover usury penalties, but that opinion was withdrawn after the second opinion was rendered in
Bohart.
256. 533 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
257. See also American Century Mortgage Investors v. Regional Centers, Ltd., 529 S.W.2d
578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Skeen v. Glenn Justice Mortgage Co., 526
S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ). Both of these cases are ably discussed in
Wallenstein & St. Claire (1976), supra note 2, at 46-47.
258. 533 S.W.2d at 425, citing Skeen v. Glenn Justice Mortgage Co., 526 S.W.2d 252 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ). See also Moss v. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank, 533 S.W.2d 397,399
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The corporate borrower next argued that the loan was usurious as to the
individual guarantor because the interest rate on the loan was in excess of ten
percent a year. The court correctly anticipated the second opinion in
Bohart,2 59 and held that article 1302-2.0921 precluded the defense of usury to
a guarantor of a loan to a corporation at an interest rate not in excess of one
and one-half percent a month. The borrower further challenged the standing
of the lender, a Massachusetts Business Trust, to maintain a suit on the loan in
a Texas court. The court, however, found that the borrower had standing to
sue as a joint stock company under article 6133.261 The court stated further
that the exculpatory language in the loan agreement protected the individual
shareholders from liability under article 6137.262
In Micrea, Inc. v. Eureka Insurance Co. ,263 a suit for a deficiency following
a foreclosure under the deed of trust, the individual guarantor of a loan made
to a corporation also failed to convince the court that the loan was, in fact,
made to him and, therefore, usurious. The court stated that "[n]othing in the
evidence proves anything fraudulent by the company's loan of the money, or
that it was in fact a loan to Adler [the guarantor] with the language of the
contract(s) actually fictional in statements that the loan was to Micrea
[corporate borrower].""6 The court noted that there was no contention that
the corporation was the alter ego of the guarantor or that the guarantor
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1 st Dist.] 1976, no writ) (involving brokerage fees paid to a third party
for placing a compensating balance with the lender) in which the court held:
One who uses the defense of usury in a suit on a note that does not call for
usurious interest on its face has the obligation to establish that there was a corrupt
agreement or scheme to cover usury and that such agreement or scheme was in
full contemplation of the parties.
259. Universal Metals & Mach., Inc. v. Bohart, 539 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. 1976).
260. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
261. Id. art. 6133 (Vernon 1970).
262. Id. art. 6137 provides as follows:
In a suit against such company or association, in addition to service on the
president, secretary, treasurer or general agent of such companies or association,
service of citation may also be had on any and all of the stockholders or members
of such companies or associations; and, in the event judgment shall be against
such unincorporated company or association, it shall be equally binding upon the
individual property of the stockholders or members so served, and executions
may issue against the property of the individual stockholders or members, as well
as against the joint property; but executions shall not issue against the individual
property of the stockholders or members until execution against the joint
property has been returned without satisfaction.
The loan agreement provided that the borrower agreed to look only to the property of the trust for
any claims against the lender and that the individual shareholders would not be liable. This sort of
exculpatory language is commonly used by Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT), and generally
is required by a trust's declaration of trust. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 1604(f), 26
U.S.C.A. § 856(a) (Supp. 1976), amending I.R.C. § 856(a), a trust, in order to qualify as a REIT,
was required to be an unincorporated association, although its characteristics more nearly
resembled a corporation. The Texas Real Estate Investment Trust Act, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 6138A (Vernon 1970), gives shareholders of a trust which is qualified under the Act
limited liability; but the Act contains no provision for a foreign REIT to qualify in Texas, and
even many domestic REITs have found the Texas Act too confining and have established their
trusts under the laws of other states. In order to avoid exposing the shareholders of the trust to
personal liability on claims against the trust, most trusts have used the exculpatory language in
loan and other agreements. Until Loomis Land & Cattle Co., however, there was no Texas
authority to the effect that such an exculpatory clause would protect the shareholders from
liability they otherwise would be subject to under the provisions of art. 6137.
263. 534 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
264. Id. at 354.
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otherwise was in privity with the corporation, 265 and concluded as follows:
"Rights of redress provided thereby [Texas usury statutes] are therefore to be
restricted to those who are original parties to the usurious contract. ,266
The mortgagee was again met with the defense of usury and counterclaims
for penalty interest when suit was filed against the maker and guarantor of the
note in Commerce Savings Association v. GGE Management Co. 267 Gertner,
individually and as president of GGE Management Co., executed in 1970 a
$600,000 promissory note which provided for interest at twelve percent a
year. The lender agreed that Gertner's liability would be limited to such loss
as the lender might realize with respect to a stated percentage of the unpaid
balance of the note at the time of foreclosure. The loan was obtained for the
purpose of providing financing in connection with an apartment project
owned by Merrill. Merrill conveyed the project for $349,000 to the lender
which then conveyed it to GGE for $400,000, resulting in a $51,000 profit to
the lender. The payment of the $600,000 note was secured by a deed of trust
covering the project, and was guaranteed by Merrill and another man. In 1972
Gertner and GGE executed an agreement to modify and extend the $600,000
note, which reduced the principal balance to $539,226.28, reduced the interest
rate to eight and one-half percent a year, and extended the maturity date. In
1974 the lender filed suit on the note against the guarantors to foreclose the
deed of trust lien. The court of civil appeals held as follows: (1) since
Gertner's liability on the note was limited to a certain amount of the unpaid
principal balance, it was not usurious as to him;268 (2) the $51,000 profit
265. Id. The guarantor and his wife owned all the stock of the corporation, and he was its
president. It is not clear what the court had in mind with the reference to the assertion of usury by
one in "privity" with the borrower. The court cites 91 C.J.S. Usury §§ 71, 132, 151, 153 (1955),
which state generally that guarantors and those otherwise in privity with the borrower may assert
the defense or raise a claim of usury. However, in Texas it is clear that when an individual
guarantees a corporate debt TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon 1956) is control-
ling. Universal Metals & Mach., Inc. v. Bohart, 539 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. 1976).
266. 534 S.W.2d at 354. The loan was not usurious as to the corporation. See TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon 1956). This statement by the court is broader than necessary
since art. 1302-2.09 ultimately controls the result.
Sanford A. Weiner, a Houston, Texas, attorney, reached the following conclusion regarding
the recent series of corporate nominee cases:
The rule emerging from the Skeen, American Century, Micrea, and Loomis cases
appears to be that a loan to a corporation at rates exceeding 10% per annum but no
more than 11/2% per month will not be held usurious merely because the lender
required the borrower to incorporate so long as the corporation is a bona fide,
legitimate corporation and not a sham (or at least the lender did not know that it
was a sham). Note, however, that the Supreme Court has not yet spoken on this
issue and that most of these cases have arisen on flimsy proof, motions for
summary judgment and reversals of temporary restraining orders.
Presentation at Houston Junior Bar Real Estate Seminar, Nov. 19, 1976.
267. 539 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976), aff'd, 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 71
(Nov. 27, 1976).
268. Id. at 77. The court's reasoning on this point is not clear, but the opinion seems to
indicate that the court was agreeing with the lender's argument that, although Gertner was a
co-maker of the note, since his liability on the note was limited, he was only a guarantor. The
court may have avoided making this distinction, because under the first Bohart opinion it would
not have mattered that Gertner was a guarantor. On the other hand, is the court saying that since
Gertner was only required to pay principal under the letter agreement, he was not liable for any
interest, usurious or otherwise? However, the principal balance could have included accrued
interest. See Bothwell v. Farmers' & Merchants' State Bank & Trust Co., 120 Tex. I, 3, 30
S.W.2d 289, 291 (1930). The court's opinion does not state the percentage of the loan balance for
which Gertner was liable, but it may have been that his percentage, if applied separately to the
interest, would have reduced the rate of interest below 10% a year. Would this point really
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realized by the lender on the resale of the property to GGE was interest,269 but
when this additional interest was spread over the effective term of the loan it
was not usurious;27 (3) the restoration of the $51,000 to GGE under the
agreement modifying and extending the loan did not remove any taint of
usury;27 (4) brokerage fees paid to third parties for the purchase of brokered
certificates of deposit did not constitute additional loan charges; 272 (5) the
guarantors were not released because the modification agreement was ex-
ecuted without their consent ;273 and (6) the mortgagee was entitled to forclose
matter? Gertner was responsible, as a maker, for the payment of all principal and all interest on
the note in order to avoid a default, and his limited liability arose only after default. TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.04 (Vernon 1967) subjects to penalty any contract "which may in any
way, directly or indirectly" provide for an excessive rate of interest, and art. 5069-1.06 speaks of
"any person who contracts for, charges or receives" excessive interest. See, e.g., Moore v.
Sabine Nat'l Bank, 527 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Wallenstein
& St. Claire (1976), supra note 2, at 48. The court cites Crow v. Home Say. Ass'n, 522 S.W.2d 457
(Tex. 1975), as authority for this holding, but it is difficult to see the application of Crow to this
case, unless it is for the purpose of comparing Gertner's lack of involvement with that of Home
Savings Association.
269. 539 S.W.2d at 79. The court stated that it was for the jury to determine whether the
$51,000 was a bona fide real estate profit or an additional charge for the loan of money. The jury
found that this sum was interest and that the transaction was a disguise to evade the usury statute.
270. Id. at 81, where the court held:
Since the loan was prematurely terminated by the borrowers' default and since
the loan documents do not, on their face, evidence a usurious contract it is our
opinion that in making this determination, we should consider the loan charges
actually charged or received by Commerce during the period of time the loan
remained in effect.
The court in its first opinion had disallowed spreading, but on this third motion for rehearing
decided that the savings provision in the deed of trust should be applied to the $51,000 of interest
and that this interest should be apportioned over the period beginning on the date it was paid and
ending on the date it was "restored" under the the modification agreement. Id. at 82. The court
treated the $51,000 as a discount and, following Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046
(1937), deducted it from the face amount of the note.
The court acknowledged that TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon 1967) may
require that each month be considered as a separate time interval for the purpose of determining if
interest in excess of one-and-one-half percent a month was charged, but refused to apply such a
standard under these circumstances, where the lawful rate was not exceeded by the aggregate
interest charges over the effective period of the loan. The court in reaching its decision may have
been influenced by the fact that TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art 5069-1.07 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77)
was amended, effective Sept. 1, 1976, to allow spreading, but the court acknowledged that since
that amendment was prospective it did not apply to this loan. For a discussion of spreading see
Comment, Usury in Texas: Spreading Interest over the Entire Period of the Loan, 12 Hous. L.
REV. 159 (1974); Comment, Usury Implications of Front-End Interest and Interest in Advance, 29
Sw. L.J. 748 (1975).
271. 539 S.W.2d at 79. The jury found that Gertner and GGE did not intend to release any
claim for usury by the execution of the modification agreement. The court cited Commerce Trust
Co. v. Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 87, 138 S.W.2d 531, 534 (1940), in which the commission of appeals
said:
That a removal of the taint of usury cannot be accomplished by merely a renewal,
or successive renewals, of an original usurious contract, is settled beyond all
controversy. . . . In our opinion in all cases where it has been held by our courts
that an executory contract has been purged of usury, as distinguished from
release of liability for usurious interest which has been paid, it will be found that
there was a new contractual arrangement which in legal effect amounted to a
novation, or the substitution of a new contract, based on a sufficient considera-
tion, in lieu of the original usurious one.
272. 539 S.W.2d at 79-80, citing Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1937), and
distinguishing Terry v. Teachworth, 431 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The jury at the trial in GGE Management Co. had found the fee to be
interest on the loan. A similar result was reached in Moss v. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank, 533 S.W.2d
397, 399 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1976, no writ).
273. The guaranty agreement permitted the lender to extend and compromise the promissory
note without the guarantors' consent.
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its liens.274 The Texas Supreme Court affirmed 2"5 on all points, but modified
the lower court's opinion reducing the rate of interest on the debt from ten
percent a year to eight and one-half percent a year.
The usury case with probably the greatest impact is Ferguson v. Tanner
Development Co. 2 76 Ferguson purchased a tract of land in 1973 subject to a
first lien note with a principal balance of $151,900.00. He paid $6,000.00 down
on the sale price, prepaid one year's interest of $21,506.93 at the closing, and
executed a non-recourse wrap-around-note for $226,338.77. The wrap note
was payable at nine and one-half percent per annum interest in quarterly
installments for four years, after which no interest was to be paid until all of
the interest which had been prepaid at closing had been exhausted. Principal
installments began in October 1977 with the entire note balance being payable
in November 1978. Thus, the interest which was prepaid at closing was not
credited to interest payments on the note until 1977. Apparently the purchaser
had persuaded the seller to accept the prepaid interest in 1973 in lieu of a more
substantial down payment on the sale price of the land, in order that the
purchaser's investors could receive the tax benefits from the interest
deductions.
277
After the purchaser defaulted on the note and foreclosure proceedings
were started, the purchaser filed this suit to enjoin the foreclosure and to
collect usurious interest. The trial court found for the seller, but the court of
civil appeals reversed and held as follows: (1) the prepaid interest was a
portion of principal which was not advanced until 1977 and which was to be
deducted from the principal of the note in order to arrive at the amount of
money on which the seller was due interest; 278 (2) the savings clause in the
note and deed of trust permitted the spreading of the prepaid interest, but for
the purposes of avoiding usury interest would not be enforced for the purpose
of allocating to principal any of the usury interest charged on the note ;2 79 (3)
274. The mortgagee had sought judicial foreclosure, presumably because it had been enjoined
from foreclosing. The judgment of the trial court had denied foreclosure and had awarded
Gertner and GGE $272,713.65 of exemplary damages.
275. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 71 (Dec. 4, 1976). Both parties agreed that the rate should be 81 /2% a
year, as was provided in the modification agreement.
276. 541 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1976, writ filed Nov. 1, 1976).
277. On pre-paid interest see generally Comment, The Pre-paid Interest Deduction Viewed
from the Perspective of Real Estate Transactions, 29 Sw. L.J. 412 (1975).
278. 541 S.W.2d at 491, citing Mossier Acceptance Co. v. Baker, 149 S.W.2d 1016 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1941, writ ref'd). The court rejected the seller's argument that the prepaid
interest should be treated as having been prepaid throughout the term of the note into 1977, when
it was to be applied to accrued interest. The court replied that to do so "would necessarily extend
the rule authorizing prepayment of interest, which has been so often criticized as being
unsound."
279. 541 S.W.2d at 491. The court followed Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046
(1937), in allowing the spreading of prepaid interest, because the note and deed of trust did
contain a savings clause. See also Imperial Corp. of America v. Frenchman's Creek Corp., 453
F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1972). The note in Ferguson provided that in the event of prepayment or the
acceleration of maturity, any interest in excess of the lawful rate would be considered as a
payment of principal and so credited to the note. The deed of trust provided that the purchaser
would not be required to pay interest in excess of the lawful rate, and that the noteholder waived
any excess interest. The court said that "[tihe savings clause cannot operate to convert payments
of interest into payments on principal contrary to clearly stated provisions of the contract." 541
S.W.2d at 491. Cf. Hurley v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 529 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (the court responded to a similar argument of a noteholder as
follows: "Such a method of purging usury from interest payments already made is not permitted
.... "). The court in Ferguson distinguished Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 120
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the $5,087.75 of interest charged was usurious, entitling the purchaser to
recover penalty interest of $202,865.74 plus reasonable attorney's fees; 280 (4)
the fact that the purchaser requested and voluntarily paid the usurious
interest was immaterial; 281 (5) the failure to pay interest on a usurious and thus
unenforceable contract is not a default, and consequently the seller could not
declare a default on the note;282 and (6) consistent with Wall v. East Texas
Credit Union283 the purchaser could also recover the amount of usurious
interest paid to the seller without any reduction for the amount of interest
which might lawfully have been collected.
The result reached in Ferguson, even if correct, seems manifestly unfair,
considering that the purchaser had requested the seller to accept the prepaid
interest in order that the purchaser's investors could enjoy the greater
year-end tax deduction. The prepaid interest did not cause the interest to be
paid over the term of the note to exceed the lawful rate. The court, however,
was concerned about allowing a lender to collect prepaid interest so far in
advance. The note might not have been held to be usurious if it had provided
that the prepaid interest would be credited to interest due in the first year of
the note. 2 4 Furthermore, had the prepayment of the $21,506.93 of interest
Tex. 400, 30 S.W.2d 282 (1930), in which the holder of the note after default could accelerate even
unaccrued interest. The note at issue in Nevels v. Harris, on the other hand, expressly provided
that on acceleration any unearned interest would be cancelled. The court said that the doctrine of
"spreading" was rejected by the court of civil appeals in Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp, and that
the Texas Supreme Court had affirmed that decision in Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp, 135 Tex.
84, 138 S.W.2d 531 (1940), which complicated its holding. For an excellent analysis of the
"spreading" concept in usury law see Comment, Usury Implications of Front-End Interest and
Interest in Advance, 29 Sw. L.J. 748 (1975).
280. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1971) provides that any person who
"contracts for or receives" usurious interest must forfeit to the obligor twice the amount of
interest contracted for and reasonable attorney's fees. The seller argued, unsuccessfully, that the
court should base any calculation of penalty interest upon the sum of $74,488.74, the difference
between the interest payable on the wrap note and the first lien note. The court acknowledged
that this argument may have been appropriate under the former usury statute, which made a
person liable only for usurious interest he "received," but was not under the present TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1971), which authorizes a penalty of the amount of twice
the interest "contracted for, demanded or received." 541 S.W.2d at 494.
A "wrap note" includes the principal balance of the notes secured by prior liens, as well as the
deferred portion of the price on the new sale. A good discussion of the wrap note can be found in
Galowitz, How to Use Wraparound Financing, 5 REAL EST. L.J. 107 (1976) (see id. at 124-25 with
respect to usury aspects of wrap notes).
281. The note required the usurious prepayment of interest, so that it was not voluntary in a
strict contractual sense. See note 285 infra and accompanying text.
282. 541 S.W.2d at 493. The court cited Wall v. East Texas Credit Union, 533 S.W.2d 918(Tex. 1976), for the holding that interest on a usurious contract is unenforceable, and added: "It
follows logically that the failure to pay interest as stipulated in a usurious contract does not
authorize the lender to accelerate future payments of either principal or interest." 541 S.W.2d at
493. Thus, Tanner Development Co. could not offset the principal balance of the note against the
penalty interest, because the principal was not due. This holding in Ferguson and Wall suggests a
return to the pre- 1967 usury statute, which made a usurious contract void as to interest. Compare
Riverside Mall, Inc. v. Larwin Mortgage Investors, 515 S.W.2d 5, 9 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), where the court held: "The 1967 Usury Statute does not provide
that a usurious contract is void as did the previous statutes."
283. 533 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1976).
284. The court in Ferguson observed that in Bothwell v. Farmers & Merchants State Bank,
120 Tex. 1, 3, 30 S.W.2d 289, 291 (1930), it was held that the "rule sanctioning the reservation of
interest in advance at the highest conventional rate for a year or less is too firmly established to be
departed from"; and that in Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc.,
511 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the Texas Supreme Court, in
refusing writ of error, said a like procedure did not involve the spreading of front-end charges
over the life of a loan.
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been voluntary (i.e. a voluntary prepayment under the prepayment privilege
in the note) instead of being required under the note, the court may have
viewed the payment differently. 285 The court also volunteered this advice:
"Had the interest rate in the transaction before this court been adjusted
downward, the requirement of one year's interest in advance would not have
rendered the contract usurious." 28 6 Spreading during the full stated term of
the loan is now permitted by statute on loans or agreements on loan made after
September 1, 1975 which are secured by a lien on real property. 217
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of civil appeals in Gonzales
County Savings & Loan Association v. Freeman,28 but granted writ to note
its disagreement with some of the statements contained in the appellate
court's opinion. The borrower asserted that a two percent "loan fee" charged
on a loan, bearing interest at the rate of ten percent a year, was additional
interest. The lender argued that the loan fee was compensation for allowing
the borrower the opportunity to make another loan in the future, which the
appellate court said would be a commitment fee and, thus, interest. The Texas
Supreme Court disagreed, stating that if the evidence shows that the loan fee
is a legitimate commitment fee, intended only as compensation for having the
future loan available and for no other purpose, then such a fee is not
interest.289 The court emphasized that its opinion was limited to bona fide
commitment fees, and that labels provided by the lender would not control.
"For example, whether or not a charge labeled a 'commitment fee' is merely a
cloak to conceal usury depends upon whether or not the fee is unreasonable in
light of the risk to be borne by the lender."290
The lender also sought to have the loan fee treated as a "premium," which
savings and loan associations are authorized by statute291 to charge. The court
answered this argument by observing that in the statute the legislature
attempted to exclude these reasonable expenses, premiums and penalties
from the definition of interest, but had failed to fix a maximum rate for these
charges. Regardless of this "extremely complex problem. . . concerning the
Legislature's power to 'define interest and fix maximum rates of interest, ''292
the courts were left with some flexibility. For example, in the case of
''reasonable expenses" the courts have the power to determine the following:
"the reasonableness of the expenses in light of the amount of actual work
done;" "penalties need bear some reasonable relationship to the amount of
285. See Vela v. Shacklett, 12 S.W.2d 1007 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, jdgmt adopted).
286. 541 S.W.2d at 483.
287. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07 (Vernon 1975). It has been suggested that this
statute violates TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11, in that effective ceilings on interest rates are
eliminated. See Comment, supra note 279, at 764-65. However, previous authors of this Survey
article have stated that, if properly construed, art. 5069-1.07 should not be vulnerable to this
claim. Wallenstein & St. Claire (1976), supra note 2, at 45 n.151.
288. 534 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1976).
289. Id. at 906. This holding was correctly predicted in Wallenstein & St. Claire (1976), supra
note 2, at 48.
290. 534 S.W.2d at 906.
291. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 852a, § 5.07 (Vernon 1964), excepts from the definition of
interest "all reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the making, closing, disbursing,
extending, readjusting or renewing of real estate loans . . . . In addition, associations may
charge premiums for making such loans as well as penalties for prepayments or late payments
292. 534 S.W.2d at 908.
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loss or inconvenience suffered by the lender due to prepayment or late
payment; ' 293 and premiums "will be deemed to constitute interest when
seeking to determine the existence or nonexistence of usury. '294
IV. REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT: MECHANIC'S AND MATERIALMEN'S LIENS;
BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
The survey period has been an active one in the area of construction
litigation. There were many cases construing the Hardeman Act, 295 and other
cases involving general problems in building and construction contracts.
Despite the increased judicial "fleshing-out" of the Texas mechanic's and
materialmen's lien laws, however, there is still a great deal of uncertainy
which perhaps points out more than ever the need for simplification of these
statutes.
29
A. Perfecting the Lien
I. Sufficiency of Affidavit.
It has been said that-the mechanic's and materialmen's lien statutes of
Texas will be liberally construed in favor of protecting laborers and material-
men. 29 Substantial compliance with the statutory requirements is generally
sufficient to give rise to a valid lien. 298 The decisions of two Texas courts of
civil appeals during the survey period illustrate the varying application of this
rule of substantial compliance.
In Conn, Sherrod and Co., Inc. v. Tri-Electric Supply Co. 299it was held that
where the purported lien affidavit bore only an acknowledgment, the instru-
ment was not an affidavit within the meaning of article 5453,1o which requires
subcontractors claiming a lien to file an affidavit not later than 90 days after
293. Id.
294. Id. The court said that with regard to "premiums" the statute "does not purport to
define interest and cannot be regarded as an attempt by the Legislature to fix maximum rates of
interest," citing Community Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. Texas, 161 Tex. 619, 343 S.W.2d 232 (1961).
With regard to "points" charged for a loan by a savings and loan association compare Wagner v.
Austin Say. & Loan Ass'n, 525 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ).
Sanford A. Weiner has posed the following questions in light of the Freeman decision:
In light of the Court's emphasis on the option aspect of a legitimate commitment
fee, must the commitment limit the lender's remedy for failure to 'take down' the
loan to a forfeiture of the commitment fee? Must the commitment clearly specify
that the borrower merely has an option, and not an obligation, to 'take down' the
loan? What if the borrower is required to close the permanent loan as a result of a
Tri-Party Agreement or similar agreement? What if there is a pre-closed loan and
a Buy-Sell Agreement between the interim and permanent lenders?
Presentation at Houston Junior Bar Real Estate Seminar, Nov. 19, 1976; see note 266 supra.
295. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5452-5472e (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
296. See Youngblood, Mechanic's and Materialmen 's Liens in Texas, 26Sw. L.J. 665,703-07
(1972). For a thorough discussion of the pre-Hardeman Act mechanic's and materialmen's lien
laws in Texas see Woodward, The Acquisition of Mechanic's and Materialmen's Liens on
Non-Homestead Property, 14 Sw. L.J. 469 (1960).
297. Hayek v. Western Steel Co., 478 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1972).
298. Texcalco. Inc. v. McMillan, 524 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, no writ).
299. 535 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
300. TEX. REV. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 5453 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77); see Barker& Bratton Steel
Works v. North River Ins. Co., 541 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
An acknowledgment is not an affidavit. See Perkins v. Crettendon, 462 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1970);
Crocket v. Sampson, 439 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969, no writ). An acknowledge-
ment generally states that an instrument is executed for the purposes expressed therein. It does
not state that the person swears to the truth of the matters set out in the instrument. An affidavit
must contain juriat, which is the attestation to the truth of the matters contained in the writing.
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the indebtedness accrues. 30 1 Since Tri-Electric filed an "Affidavit of Correc-
tion" outside the 90 day period, the Tyler court of civil appeals held that
Tri-Electric had not substantially complied with article 5453 and therefore
had no valid lien. On the other hand, the court in Marathon Metallic Building
Co. v. Texas National Bank30 2 found that a materialman had substantially
complied with the lien laws even though the affidavit claiming the lien
erroneously named the wrong party as "owner or reputed owner" 30 3 of the
property. Marathon's lien affidavit named "O'Grady Containers, Inc." as
the owner or reputed owner, while the property in question was actually
owned by two individuals, each of whom was an officer and stockholder of
the Corporation. The property had formerly been owned by O'Grady Con-
tainers, Inc., and the county tax assessor's rolls still showed the corporate
owner. Additionally, the general contractor's purchase order named the
corporation as the customer, and Marathon's supplies were held by the
corporation at its plant. The Waco court of civil appeals held that in light of
these circumstances Marathon had substantially complied with the require-
ments of the lien laws.
Article 5455(C)3' requires that a lien affidavit contain a "general statement
of the kind of work done or materials furnished. . . , or both." Where the
lien affidavit made a claim for "materials furnished," and the two contracts
attached called for both labor and materials, the court in Mathews Construc-
tion Co. v. Jasper Housing Construction Co. 305 held that there had been
substantial compliance since the statute only requires a general statement. 306
2. The Statutory Retainage Fund.
Article 54693o7 provides for a preference lien on the ten percent retainage
fund which the owner must, if properly notified, hold for thirty days after
completion of the work. 318 The court in Donahue v. Rattikin Title Company3°9
stated, in dicta, that even where a lien could not be obtained against the
homestead because of the lack of a written contract, 310 had written notice
301. For what constitutes the "accrual of indebtedness" under the Hardeman Act see TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN art. 5467 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
302. 534 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
303. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5455(b) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77) provides, among other
things, that the affidavit claiming a lien must contain in substance the "name of the owner or
reputed owner, if known."
304. Id. art. 5455(c).
305. 528 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). For discussion of
other aspects of this case see notes 355-58 and 363-65 infra and accompanying text.
306. See Youngblood, supra note 296, at 677. Prior to 1961 it was necessary for a detailed
summarization to be made in the affidavit. See Woodward, supra note 296, at 482.
307. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5469 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
308. The owner must retain 10% of the contract price for work done under each original
contract. This rule reflects the legislative reversal of the decision in Hayek v. Western Steel Co.,
478 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1972), which held that the owner must retain 10% of the total improvement
cost rather than merely 10% of a particular contract for specific work. Section 2 of art. 5452 was
amended by the legislature in 1972, changing the definition of "work" to that "which is
performed pursuant to an original contract." The 1972 amendments also added a definition of
"contract price" which is limited to costs incurred "pursuant to an original contract." See
Wallenstein (1974), supra note 2, at 5 1. See generally Youngblood, supra note 296, at 682-87,707.
309. 534 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
310. See TEX. CoNsr. art. XVI, § 50. A valid mechanic's lien against the homestead requires a
contract in writing, signed by both husband and wife, and recorded with the county clerk before
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been served upon the owner as required,3 1' personal judgment could have
been obtained to the extent of ten percent of the contract price which should
have been, but was not, retained by the owner.312 No cases were cited by the
court in support of this dictum. It is clear that the failure to retain the ten
percent as required by law may expose the owner to a personal judgment as
provided in article 5463, section 2, 3 13 but it is not clear that this rule should
have any application in the case of a homestead where the provisions of
article 5460314 and article XVI, section 50, of the Texas Constitution" 5 are not
satisfied. 316 The court also held that the title company breached its agency
contract with the owner by paying subcontractors in violation of the terms of
an escrow agreement. The owner had placed money in escrow with the title
company under an agreement which authorized Rattikin to apply the funds in
payment of "perfected valid mechanic's or materialmen's liens." The court
found this provision unambiguous, and held that as the title company had paid
subcontractors whose liens were not perfected and valid, the title company
was liable to the owner for such amounts.
Sixty-Seven Properties v. Cutsinger Electrical Contractors317 illustrates the
relationship between the concept of recovery in quantum meruit1 8 and the ten
percent retainage provision of the mechanic's and materialmen's lien stat-
utes.3 19 The court permitted a subcontractor which had been wrongfully
terminated to recover in quantum meruit and to foreclose a lien on the
property to the extent of the ten percent retainage fund. 320 While there is some
authority that when recovery is in quantum meruit there can be no lien on the
land,321 the courts have rather consistently allowed a lien to the extent of the
work done where work is wrongfully halted by the owner or where there has
performance of the work. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.'art. 5460 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77); TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3839 (Vernon 1966). See Kepley v. Zachary, 131 Tex. 554, 116 S.W.2d 699
(1938).
311. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5453 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
312. The owner gave the original contractor a promissory note for $60,000 which the court
treated as being payment in full. 534 S.W.2d at 157. See W & W Floor Covering Co. v. Project
Acceptance Co., 412 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, no writ).
313. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5463(2) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77). See W & W Floor
Covering Co. v. Project Acceptance Co., 412 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, no writ).
314. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5460 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
315. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
316. This is not to say, however, that unpaid contractors may not recover personal judgments
from homestead owners. But where, as in Donahue v. Rattikin Title, the general contractor is
fully paid, it seems anomalous to permit his unpaid subcontractors to trap funds and recover
under arts. 5469 and 5463, absent compliance with the requirements of article 5460 and the Texas
Constitution. See note 310 supra.
317. 536 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ).
318. Quantum meruit is one of the two major "value counts," the other being quantum
valebant. Quantum meruit is for the recovery of the value of services, while quantum valebant
pertains to goods. See D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 4.2, at 237-38 (1973).
319. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5469 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77). See notes 307, 308 supra
and accompanying text.
320. In order to secure recovery under the lien statutes for less than full performance, there
must either be substantial compliance with the contract or the owner must wrongfully prevent the
contractor's compliance. If the materialman or laborer does not substantially perform, recovery
is limited to the value of the improvement to the owner, and there is no lien or recovery of
attorneys' fees available. Davidson v. Clearman, 391 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. 1965). If further perform-
ance is prevented by the owner, the builder may recover in quantum meruit. Austin Stone Indus.,
Inc. v. Capital Powder Co., 290 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
321. Davidson v. Clearman, 391 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. 1965).
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been substantial compliance with the contract.322 In Sixty-Seven Properties
the subcontractor was held to have perfected a valid lien against the land to
the extent of the ten percent fund which should have been retained under
article 5469, even though the lien affidavit was not filed within thiry days after
the work was completed. The court noted that while the claimant must both
send notice and file an affidavit within thirty days after completion of the
work in order to perfect a lien against the retainage fund under article 5469,
the filing of an affidavit within thirty days is not required in order to secure a
lien against the property.323 In such a case the contractor need only comply
with the notice provisions of article 5453 .324
B. Priorities
1. Inception of the Lien.
One of the more noteworthy decisions during the survey period is that of
the Amarillo court of civil appeals in Justice Mortgage Investors v. C.B.
Thompson Construction Co. 32 5 As security for the original construction loan
note, Justice took a deed of trust covering the realty together with a financing
statement covering all personal property then or thereafter on or attached to
the land and/or improvements thereon. The deed of trust contained a "drag-
net clause" providing that it secured payment of renewals of and increases in
the amount of the original note. 326 In February 1973 Thompson moved a tool
shed on the property and began some preliminary staking. Later, in
November 1973 after Justice had advanced approximately one million dollars
on the loan, a new note was executed by the owner as a renewal of,
substitution for, and an increase in the original note. When the owner failed to
make the designated payments, Justice exercised its rights under the optional
322. See, e.g., Grayson County State Bank v. Osborne, 531 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Robinson v. Leach, 237 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
195 1, writ ref'd n.r.e.). While it appears well settled that a lien may be had to secure the payment
of the value of services rendered up to the time of the breach of the construction contract by the
owner, should such a recovery be limited by the contract price? Moreover, in situations where the
contractor would have sustained a substantial loss on the contract had he been allowed to
complete the work, should he nevertheless be permitted a quantum meruit recovery and hence a
lien when he is saved this loss because of the owner's breach? There are two competing theories
at work here. On one hand, the law attempts to provide the builder with the benefit of his bargain;
on the other hand, there is a strong policy in favor of avoiding the unjust enrichment of the owner.
The general rule seems to permit the contractor to recover in excess of the contract price where
he bases his recovery on the theory of rescission and restitution. See Boomer v. Muir, 24 P.2d 570
(Cal. App. 1933). In Texas it is clear that a builder may not recover both under the contract and on
a quantum meruit basis. See Osage Oil & Ref. Co. v. Lee Farm Oil Co., 230 S.W. 518 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1921, writ ref'd). See also Sherril v. Bruce Advertising, Inc., 538 S.W.2d 865
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ); Freeman v. Carroll, 499 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Black Lake Pipeline Co. v. Union Constr. Co.,
538 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1976), discussed in note 375 infra. However, it is not clear whether in cases
of rescission and restitution the quantum meruit recovery may exceed the contract price.
Compare Texas Associates, Inc. v. Bland Constr. Co., 222 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.), with Schulz v. Tessman, 48 S.W.207 (Tex. Civ. App.-1898), rev'd on
other grounds, 92 Tex. 488, 49 S.W. 1031 (1899). See also Texas Delta Upsilon Foundation v.
Fehr, 307 S.W.2d 124, 131 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
323. 536 S.W.2d at 272; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5453, 5463 (Vernon Supp.
1976-77). See also W & W Floor Covering Co. v. Project Acceptance Co., 412 S.W.2d 379 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1967, no writ).
324. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5453 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77); see note 300 supra and
accompanying text.
325. 533 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
326. For a discussion of dragnet or future advance clauses see Wallenstein & St. Claire (1976),
supra note 2, at 53 n.214.
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acceleration clause in the note and declared the entire loan due. Thompson
filed suit claiming that its recorded mechanic's lien was superior to Justice's
deed of trust lien and security interest, and asked for and obtained a
temporary restraining order and a temporary injunction preventing the trus-
tee's sale. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order and, after
hearing, granted the temporary injunction.
In the court of civil appeals the central controversy concerned the relative
priorities of the liens. A deed of trust mortgagee claiming under a deed of trust
given solely to secure payment of a non-purchase money debt will have
priority only if the deed of trust was recorded prior to the inception of the
mechanic's and materialmen's lien. 327 Section 2 of article 5459328 establishes
the inception of a mechanic's and materialmen's lien at the occurrence of the
earliest of (1) actual commencement of construction or delivery of material to
be used in construction to the land if either is actually visible from inspection
of the land, or (2) the proper recording of the written agreement, if any, to
perform or furnish materials, or (3) the proper recording of a sufficient
affidavit by the lien claimant of an oral agreement for construction. The court
in Justice Mortgage Investors held that Thompson's lien had its inception
when Thompson actually commenced construction or delivered materials to
be used in construction, and not when Thompson placed a tool shed and did
preliminary staking of the property. 329 Thus, Justice's deed of trust lien,
including advances made pursuant to the renewal of the original construction
loan note, was found to be prior in time and superior to Thompson's
mechanic's and materialmen's lien. 330
327. It has been held that a vendor's lien on the land or the lien of a mortgagee claiming under a
purchase money deed of trust will by necessity have its inception prior to that of a mechanic's
lien. See Irving Lumber Co. v. Alitex Mortgage Co., 468 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1971); National W.
Life Ins. Co. v. Acreman, 415 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1967), aff'd in part and
modified in part, 425 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. 1968); Shamburger Lumber Co. v. Holbert, 34 S.W.2d 614
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1931, no writ). A mechanic's lien claimant who contracts with a
prospective owner cannot obtain priority over a vendor's lien which encumbers the property
when title is transferred. Harveson v. Youngblood, 38 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931,
holding adopted), except as provided in TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5459, § I (Vernon Supp.
1976-77).
328. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5459, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77). For the very interesting
history of the circumstances leading up to the enactment of this provision see Youngblood, supra
note 296, at 665. See also Note, Deed of Trust Mortgage Foreclosure Problems, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J.
135, 146-50 (1975).
329. This result is based on the theory that mere preparation for construction, such as staking
the property, is insufficient to constitute the commencement of construction. See Kloster-
Madsen, Inc. v. Tafi's, Inc., 226 N.W.2d 603 (Minn. 1975); M.E. Craft Excavating & Grading Co.
v. Barac Constr. Co., 279 Minn. 278, 156 N.W.2d 748 (1968); Mortgage Associates, Inc. v.
Monona Shores, Inc., 47 Wis. 2d 171, 177 N.W.2d 340 (1970). The wording of art. 5459, § 2
supports this result. What is not clear, however, is whether the lien of a second original contractor
will relate back to and have its inception at the commencement of visible construction by the first
original contractor. See Woodward, The Hardeman Act-Some Unanswered Questions, 6 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 1 (1974).
330. Generally, whether a prior deed of trust lien secures additional indebtedness depends on
whether the additional advances were reasonably within the contemplation of the parties at the
time the deed of trust was executed. See Wood v. Parker Square State Bank, 400 S.W.2d 898(Tex. 1966); Moss v. Hipp, 387 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1965); Coke Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 529 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd). See generally Wallenstein & St.
Claire (1976), supra note 2, at 53 n.214. Dragnet clauses such as the one involved in this case often
create problems for subsequent purchasers. See, e.g., Estes v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 462 S.W.2d
273 (Tex. 1970). See also Airline Commerce Bank v. Commercial Credit Corp., 531 S.W.2d 171




2. "Whirlpool Doctrine."3 3'
A mechanic's and materialmen's lien is given preference over all prior
recorded liens unless the prior lien will be "affected" by the enforcement of
the mechanic's lien.3 32 A prior lien will be affected if the removal of improve-
ments will cause material injury to the land, to pre-existing improvements, or
to the improvements to be removed.33 3 The court in Justice Mortgage Inves-
tors reaffirmed this rule holding that Justice's deed of trust lien was superior
except with respect to items of improvement furnished by Thompson which
could be removed without material injury to the land, to the building, and to
the items themselves.
334
Although implied by the language of the opinion, the court did not specifi-
cally state whether the preference lien for mechanics and materialmen is
limited to severable improvements furnished by the claimant himself, or
whether the claimant is entitled to remove any and all severable improve-
ments sufficient to satisfy his lien, including those on which the claimant
never worked and those which he did not furnish. The early decisions on this
issue held the preference lien applicable to all severable improvements.
3 5
More recent authority, however, supports the view implied in the Thompson
case that priority is allowed only with respect to improvements furnished by
the lien claimant.
336
Justice argued that with respect to the severable improvement its prior
recorded security interest was superior to Thompson's mechanic's lien, even
though the deed of trust lien had no such priority. The court rejected this
contention, citing Whirlpool,337 which held that mechanic's and material-
men's liens have a preference with respect to improvements which are
sufficiently affixed to the real estate so as to become part thereof. 338 Finally,
the court held that although Thompson had shown a probable right of
recovery with respect to severable improvements, it was not shown that an
interim legal injury would probably result unless the trustee's sale was
331. First Nat'l Bank v. Whirlpool Corp., 517 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1974).
332. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5459, § I (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
333. First Nat'l Bank v. Whirlpool Corp., 517 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1974); Hammann v.
McMullen & Co., 122 Tex. 476, 62 S.W.2d 59 (1933); see Wallenstein (1975), supra note 2, at
48-49.
334. 533 S.W.2d at 944.
335. Wallace Gin Co. v. Burton-Lingo Co., 104 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1937, no
writ); R.B. Spencer & Co. v. Brown, 198 S.W. 1179 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1917, writ ref'd).
This view is grounded on the theory that a mechanic's and materialman's lien is a charge on the
entire parcel of real property, so that when improvements are affixed to the realty and lose their
identity as personalty, such improvements are thus subject to the lien, regardless of who actually
placed them on the land.
336. See Houk Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Mortgage & Trust, Inc., 517 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1974, no writ); Kaspar v. Cockrell-Riggins Lighting Co., 511 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1974, no writ); Freed v. Bozman, 304 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.). This view seems to be supported by implication in First Nat'l Bank v.
Whirlpool Corp., 517 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1974) (citing Freed v. Bozman, supra, with approval).
337. 533 S.W.2d at 944-45.
338. Cf. Gulf Coast State Bank v. Nelms, 525 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1975). This rule creates an
obvious grey area between those items which are placed on the land, but are not sufficiently
attached and thus remain personalty subject to ch. 9 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code,
those which are sufficiently affixed so as to be subject to a mechanic's and materialmen's lien,
and those which are so affixed that they are not severable without material damage and are thus
subject to a prior deed of trust lien.
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enjoined. 339 Presumably, there could be no injury since foreclosure under the
deed of trust could not affect the mechanic's lien to the extent it had
priority. 340 Therefore, the court of civil appeals held that the trial court had
abused its discretion in granting the temporary injunction.
3. Trust Fund Statute. 34'
In American Amicable Life Insurance Co. v. Jay's Air Conditioning and
Heating, Inc.34 the court held that a materialman was not a trustee of funds
for the benefit of the beneficiary under the deed of trust covering the
property. On the contrary, the court found that the trust fund statute gives a
materialman a preferred status with respect to funds borrowed by the general
contractor.3 43 The court also held that for the purpose of determining whether
there has been payment in full a subcontractor who has several existing
unpaid accounts owed to him by a particular general contractor is permitted to
follow a "first-in, first-out" rule with random payments received from that
general contractor applied to the oldest existing debt. 344 The court did not
discuss the applicability of this rule where the subcontractor knows the
source of the payments and/or is instructed as to how the payments should be
applied .14
C. Performance and Payment Bonds3'4
Parliament Insurance Co. v. L. B. Foster Co. 347 involved a supplier
bringing suit against a surety on a performance and payment bond executed
by a subcontractor in favor of the original contractor. 348 The supplier had
furnished materials to the subcontractor who was unable to pay for them. The
surety argued that the payment language in the bond was solely for the
purpose of indemnifying the general contractor for any payments for which it
might become liable on account of the subcontractor, and as such, the bond
was not for the benefit of the supplier. In holding that the bond was intended
to and did enure to the benefit of suppliers and subcontractors, the court
noted that ordinarily a performance bond is for the benefit of the principal
(here the general contractor), whereas a payment bond generally benefits
339. 533 S.W.2d at 946. A temporary injunction is not proper unless the applicant shows a
probable injury. Armendariz v. Mora, 526 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. 1975); Chisholm v. Adams, 71 Tex.
678, 10 S.W. 336 (1888).
340. It is well settled that the foreclosure of a junior lien does not affect a senior lien. 39TEx.
JUR. 2d Mortgages and Trust Deeds § 174 (1976).
341. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5472e (Vernon Supp. 1976-77). The statute declares funds
borrowed for the improvement of real property to be trust funds for the benefit of suppliers and
laborers. See Youngblood, supra note 296, at 687. Another case decided under art. 5472e is
Celanese Coating Co., Devoe Paint Div. v. Soliz, 541 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1976, no writ).
342. 535 S.W.2d 23 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
343. See Panhandle Bank & Trust Co. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 492 S.W.2d 76, 81 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
344. 535 S.W.2d at 26.
345. See related discussion in note 352 infra.
346. See generally TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5160-5160a (Vernon 1971), as amended,
(Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
347. 533 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
348. The original contractor required the subcontractor to secure a performance and payment
bond. See A.B.C. Truck Rental & Leasing Co. v. Pletz, 540 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), for another case involving a subcontractor's performance bond.
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laborers and materialmen. While the result in this case seems correct, in
further support of its decision the court unnecessarily stated that all doubts
and ambiguities in a bond must be resolved against a surety.34 9 This statement
is a departure from the general rule that a surety's obligation will be strictly
construed within the terms of the contract,350 and should be questioned since
among the cases relied on as authority the court cited First State Bank v.
Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co.,35 1 a Texas Supreme Court decision
which actually held in accordance with the general rule of strict construction.
The court went further in holding that where a bond is for the benefit of
materialmen, it is inconsequential that some materials are supplied prior to
the execution of the bond. As long as the materials are used in performance of
the work covered by the sub-contract, a payment bond will secure payment of
the price of such materials. 352 Generally, as between principal (contractor)
and surety, the latter will be discharged from liability because of a violation by
the principal of the terms of the bond, including a material alteration of the
contract between the contractor and owner. 353 As pointed out in a recent
case,354 however, where there is a payment bond for the benefit of material-
men, the surety is not discharged as to materialmen who furnished supplies
after a material alteration of the original contract but who were without actual
or constructive notice of such alteration.
Article 5472d, section 6, 355 provides that a claim under a payment bond
must be made within fourteen months after the required notice 356 is given. In
Mathews Construction Co. v. Jasper Housing Construction Co.157 the plain-
tiff filed its original petition within the fourteen month period, but its
amended petition was filed beyond the statutory period. In reversing the trial
court, the court of civil appeals held that as the amended complaint was not
based on a new, distinct, or different transaction, 35 8 the plaintiff had suffi-
ciently invoked its claim against the surety within the statutory period.
349. 533 S.W.2d at 49.
350. See generally, 53 TEX. JUR. 2d Suretyship § 27 (1964).
351. 125 Tex. 113, 79 S.W.2d 835 (1935). The court also cited a civil appeals case, Fidelity &
Deposit Co. v. Central State Bank, 12 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1928, no writ), which
goes against the weight of authority.
352. Another issue in the case concerned the fact that prior to the subcontract in question, the
subcontractor owed outstanding balances for other materials; the materialman apparently
applied some of the proceeds of the subcontract to discharge these prior obligations. Generally, a
surety is entitled to have the proceeds from the contract covered by the bond applied toward the
discharge of the debt for which the surety is bound. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hawn Lumber
Co., 128 Tex. 296, 97 S.W.2d 460 (1936). However, this rule is qualified in cases where the
recipent of the payments does not know the source of the funds and does not receive any special
instructions regarding the application of the payments. Here there was no evidence that the
materialman knew of the source of the payments or received any instructions as to their
application.
353. Straus-Frank Co. v. Hughes, 138 Tex. 50, 156 S.W.2d 519 (1941).
354. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Borden Metal Prods. Co., 539 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ).
355. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5472d(6) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
356. Notice may be given either in compliance with id. art. 5453, or as provided in art.
5472d(4). See Barker & Bratton Steel Works, Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 541 S.W.2d 294 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
357. 528 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). For discussion of
other aspects of this case see notes 305-06 supra and 363-65 infra and accompanying text.
358. Leonard v. Texaco, Inc., 422 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1967), sets forth the rule as to when the
statute of limitations should apply to amended pleadings. See also Hallaway v. Thompson, 148
Tex. 471, 226 S.W.2d 816 (1950); John H. Pelt Co. v. American Cas. Co., 513 S.W.2d 128 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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First Hutchings-Sealy National Bank v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 311
concerned the priority of a surety under a contractor's payment and perform-
ance bond as against the bank which made a loan to the contractor and
obtained a security interest in the construction contract. The bank advanced
over $35,000.00 before the contractor became unable to perform and de-
faulted on the contract, and the surety assumed the contract and completed
the job. Thereafter, the owner paid the balance of the contract funds to the
surety. The defaulting contractor never paid the surety the amount of its loss
under the contract, and the contractor also defaulted in the payment of its
note to the bank. The bank then brought suit against the contractor, the
owner, and the surety. The trial court entered a take nothing judgment against
the owner and the surety. On appeal, the bank argued that its perfected
security interest in the construction contract gave it priority to funds paid to
the surety who completed the work under the contract.
Article 5160, section E, 360 provides that in the event a contractor who has
furnished a performance bond fails to perform his contract, no further
proceeds of that contract shall be payable to him until the cost of completing
the work has been paid by the contractor. That section also provides that any
balance remaining on the contract shall be payable to the contractor or his
surety in accordance with their respective interests. The court held that as the
bank had no greater right to the contract funds than the defaulting contractor,
and the contractor was barred from recovering funds under the contract by
article 5160, section E, the bank was likewise barred from any recovery.36'
D. Building and Construction Contracts3 62
Mathews Construction Co. v. Jasper Housing Construction Co.363 also
involved several issues concerning construction contracts. An unpaid sub-
359. 532 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
360. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5160(E) (Vernon 1971).
361. The bank had argued that its security interest in the construction contract gave the bank a
prior right to funds earned under that contract by the surety which assumed the contract and
performed the remaining contractual obligations. The bank's theory seems to suggest that the
surety, not the bank, stood in the shoes of the defaulting contractor. This argument has a certain
amount of force, but it goes against the weight of authority in Texas which holds that the rights of
a surety are superior to the rights of a bank as the contractor's assignee. See, e.g., O'Neil Eng'r
Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 222 S.W. 1091 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920, holding approved); Deer Park
Bank v. Aetna Ins. Co., 493 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, no writ). These cases
as well as First Hutchings-Sealy cast the position of the surety as having subrogation rights under
the owner. 532 S.W.2d at 117. Subrogation means that one person is allowed to stand in the shoes
of another and assert his rights. See generally D. DOBBs, supra note 107, § 4.3, at 250-52. What the
courts seem to be saying is that a surety who performs for the defaulting contractor is subrogated
to the rights of the owner against that contractor. In First Hutchings-Sealy these rights followed
out of a construction contract which was prior in time and right to the bank's assignment.
Moreover, since the bank stood in the contractor's shoes as its assignee, the surety thus had a
position superior to that of the bank. See Hess & Skinner Eng'r Co. v. Turney, I OTex. 148,216
S.W. 621 (1919). In spite of the case law supporting the surety's position, it is submitted that had
the original contract been terminated and a new "completion contract" been entered into, the
bank's argument would have been insupportable. This latter procedure would be advisable under
cases such as First Hutchings-Sealy.
362. In addition to the cases discussed in the text see Ross v. Stinnett, 540 S.W.2d 493 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler, 1976, no writ) (parol evidence rule); McPherson v. Longview United Pen-
tecostal Church, Inc., 540 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (unsigned
instrument held construction contract); Crawford-Strauss Properties, Inc. v. Doolittle, 540
S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (substantial performance).
363. 528 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). For discussion of
other aspects of this case see notes 305-06 and 355-58 supra and accompanying text.
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contractor assigned its lien to a bank and executed two promissory notes. The
general contractor guaranteed payment of the notes and orally promised to
pay the subcontractor the interest on the notes. The court held that the general
contractor's oral agreement to pay the interest was not barred by the Statute
of Frauds 36 since this was not a promise to pay the debt of another, but rather
a direct promise to reimburse the subcontractor for interest charges incurred.
Since Jasper Housing had agreed to pay the interest in order to defer paying its
obligation to Mathews, this promise was supported by adequate considera-
tion. The court also held that when Mathews performed the ground prepara-
tion work for Jasper Housing, Mathews was performing a service so that
attorneys' fees would be recoverable under article 2226.365
Muller v. Light366 concerned issues under both an express contract and an
oral agreement. The contractor sued the owner for the cost of construction
and certain extra items, and to foreclose a lien on the property. The owner
brought a counterclaim based on a liquidated damage provision in the
construction contract under which the owner was given the right to deduct
$100.00 per day for each day the work remained unfinished after the
scheduled completion date. In refusing to honor the liquidated damages
clause, the court noted that the clause would establish damages of $3,000.00
per month while the undisputed rental value of the home was approximately
$400.00 per month. Since actual damages would not have been difficult to
estimate when the contract was made, and since the liquidated sum was
clearly excessive, the court found that "the provision was intended to serve
as an in terrorem device to insure prompt performance by the builder, rather
than as a reasonable estimate of actual damages. '367
The jury, in answering certain special issues, found an oral agreement
whereby the builder promised to perform certain extra work in a "good and
workmanlike manner." It was also found that the builder had breached this
contract by not properly constructing the extra items. The court held that
although the work was defective, it was of some value to the owner, and that
the builder was therefore entitled to recover the value of the extras less the
estimated cost to repair them. 368
It was held in Syring- Workman, Inc. v. Colbert369 that a contract providing
that the "Approximate Maximum Cost shall be $120,000" for remodeling and
renovating a building did not limit the maximum cost of the project to the
owner to $120,000.00. The court stated that the word "approximate" indi-
cated that the parties contemplated a "reasonable variance. 3 70
364. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE. ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1%8).
365. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon 1971). Absent statutory authorization or
provision in a written contract, attorneys' fees are not recoverable. See New Amsterdam Cas.
Co. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 414 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1967). Seealso Bullard v. Carroll Equip. Co., 539
S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
366. 538 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
367. Id. at 488. See also Loggins Constr. Co. v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 543 S.W.2d
682 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
368. See Rogowicz v. Taylor & Gray, Inc., 498 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). A builder is precluded from any recovery whatsoever only if his work is worthless to
the owner. The court did not discuss the availability of a lien in this case. See notes 310-22 supra
and accompanying text.
369. 532 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
370. Id. at 710. Such a provision does not render the contract so indefinite as to be
unenforceable. See Norton v. Menard Lumber Co., 523 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1975, no writ).
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In Board of Regents of the University of Texas v. S. & G. Construction
Co. 371 the written contract for the construction of married students apart-
ments included as attachments maps, plats, drawings, and site plans, and
contained a provision requiring the Board of Regents to furnish the contractor
with "instructions and detail drawings necessary to carry out the work
included in the contract. ' 372 The Board failed to provide correct plans,
specifications, instructions, and detailed drawings necessary to carry out the
work called for in the contract. In fact, the topographical survey provided by
the Board contained numerous errors which greatly increased the cost of
construction to the builder. After completing the project the builder brought
this action for additional compensation, seeking damages incurred as a result
of the Board's failure to supply a correct survey. The trial court entered
judgment in favor of the builder.
The Board of Regents argued that the builder, having elected to complete
the work in spite of the Board's breach of the contract, waived the breach and
was estopped from asserting any claim for additional compensation other
than under the change-order procedure contained in the contract. The court
rejected this theory holding that the builder's election to continue construc-
tion simply precluded the builder from subsequently ceasing its performance
based on the Board's breach.373 The court stated that the builder's additional
compensation was not limited by the change-order procedure set forth in the
contract. The builder was held entitled to recover the additional costs
incurred, this being the measure of damages which would place the builder as
nearly as possible in the position in which it would have been had the Board
not breached the contract.374
Another case decided during the survey period, however, denied the
builder any recovery for additional expenses incurred in the performance of a
construction contract. In Brown-McKee, Inc. v. Western Beef, Inc.37 5 a
builder sought to recover additional expenses incurred because of the unfor-
seen presence of rock under the construction site. The court considered the
distinction between extras and work required by the contract, and held that
extra work is that which arises outside and independent of the contract. Thus,
any work done incidental to the performance of the contract would not be
compensable as extra work. The court found that the expense of clearing rock
was incurred in order to facilitate the performance of the builder's contractual
obligations. Moreover, the builder could not recover on the basis of mistake
since the court found that any mistake relating to the presence of underlying
rock did not go to the substance of the contract, but related to a mere
collateral matter.37 6 The court, however, did not indicate the criteria for
371. 529 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
372. Id. at 95.
373. Id. at 97.
374. Id. at 98.
375. 538 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). During the survey
period the Texas Supreme Court made the distinction between "extras" and work called for
under an express contract clear in Black Lake Pipe Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 538 S.W.2d 80(Tex. 1976), where the court held that the existence of an express contract bars recovery in
quantum meruit only with respect to work covered by the express contract. Compare the general
rule discussed in note 322 supra.
376. 538 S.W.2d at 845.
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distinguishing mere collateral matters from those which go to the substance of
a contract. This metaphysical distinction is not a sound basis for decision. 377
The result reached by the court ultimately rests on its finding that the expense
incurred in clearing the rock was necessary in the performance of the
builder's contractual obligations .37 8 Thus, such expenses were part and parcel
of the risks incurred by the builder under the contract in question, and
accordingly must be borne by him.
An interesting case only tangentially related to building contracts neverthe-
less exemplifies the hidden obstacles which can often impede the develop-
ment of real property. The court in Brodhead v. City of Forney379 held that
developers could not recover damages from the city because of the city's
breach of an agreement to install water lines and sanitary sewer lines and do
street work in a subdivision developed by the plaintiffs. Article 11, sections
five and seven of the Texas Constitution 380 provide that no debt shall ever be
incurred by a city or county unless, at the same time, provision is made for
levying and collecting a sufficient tax to provide payment of interest on the
debt and a sinking fund of at least two percent for payment of principle. The
court held that the plaintiffs failed to meet the burden of pleading and proving
that the constitutional requirements were met or that the debt when made was
payable out of available current revenues.38'
V. LANDLORD AND TENANT
A. Construction of Lease Agreements
1. Renewal Options.
Most landlord and tenant cases decided during this survey period involved
the interpretation of lease provisions. Three cases dealt with options to renew
leases. In Stephenson v. Chrisman382 the court was asked to decide whether
an option to renew a lease at a rental rate to be fixed by future agreement 383 of
the parties was enforceable. The parties had been unable to agree on a
renewal rental rate at the end of the primary term. The trial court held the
renewal option enforceable, and set the renewal rental at a rate it found to be
reasonable. The court of civil appeals reversed because, in its view, reason-
377. The courts in Pruett v. Munroe, 474 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1971, no writ), and City Inv. & Loan Co. v. Wichita Hardware Co., 57 S.W.2d 222, 223
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1931), rev'd in part on other grounds, 127 Tex. 44,91 S.W.2d 683
(1936), struggled with the meaning of "collateral."
378. 538 S.W.2d at 844.
379. 538 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
380. TEX. CONST. art. XI, §§ 5, 7.
381. 538 S.W.2d at 875; see City of Terrell v. Dissaint, 71 Tex. 770, 9 S.W. 593 (1888). For
another case concerning water and sewer services see Clear Lake Apartments, Inc. v. Clear Lake
Util. Co., 537 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ granted), discussed in
the text accompanying notes 92-94 supra. See also A.F. Conner & Sons v. Tri-County Water
Supply Corp., 541 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ) (breach of contract to
construct water distribution system).
382. 537 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ).
383. The lease agreement gave the lessee the option to renew the lease for an additional
five-year period "upon such money rents as may be agreed upon by the parties but not more than
the sums for which same could be leased to a bona fide lessee." Presumably, all the terms of the
original lease, other than the rental rate, were to be carried forward in the renewal. See 2 M.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 228, § 14.1, at 557; 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 71 (1968).
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able rental value was not necessarily the rate at which the property could be
leased to a bona fide lessee, as required by the lease. Before abandoning its
effort to decide the enforceability of the option, the court noted that a lease
agreement which gave the lessee the "first refusal to renew this lease at a
price to be agreed upon or to meet any bona-fide offer" had been held to be
unenforceable in Schlusselberg v. Rubin38 4 because such a provision was
indefinite and uncertain. Nevertheless, the court appears to have felt that
Pickrell v. Buckler 385 was some authority for the enforceability of the renewal
option. The court of civil appeals in Stephenson, after discussing these two
cases, concluded that there is a division of authority among the various states
as to the enforceability of renewal option provisions which leave the rental
rate to the future agreement of the parties. The court, however, refused to
expressly adopt either view and remanded the case for a new trial on the issue
of the proper renewal rate. This aspect of the decision is unfortunate; if, after
a new trial the court of civil appeals holds the renewal option to be unenforce-
able, the time and expense of the second trial will have been wasted. The
Schlusselberg decision is in line with the majority rule386 unless the Texas
courts are ready to adopt a rule that such a renewal option will be enforced at a
reasonable rental rate where the parties are unable to agree upon a rate. 387
Parties to a lease should avoid this problem either by agreeing in advance
upon the rentals for the renewal period, or by providing in the lease a method
of arriving at the rental, such as by appraisal, arbitration, application of a
definite formula, or reference to comparable properties. In agreeing upon a
future rate the lessee should consider adjustments for improvements he will
make during the primary term and reductions in value due to condemnation,
depreciation, and other factors.
The lessor was the one contending that the renewal option of an office lease
had been exercised in Pratt v. Dallas County.38  The lessee, by giving written
notice,389 had the option to renew the lease on the same terms, except that the
384. 465 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Schlusselberg the
court found the requirement that the renewal rate be agreed upon by the parties to be fatal. It
would appear that the court in that case probably would have upheld the option if it had omitted
that requirement and had merely given the lessee the right to meet any bona fide offer. There was
no evidence that a bona fide offer to lease the property had been made by a third party. A "first
refusal to renew" is comparable to a first refusal right, which gives the lessee the right to renew
the lease only in the event the lessor wants to relet at the end of the lease term. 2 M. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 228, § 14.1, at 550.
385. 293 S.W. 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1927, writ ref'd). Pickrell is discussed in 36TEx.
JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 243, at 89 n.2 (1962). The renewal of the lease under the option
before the court in tickrell was to be "at the price the party of the first part is willing to rent to any
one else." The court of civil appeals in Stephenson observed that, while the appeals court in
Pickrell held that the renewal option was void for uncertainty, the Texas Supreme Court in
refusing error disagreed with that holding. The Pickrell case was distinguished in Schlusselberg
on the basis that the rental rate under the renewal option was not to be set by agreement of the
parties, but by the choice of the lessor. The lessor could, under an option allowing him to set the
renewal rate, simply set the rate higher than the lessee would be willing to pay. One court,
however, has held that if the lessor choses a renewal rate that is unconscionable, the court will set
a proper rate. Tai On Luck Corp. v. Cirota, 35 App. Div. 2d 380, 316 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1970).
386. 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 228, § 14.1, at 562.
387. Compare 2 id. § 14.1, at 562-65.
388. 531 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
389. The court held that the lessor can waive the requirement for written notice, since it is for
the lessor's sole benefit, citing Pruett Jewelers, Inc. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 426 S.W.2d 902, 905
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See note 390 infra.
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rental rate would be increased by five percent. No written notice was given by
the lessee; however, it held over after the termination of the original lease.
After the lessor gave the lessee notice that the rental rate was increased by
five percent, the lessee paid this increased rate for two months before
abandoning the premises and refused to pay additional rentals. The lessor
took the position that the lessee had, as a matter of law, exercised the renewal
option by remaining in possession and paying the increased rentals. The court
of civil appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that although, in the absence
of an express or implied agreement, a lessee's holding over and payment of
rentals would constitute an election to exercise the renewal option, in this
case the lease expressly provided that a holding over would be construed as a
tenancy from month-to-month only. The court found that this provision
controlled the relationship of the parties after the expiration of the primary
lease term, even though the lessee did pay the rental rate provided for under
the renewal clause. 390
As illustrated by Parham v. Gloss Club Lake, Inc. ,391 Texas follows the rule
that in the absence of a lease provision to the contrary a lessee can exercise an
option to renew the lease even though he is then in default under the lease.
Although the court in Parham found that the lessee had violated the lease by
fencing a part of the lake, a breach of that covenant did not excuse the lessor
from the obligation to renew the lease. The lease did not provide that the
lessor could forfeit the lease because of a violation or nonperformance of a
covenant other than the failure to pay rent. Further, the exercise of the option
to renew was not conditioned upon performance of or compliance with all or
any of the covenants in the lease.3 92 A different result should be reached in a
case where the lease requires that the lessee be in good standing at the time the
renewal option is exercised, unless, of course, the lessor waives the default or
390. The hold-over clause involved in Pruett Jewelers, Inc. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 426 S.W.2d
902 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.), provided that the lessee would pay the same
rental rate as was paid during the last month of the primary term. One Texas court has held that a
lease provision which states that holding over does not constitute a renewal can be waived. In
McCue v. Collins, 208 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1948, no writ), the court held that
acceptance of increased rentals for fifteen months after the expiration of the primary term and
evidence of an oral agreement to extend the lease term resulted in a waiver of both the provision
requiring written notice to extend, and the provision that any holding over would not, without
written agreement, extend the lease. However, Pruett demonstrates that it will take something
more than the lessee's payment of rentals at the renewal rate in order to constitute waiver.
The following commentary appears in 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 228, § 14.3, at 597:
Other matters may bar an implication of a renewal from a tenant's continuance in
possession. It is not uncommon for a lease to provide that a tenant's continuance
in possession after expiration shall constitute a month-to-month tenancy. This
protects both landlord and tenant against perhaps unintentionally binding them-
selves for another year. When a lease includes both this clause and a right to
renew, the renewal usually being on notice, a failure to give notice results in the
month-to-month tenancy, absent evidence of intention otherwise.
Haltom City State Bank v. King Music Co., 474 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), Corpier v. Lawson, 356 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1962, no writ), and
Nortex Foods, Inc. v. Burnett, 278 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955, no writ), are
authority for the above quote and for the holding in Pratt, although in each of those cases the
renewal rental rate was the same as the rate for the primary term. But see Coulter v. Capitol Fin.
Co., 266 N.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 97 (1966), where the opposite result was reached, largely because
the renewal rate (which was greater than the primary term rate) was paid and accepted for
months. See generally 36 TEX. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 246 (1962).
391. 533 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
392. See generally 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 228, § 14. 1, at 551; 50 AM. JUR. 2d Landlord and
Tenant §§ 1176, 1177 (1970); 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 62(l)(b) (1972).
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the court finds the lessee to be in substantial compliance with the lease
terms.393 Thus, in Tidwell v. Lange"' it was held that the lessee could not
enforce a lease option to purchase the property because he was in default
under the lease.
2. Indemnity.
The lessor's right to recover against the lessee under an indemnity clause in
a lease agreement was the issue in Bernard v. L.S.S. Corp.39 5 Mother Blues,
Inc. leased the property in 1967 for use as a nightclub. A state tax lien was
imposed against the property in 1969 because of the failure of Mother Blues to
pay admission tax on its business.396 The State of Texas filed suit in 1973 to
collect the tax and to foreclose the statutory lien. The lessor filed a cross-
claim against the lessee for indemnity under the lease,3 97 and against the
guarantors of the lease. Summary judgment was entered in favor of the State
of Texas for the deficient taxes, for foreclosure of the statutory lien, and in
favor of the lessor for indemnity and attorneys' fees. Against the contention
of the appellees that the lessor's cause of action for indemnity arose when the
taxes became delinquent and, thus, was barred by the four-year statute of
limitations, the court of civil appeals held that the lessor became entitled to
indemnity only upon the foreclosure of the tax lien, 398 so that its claim for
indemnity was not barred by limitations. On the other hand, the court of civil
appeals found that the guarantors were liable on their guaranty of the lease
even though the guaranty, by its own terms, expired before the date the
judgment for indemnity was entered in favor of the lessor. The court said that
the guarantor's liability arose out of the lessee's failure to pay the admissions
tax, which was a breach of a provision in the lease requiring the lessee to
comply with all laws applicable to the property. The lessee's liability for
payment of the taxes and its breach for failure to pay the taxes arose while the
guaranty was in effect, and the guarantors would not be allowed to escape
liability simply because the lessor's claim for indemnity did not arise until
after the guaranty had expired. o
3. Subrogation.
The effect upon the insurer of a lease clause which waives the parties' right
to subrogation was the issue in Williams v. Advanced Technology Center,
393. See 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 228, § 14.1, at 551.
394. 531 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
395. 532 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
396. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 21.04(2) (Vernon 1969) provided that the state had a lien for
delinquent taxes and penalties pn all property used by the owner or operator of any place of
amusement. This statute was amended in 1971 to make the lien applicable only to property
belonging to the owner or operator of a place of amusement.
397. The indemnity clause provided: "Tenant agrees to indemnify and save landlord harmless
from all claims (including costs and expenses of defending against such claims) arising (or alleged
to arise) from any act or omission of Tenant .. "
398. The court cited Texas Auto Servs., Inc. v. Kemp, 478 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1972, no writ), and Russell v. Lemons, 205 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1947,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), for the rule that "a cause of action accrues to the indemnitee only when liability
becomes fixed, as upon rendition of judgment." 532 S.W.2d at 410. It is curious, then, why the
court followed that statement with the holding that in this case liability became "fixed" upon
foreclosure of the tax lien. Presumably, foreclosure had not occurred at the time this decision was




Inc.399 The subrogation clause provided that to the extent of the recovery on
the insurance each party waived any claim against the other party for any loss
or damage to property which was covered by fire and extended coverage
insurance. Another lease provision contained a covenant of the lessee not to
use the property for a purpose which would be extra hazardous because of
fire. The full amount of a loss claim for an explosion and accompanying fire
damage to the property was paid by the lessor's insurer, who on the theory of
subrogation sued the lessee to recover for the loss. The lessee did not dispute
the insurer's allegation that the lessee's use of the property was extra
hazardous. The trial court entered summary judgment for the lessee and the
court of appeals affirmed, holding that where the insured settles with or
releases another from liability for a loss before the insurer makes payment on
the loss, the insured's right to subrogation is abrogated to the extent of the
waiver. 4°° The lessor had recovered under the insurance policy, and the court
held that since the lessor had no claim against the lessee under the waiver of
subrogation clause, the insured had no claim against the lessee. The lessee's
breach of its covenant not to use the property for an extra hazardous purpose
was held to have no effect on the waiver of subrogation.
4. Merger of Agreements.
The lessee in Austin Shoe Stores v. Elizabeth Co.4°1 sought a partial rebate
of rents based upon the provisions of a letter written by the original lessor
prior to the execution of the lease. The defendant, a subsequent owner of the
property, refused to abide by the agreement contained in the letter, relying
upon the parol evidence rule and the merger provision in the lease which
stated that the lease contained all the agreements of the parties. The court
acknowledged that in the absence of fraud, accident, or mutual mistake, the
parol evidence rule is applicable, particularly if the lease contains a merger
provision. 402 It was held, however, that parol evidence may be introduced to
show mutual mistake and to show the modifications required to correct it,
where, as here, mutual mistake has been alleged. 403 The court further held that
parol evidence is admissible if it demonstrates the inducements that led to the
execution of the lease or the circumstances under which it was executed.
4°4
Denial of summary judgment for the lessee was affirmed, but the trial court's
summary judgment for the lessor was reversed.
399. 537 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
400. The court relied upon International Ins. Co. v. Medical-Professional Bldg., 405 S.W.2d
867 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
401. 538 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
402. The court cited Hubacek v. Ennis State Bank, 159 Tex. 166, 317 S.W.2d 30 (1958);
Milliken v. Callahan County, 69 Tex. 205, 6 S.W. 681 (1887); Guarantee Life Ins. Co. v.
Davidson, 234 S.W. 883 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921, jdgmt adopted).
403. See Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Crabb, 249 S.W. 835 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923, jdgmt
adopted).
404. The trial court, in effect, excluded affidavits offered by the lessee to show that the letter
agreement was omitted by mutual mistake, that the lessee was induced to execute the lease in
reliance upon the letter, that the original lessor and subsequent owners prior to the defendant had
acknowledged and honored the lessee's right to renewal rebates, and that the defendant acquired
the property with actual knowledge of the letter.
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5. Duty to Repair.
Lease agreements often obligate the lessor to make repairs to the leased
property, and give the lessee the right to make the repairs if the lessor fails to
do so. The lease agreement in McCreless Properties, Ltd. v. F. W. Woolworth
Co. 40 5 provided that the lessor would make all exterior repairs caused by
leakage or flowing of water. If the lessor failed to make the repairs within ten
days' written notice from the lessee, the lessee could cure the default at the
lessor's expense. Standing water on the roof over the lessee's premises,
which prior repairs by the lessor failed to correct, caused the roof to collapse
and resulted in substantial damage to the lessee's store. The lessor argued that
its liability was limited to the cost of repairs since the lessee had the right to
make the repairs and failed to do so.4°6 The trial court and the court of civil
appeals disagreed and held that the lease agreement did not limit the lessor's
obligation to make only the repairs demanded by the lessee 407 or limit the
lessor's liability to make the repairs. 40 8
6. Condemnation.
The lessee's right to compensation when the leased premises are con-
demned was considered in Evans Prescription Pharmacy, Inc. v. County of
Ector.4° The lease agreement stated that the lease would terminate if the
property was taken by eminent domain. The condemning authority paid the
lessee for moving expenses and damages to trade fixtures, 410 but because of
the lease provision, refused to pay the lessee any damages for its leasehold
interest. The court of civil appeals, following United States v. Petty Motor
Co. 41  and Fort Worth Concrete Co. v. Texas, 412 affirmed the trial court's
declaratory judgment and denied the lessee any recovery for the taking of the
leasehold. This interpretation of such a lease provision should, however, be
limited to cases where the entire premises are condemned, and should not
405. 533 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
406. The lessor relied upon McCrory Corp. v. Nacol, 428 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Hamblen v. Mohr, 171 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Galveston 1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.), which the court of civil appeals distinguished on the ground
that the covenants in the leases before those courts required the lessor to make only the repairs
demanded by the lessee. A lessee would be rightfully cautious in making repairs at the lessor's
expense. See generally 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 228, § 10.501a2.
407. The court noted that the lessee's right to repair at the lessor's expense was not even
triggered until the lessor refused to make the repair, which it had not done, after notice from the
lessee, which was never given. In fact, the court reasoned, the lessor earlier had attempted to
make the repairs to the roof.
408. The court alluded to the rule that the lessor is responsible for maintaining the portion of
the leased property it retains possession or control of, even if the lease did not impose this
obligation, citing Brown v. Frontier Theatres, Inc., 369 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1963). See generally 2
M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 228, § 10.103. The lessee's remedies for breach of a covenant to repair
are discussed in 51C C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 373(l) (1968).
409. 535 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd).
410. The lessee's right to recover for fixtures is separate from his right to recover on the
leasehold estate. See generally 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 228, §§ 13.4, 13.5. See 29A C.J.S.
Eminent Domain § 165 (1965) for discussion of a lessee's claim for damages to his business.
411. 327 U.S. 372 (1946).
412. 416 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court followed
the general rule, citing 2 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.23(a) (3d ed. 1976). See also 51C C.J.S.
Landlord & Tenant § 98 (1968).
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preclude a lessee from a recovery for a partial taking of the property.4 13 Lease
agreements often allow the tenant to participate in condemnation proceeds,
especially where there is only a partial taking. Absent any provision in the
lease as to the effect of a condemnation, the lessee has a claim against the
condemning authority for the value of the unexpired portion of the lease.4 1 4 It
should be noted further that even under a clause such as the one present in
Evans Prescription, the lessee may be entitled to damages if the lessor
consents to the taking and there is no actual condemnation.
411
B. Remedies for Breach
1. Effect of Foreclosure on Lessee's Breach.
In Thomas v. Morrison416 the court considered the proper measure of
damages where the lessee breaches the lease, abandons the property, and the
property is subsequently foreclosed upon before the end of the lease term
under a deed of trust made prior to the inception of the lease. The court held
that a lessor has two remedies for the breach of a lease and the abandonment
of the leased premises: (1) he may accept the breach, retake possession, and
sue for damages, and if he then relets for the balance of the lease term,41 7 his
measure of damages will generally be the difference between rentals owed
under the lease and the rentals he collects from the reletting; or (2) he may
elect not to accept the breach and sue for damages for the anticipatory breach
without reletting or being obligated to exercise reasonable diligence to relet,
in which event the measure of damages is the difference between the present
cash value of the rentals owed under the lease and the reasonable cash market
value of the lease for its unexpired term. 4 8 The lessor in this case apparently
elected the second remedy, but because there was no finding in the trial as to
the present cash value of the rentals owed for the balance of the lease term, or
as to the reasonable cash market value of the lease for the unexpired term, the
court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The court further held
that since the foreclosure under the pre-existing deed of trust terminated the
rights of both the lessor and lessee ,419 the lessor's damages would be limited to
a period of the lease up to the date of foreclosure.
413. See 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 228, § 13.3, at 511.
414. 2 id. § 13.3. But the lessor should have no liability to the lessee because of the taking. See
generally 35 TEX. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 73 (1962).
415. It could be argued in such a case that the property was taken by voluntary conveyance,
and was not taken by condemnation or the exercise of the power of eminent domain, and
accordingly, that a lease provision which terminates the lease upon a taking by condemnation or
eminent domain is inapplicable. There is some authority for the position that a taking by
condemnation or exercise of the power of eminent domain means the taking by court proceeding
and under the applicable constitutional and statutory authority, and does not apply to a voluntary
conveyance. See, e.g., L-M-S Inc. v. Blackwell, 149 Tex. 348, 233 S.W.2d 286 (1950); Texas v.
Steck Co., 236 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1951, writ ref'd); 29A C.J.S. Eminent
Domain § 5 (1965).
416. 537 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
417. The lessor would be under an obligation to use reasonable diligence to relet the property.
See Evans v. Winkler, 388 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1965, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
418. Evans v. Winkler, 388 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1965, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); White v. Watkins, 385 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1964, no writ).
419. The lessee's rights would not have been terminated under a deed of trust which came
after the lease, unless the lessee agreed to subordinate his rights to the deed of trust. In F. Groos
& Co. v. Chittim, 100 S.W. 1006, 1010 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, no writ), the court, in holding that a
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2. Landlord's Lien; Conversion by Lessee.
Dill v. Graham4 20 involved a suit by a lessor against her lessee for breach of
the lease and against Keaton McCrary Cotton Co., Inc. ,421 the purchaser of
cotton from the lessee, for conversion of the lessor's share of the cotton. The
lessee farmed the lessor's land under an oral agreement which provided that
one-fourth of the cotton crop was to be rented to the lessor. The lessee, before
the cotton crop was harvested, contracted to sell all of the crop, and
subsequently refused to deliver one-fourth of the crop, or any of the cards
held on the ginned cotton, to the lessor. The jury found that the lessor had not
agreed that the lessee could contract the cotton for future delivery. The court
of civil appeals stated that unless the lease agreement provides otherwise, the
lessee owns the entire crop prior to harvest, but the lessor becomes the owner
of his share when the crop is harvested. 42 2 To secure her right, the lessor has a
statutory lien under article 5222423 which the court held is good against a
purchaser whether or not the purchaser is aware of the lessor's right. 424 The
lessor can enforce his lien either by foreclosing his lien against the cotton or
by suing the purchaser for conversion. 425 The court stated that although the
lessor could waive his lien by authorizing the lessee to sell the crop, 426 there
was no evidence that the lessor did so in this case. Accordingly, it was held
that the purchaser of the cotton from the lessee was liable for the conversion
of the lessor's share of the crop. "If a purchaser buys the crop or a part of it on
which the landlord has a lien, without the landlord's consent or authorization
to sell, the purchaser is liable in conversion to the landlord to the extent of the
lesser of the value of the crop converted or the amount of rent due. ,427 The
purchaser was held to have a duty to determine the lessee's authority to sell if
he wants to protect himself from this liability. 428
Virtually the same facts involved in Dill were present in Keaton McCrary
Cotton Co., Inc. v. Herron,429 but the lessor apparently chose to sue only the
purchaser, Keaton McCrary Cotton Co., Inc., and the ginner for conversion
of her share of the cotton crop. The purchaser, as in Dill, contended that the
lessee had the right to sell the entire cotton crop, and in the alternative, filed a
deed of trust lien which arose subsequent to a lease on the same property was subject to the lease,
stated that "a lease existing on the date of the mortgage is in no way invalidated by giving the
mortgage. It is then the paramount interest, and the mortgage is subject to it." See also Draper v.
Gochman, 400 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. 1966). See generally 36TEX. JUR. 2d Landlordand Tenant § 262,
at 117 (1962); 3 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY §§ 1078, 1319, 4698 (Grimes ed. 1959).
420. 530 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
421. See Keaton McCrary Cotton Co. v. Herron, 529 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1975, no writ).
422. The court cited Milligar v. Foster, 17 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, jdgmt
adopted) in support of this statement.
423. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5222 (Vernon 1958).
424. 530 S.W.2d at 160, citing Mathews v. Burke, 32 Tex. 419 (1870).
425. The court relied on Jarvis v. Spangler, 251 S.W. 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1923,
no writ), for this statement.
426. See Woodson v. Westbrook, 272 S.W. 821 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1925, writ dism'd);
Gilliam v. Smither, 33 S.W. 984 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, no writ).
427. 530 S.W.2d at 160. Zapp v. Johnson, 87 Tex. 641, 30 S.W. 861 (1895), and Farmers'
Elevator Co. v. Advance Thresher Co., 189 S.W. 1018 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1916, writ ref'd),
were cited by the court.
428. See Kimbell Milling Co. v. Greene, 162 S.W.2d 991,997 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth),
aff'd, 141 Tex. 84, 170 S.W.2d 191 (1943).
429. 529 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ).
[Vol. 31
PROPERTY
cross action against the lessee for damages for breach of the contract to sell
the cotton. The court of civil appeals reached the same conclusions as in Dill,
and found the purchaser to be liable for conversion of the lessor's one-fourth
share of the crop.430 The court, however, reversed the trial court's judgment
to the extent it denied the purchaser any recovery of damages against the
lessee. No ambiguity was found in the contract to sell the crop, and since the
lessee contracted to sell the lessor's share of the crop which he could not
deliver, he was liable to the purchaser for the breach of that portion of the
contract.
3. Lessor's Liability for Theft.
The liability of a lessor for the burglary of a lessee's apartment was alleged
in Knapp v. Wilson.4 31 The court found that there was no causal connection
between the loss of an unmarked apartment key by a former tenant and the
burglary of the tenant's apartment. But it was recognized that in a proper case
a lessor may be held liable for loss due to theft by third parties if that
consequence is reasonably foreseeable by the lessor.4 32
VI. RESTRICTIONS ON LAND USE
A. Private Restrictive Covenants
As in past years, there were several cases involving private restrictions on
land use, primarily restrictive covenants in residential areas. In the 1969 case
of MacDonald v. Painter433 the Texas Supreme Court held that a deed
restriction which limits improvements to those "built and used for residential
purposes only" does not as a matter of law prohibit the construction of a
duplex. Deed restriction cases, however, generally turn on their particular
facts and the language of the restriction itself. Thus, in the case of Stephenson
v. Perlitz434 the Texas Supreme Court was again presented with the question
of whether the construction of a duplex violated a residential deed restriction.
The restriction in question provided that all improvements must be "built and
used for residence purposes," but added that "[o]nly one residence shall be
erected upon the premises." 435 The court stated that this additional language
was sufficient to distinguish the general rule of MacDonald v. Painter,436 and
430. The purchaser argued that the lessee either waived her landlord's lien or was estopped to
assert that the lessee had no authority to sell the entire crop, because the lessor had previously
allowed the lessee to sell the crop after the harvest. The court disagreed, and stated that the fact
the lessor in a previous year had allowed the lessee to sell the lessor's share of the crop afterit was
segregated was not evidence of the lessee's authority to contract before segregation for the sale
of the lessor's share. Id. at 633.
431. 535 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
432. The court cited Warner v. Arnold, 133 Ga. App. 174, 210 S.E.2d 350 (1974); Braitman v.
Overlook Terrace Corp., 132 N.J. Super. 51, 332 A.2d 212 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B (1965); 49 TEXAS L. REV. 586 (1971); Annot.,
Landlord's Obligation to Protect Tenants Against Criminal Activity of Third Persons, 43
A.L.R.3d 331 (1972).
433. 441 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1969).
434. 532 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. 1976). See Wallenstein & St. Claire (1976), supra note 2, at 64. On
remand the court of civil appeals held that previous violations of the one-residence restriction
were not such as to constitute a waiver. There were only nine violations in an addition of over 100
lots. 537 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
435. 532 S.W.2d at 955. The court held that the term "one residence" is not ambiguous.
436. 441 S. W.2d 179 (Tex. 1969). See text accompanying note 433 supra. The court stated that
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held that the restriction prohibited the erection of a duplex.437
In Edwards v. Southampton Extension Civic Club 438 the tract constituting
the Southampton Place Extension Subdivision was conveyed by general
warranty deed dated July 1, 1925, subject to certain restrictions which
prevented the use of the property for business purposes. Paragraphs one and
two of the deed restrictions stated that no part of the property should ever be
used for business purposes of any kind. In paragraph seven, however, it was
stated that "the foregoing Restrictions" were for twenty-five years, and
provided that if a majority of the owners in the subdivision so desired, the
restrictions could be extended for a further period of twenty-five years or
less. In 1950 the deed restrictions were extended for an additional twenty-five
year period. In June 1975, just prior to the expiration of the extended
restrictions, a campaign was organized to obtain signatures for another
extension. A majority of the homeowners agreed to a further extension, but
certain homeowners refused to sign the agreement. Thereafter, the home-
owners association and a number of individual homeowners brought suit
against those owners who refused to sign, seeking a declaration that the deed
restrictions had again been renewed. The district court held in favor of the
plaintiffs, but the court of civil appeals reversed. Noting that a deed should be
construed so as to ascertain the intention of the parties,439 that this intention
should be gathered from the entire instrument construed as a whole," and
that restrictions are generally construed strictly in favor of the grantee against
the grantor and in favor of the free use of the property,44' the court found that
paragraphs one and two were expressly made subject to the provisions of
paragraph seven, the extension clause, and that the language of paragraph
seven clearly contemplated a single extension of twenty-five years or less.
Therefore, the court held that the deed restrictions expired in 1975 and could
not be extended." 2
"[a] restriction that property is for residential purposes is quite different from a restriction which
additionally provides that only one residence may be erected on the property." 532 S.W.2d at
956.
437. In another case decided by the Texas Supreme Court, Zmotony v. Phillips, 529 S.W.2d
760 (Tex. 1975), the restrictive covenant in question prohibited, among other things, the use of
mobile homes as residences. The trial court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a
temporary injunction compelling defendants to remove a mobile home from their property; the
court of civil appeals reversed, but the Texas Supreme Court then affirmed the judgment of the
trial court. While not reaching the question of waiver, the court noted that another trailer home
had been located across the street from one of the plaintiffs for over three years. Additionally, the
court noted that the plaintiffs had failed to show that they would suffer any irreparable harm
pending trial on the merits or that defendants would incur costs of $1,000 in removing the mobile
home. See Wallenstein & St. Claire (1976), supra note 2, at 65, for a discussion of the civil appeals
decision. With respect to waiver, another case decided during the survey period, Fowler v.
Brown, 535 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ), reaffirmed the rule that violations
of restrictions outside the area in question cannot be relied upon as a waiver. Also on the issue of
waiver see Alcorn v. Brown, 536 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
438. 540 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). By way of
full disclosure, and in keeping with the fine example set by previous authors of property survey
articles, the authors wish to point out that their law firm served as counsel for the defendants-
appellants in this case. See Wallenstein & St. Claire (1976), supra note 2, at 47; Wallenstein
(1975), supra note 2, at 46 n.121.
439. Newsom v. Newsom, 378 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1964).
440. Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Harrison, 138 Tex. 84, 156 S.W.2d 963 (1941).
441. MacDonald v. Painter, 441 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1969).
442. The dissenting judge took the position that the trial court found as a "fact" that the
language of paragraphs I and 2 of the restrictions indicated that the true intent of the grantor was
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Harrison v. Air Park Estates Zoning Committee"3 concerns the modifica-
tion of deed restrictions. Harrison purchased a lot under a contract for deed in
a subdivision designed for "people who like airplanes."444 The development
contemplated that those buying lots would build both a hangar and a residence
on each lot. The contract for deed contained certain restrictions and provi-
sions which stated in part that a hangar could be built prior to the construction
of a home and that the restrictions would be binding until revoked or modified
by three-fourths majority of the then owners of the real property. Acting
under this modification provision by written agreement of over three-fourths
of the property owners, the restriction was modified to provide that a home
could be built with a hangar as a later addition, but that no hangar could be
built prior to the construction of a home. Harrison argued that the modifica-
tion was void because it was more restrictive than the original covenant. The
court rejected this contention, however, finding that the modification, al-
though more restrictive, was both consistent with the overall plan and
development and reasonable.
B. Public Restrictions
There was also litigation during the survey period concerning public
restrictions on land use. In Mahler v. City of Seabrook"5 the city and others
brought suit to enjoin the purchaser of a certain tract from violating a city
zoning ordinance which restricted the use of the property to single family
residences. The defendants, who had been using this property as a sand pit,
relied on the doctrine of estoppel, contending that the city had used sand and
other fill material from the pit in constructing city improvements and there-
fore should now be estopped from enforcing the zoning ordinance. The court
rejected this argument, holding that an estoppel against a municipality acting
in its proprietary capacity will not be allowed to defeat a mandatory provision
of a statute. Thus, this act was not such as to estop the city from enforcing its
zoning ordinance, a governmental function.
In Coffee City v. Thompson" 6 a property owner in Coffee City brought suit
against the town and members of the town council to have the town zoning
ordinance declared null and void, and also for a mandatory injunction for the
issuance of a building permit which had been denied under the ordinance.
Affirming the trial court, the court of civil appeals held that the ordinance was
unconstitutionally vague because it merely described "a certain area as
commercial and declared that all other property is zoned residential,"" 7
failed to describe what structures may be built, provided no guidelines or
criteria for the town secretary to follow in granting or refusing building
that the restrictions continue indefinitely, citing Moore v. Smith, 443 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. 1969). The
majority, however, considered the construction of the restrictions as a question of law, not a fact
issue, and held that the clear language of paragraph 7 distinguished the Moore decision. 540
S.W.2d at 537.
443. 533 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
444. Id. at I10.
445. 538 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ).
446. 535 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
447. Id. at 763.
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permits,"' and provided no appeal procedure through a zoning commission as
required by article 101 if.449 The town argued that article 974d-18, 450 a valida-
tion statute affecting small towns, cured any failure by Coffee City to appoint
a zoning commission. The court, however, rejected this contention, holding
that validating acts are intended merely to cure technical procedural defects
in the proceedings of city and town governments, and, as such, do not serve to
excuse compliance with a mandatory duty required by statute. 4 1
VII. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Real Estate Partnerships and Ventures
Although real estate syndications have lost much of their former glamour,
partnerships and joint ventures continue to be popular vehicles for group
ownership of real property. While an in-depth discussion of partnership law is
beyond the scope of this Survey Article, several decisions during the survey
period are of interest to real estate lawyers.
In Park Cities Corp. v. Byrd 452 the deceased general partner's capital
account showed a $1,987,344.00 deficit upon dissolution of the partnership,
mainly because of a special allocation to her account of depreciation on the
partnership's apartment project for federal income tax purposes. The Texas
Supreme Court held that this deficit was an asset of the partnership, 453 and the
estate of the general partner was required to contribute funds to bring her
capital account up to zero, resulting in a tremendous windfall to Park Cities
Corporation, the limited partner. To the extent that special allocations are still
available under federal tax law,454 when drafting partnership agreements
containing such allocations consideration should be given to the desired
treatment of such artificial deficits upon dissolution of the partnership.
Sherrill v. Bruce Advertising, Inc.455 involved an advertising agency's suit
against a developer with whom the advertiser had a contract for services in
connection with the development of certain real property. The agency also
sued the trustee of the trust which owned the property seeking to establish a
448. Id. The court reasoned that an ordinance allowing the exercise of arbitrary discretion is
invalid. See Spann v. City of Dallas, II1 Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513, 517 (1921).
449. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 101 If (Vernon 1963).
450. Id. art. 974d-18 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77) provides in substance that "all . . . acts
performed by the governing bodies of . . . cities and towns . . . since their incorporation...
are hereby in all respects validated .... "
451. Finally, in dictum, the court hinted that the ordinance may have been motivated by a
desire to advance the pecuniary interests of certain town councilmen and might be invalid on this
basis as well. 535 S.W.2d at 767-68.
452. 534 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976).
453. The court interpreted the partnership agreement in light of the Texas Uniform Partner-
ship Act, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 61 32b (Vernon 1970), and found that section 40(a), which
includes among the assets of a partnership "the contributions of the partners necessary for the
payment of all liabilities," supported the decision that Mrs. Byrd's negative capital account was
an asset of the partnership. Even if correct, this result seems unfair. As a practical matter the only
loss to the partnership was on paper. As general partner, with all losses and liabilities allocated to
her, Mrs. Byrd bore the lion's share of the risks of the enterprise. Additionally, the language of
the Texas Uniform Partnership Act can be read as referring to real money liabilities rather than
mere accounting losses such as depreciation. Under this view, it could be argued that unless the
partnership agreement provides that such a deficit be restored, it need not be brought up to zero
upon dissolution.
454. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 213(d), 90 Stat. 1548, amending
I.R.C. § 704(b), discussed at note 501 infra and accompanying text.
455. 538 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ).
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joint venture between the developer and the trust and to hold them jointly and
severally liable on the contract. The court stated that in order to constitute a
joint venture it must be shown that the parties had joint control of the
enterprise, participated in profits, and shared the losses of the enterprise. 56
Since no agreement for the sharing of losses was shown, the court held that as
a matter of law no joint venture existed between the trust and the
developer.457
The court stated that there was evidence showing that the developer was
acting as the agent for the trust, which was an undisclosed principal. Citing
the Restatement (Second) of Agency, section 210(1), 458 the court held, how-
ever, that an undisclosed principal is discharged from liability under a
contract if the other party, with actual knowledge of the identity of the
undisclosed principal, takes a judgment against the agent who made the
contract. 459 Since the advertiser had won a final judgment against the de-
veloper, the court held that the trust was not liable as an undisclosed
principal .41
Section six of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act 461 defines a partnership
as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business
for profit." In Cherokee Village v. Henderson 2 the court held that the
evidence supported the finding of the trial court that a partnership existed
with respect to the ownership and management of an apartment complex,
notwithstanding the fact that legal title was held by a designated trustee. The
case involved an action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly
sustained by a minor when she fell into an open hole filled with scalding hot
water on the premises of the Cherokee Village Apartments in Dallas. The suit
was brought, however, in Harris County against Cherokee Village, alleged to
be a general partnership, the trustee holding legal title to the property, and the
corporation responsible for maintenance and management of the apartment
complex. The plaintiffs sought to establish venue in Harris County on the
basis that one of the alleged general partners resided in Harris County,4 3
arguing that the partnership continued to exist notwithstanding the fact that
title to the property had been conveyed into trust for the benefit of certain
individuals who were partners in the original partnership. 464
456. Id. at 866. The court cited Allan Constr. Co. v. Parker Bros. & Co., 535 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ). See also Luling Oil & Gas Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co.,
144 Tex. 475, 481, 191 S.W.2d 716, 722 (1945).
457. 538 S.W.2d at 866.
458. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 210(l) (1957).
459. See generally 2 TEX. JUR. 2d Agency §§ 233, 234 (1959).
460. 538 S.W.2d at 867. The court also held that there could be no quantum meruit recovery
against the trust since there was a valid express written contract covering the services rendered.
Id. See note 322 supra.
461. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 6 (Vernon 1970). Id. §7 sets forth certain criteria
for determining the existence of a partnership.
462. 538 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1976, writ dism'd).
463. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(4)(Vernon 1964). Apparently, the other general
partners were residents of Dallas County. This, of course, raises the question of why the
plaintiffs sought in the first place to bring the action in Harris County rather than Dallas County
where the accident occurred. Some might say that it was because the plaintiff believed juries in
Harris County tend to be more generous in their verdicts than do juries in Dallas County.
464. The declaration of trust stated that it was not intended to create a partnership nor to carry
on a business actively. However, the instrument also provided that the parties would pay their
pro rata share of the capital investment and also share profits and losses on a pro rata basis
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The court of civil appeals indicated that the evidence supported the trial
court's "implied finding" that the trust was merely a mechanism used by the
co-owners to carry on the apartment business for profit.165 Therefore, the
court found that the partnership existed at the time the accident occurred, and
since one of the partners was a resident of Harris County, venue was proper in
Harris County.
B. The Tax Reform Act of 1976'
Extensive tax reform was enacted on October 4, 1976, and while real estate
lawyers may, at first glance, feel that their practice and clients escape this
extensive tax surgery with few scars, the indirect effect on real estate
investments may be substantial. Obviously, this is not a survey of tax law or
of the Act. Nevertheless, due to the impact of tax law on real estate
transactions, mention will be made of certain provisions of the Act which
apply to real estate.
The chief aim of the Act was to eliminate or reduce the tax preferences that
flow from tax shelter investments. To many this meant mainly real estate tax
shelters, although the Act may have a broader effect. Section 201(a)1 7 of the
Act denies a deduction to individuals, subchapter S corporations, and person-
al holding companies for interest and taxes paid or accrued during the
construction period468 of improvements held in a trade or business in an
activity conducted for profit. These amounts must be capitalized and amor-
tized in the manner provided in the Act. 9 The depreciation recapture rules
made applicable to non-residential rental property by the Tax Reform Act of
1969470 have been extended to residential rental property, except for certain
government financed or assisted residential rental property .471 Thus, any gain
according to their respective beneficial interests. Some two years after the execution of the trust
instrument, an instrument purporting to be an amendment to the earlier partnership agreement
was executed. This amendment provided for the withdrawal of three of the original partners and
also stated that except as amended, the original partnership agreement was to remain in full force
and effect. Shortly after this amendment an assumed name certificate was filed for the name
"Cherokee Village," which certificate listed the names of individuals conducting the business in
accordance with the amended partnership agreement. Beside each person's name was the
designation "general partner." It was not until after this lawsuit was filed that the assumed name
certificate was withdrawn and a new certificate of assumed name filed showing the trustee as the
owner. Up until the year of suit partnership income tax returns were filed in the name of
Cherokee Village.
465. 538 S.W.2d at 174.
466. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 [hereinafter referred to in the text and footnotes as the
"Act"]. See generally Vaughan, The Tax Reform Act of 1976, 40 TEX. B.J. 69 (1977).
467. Act § 201(a), adding I.R.C. § 189 [hereinafter referred to in the text as the "Code"].
468. "Carrying costs" incurred or paid before construction begins, such as taxes or interest
paid or accrued while waiting for plans to be approved or for property to be rezoned, would not be
affected. New § 189 applies only to construction which was started after Dec. 31, 1975, in the case
of nonresidential real property, or after Dec. 31, 1977, in the case of residential real property
(other than low-income housing), or after Dec. 31, 1981, in the case of low-income housing.
469. For example, if construction of a shopping center began in 1976, only 50% of the
construction period interest and taxes paid in 1976 can be deducted. The other 50% must be
capitalized and amortized over the three years following the date the property is first placed in
service or is ready for sale. See TAX REFORM AcT OF 1976, 118 (P-H 1976). The period over
which the costs must be amortized increases by one year for each year after 1976, and over 10
years for construction commenced in or after 1982.
470. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
471. Act § 202(a), amending I.R.C. § 1250(a).
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realized on the sale of residential rental property, regardless of how long that
property has been held, will be ordinary income to the extent accelerated
depreciation after December 31, 1975, exceeds straight-line depreciation.
Present rules requiring that all the depreciation taken, excess or otherwise,
will be recaptured as ordinary income if the property is held twelve months or
less have been retained.47 2 For the purposes of eliminating the benefit
taxpayers sometimes have won (e.g., through bankruptcy proceedings or
temporary restraining orders) by delaying the foreclosure of property until a
later year or years, a new section 1250(d)(10)47 3 has been added to the Code to
require property owners whose property has been foreclosed or reconveyed
to the mortgagee after default under the deed of trust to recapture the
accelerated depreciation as of the date the foreclosure proceeding was begun,
or on the date the operation of the agreement (e.g., deed in lieu of foreclosure)
began. If the complexity and impact of the new rules for depreciation
recapture are not reason enough to discourage clients from using accelerated
depreciation methods, consider the fact that accelerated depreciation is a tax
preference item for purposes of determining the minimum tax on individuals
under Code sections 56, 57, and 58, 4 7 4 and that it will reduce the already
reduced benefit of the maximum tax on personal service income.
475
The Act attempts to codify some of the case law regarding prepaid interest.
Cash method taxpayers may deduct interest only in the taxable year in which
and to the extent that interest represents a charge for the use or forebearance
of borrowed money.476 After December 31, 1975, 47 prepaid interest must be
capitalized and deducted ratably over the term of the loan. This rule also
applies to "points," except that points paid by a cash basis taxpayer on a
home mortgage (principal residence only) may be deducted in full in the year
in which they are paid, provided (1) the payment of points is an established
business practice in the area, and (2) the amount of the points does not exceed
the amount generally charged in the area.47 Additionally, Code section
163(d)479 has been amended to limit to $10,000 plus the amount of net
investment income (and certain lease expenses) the amount of investment
interest a taxpayer other than a corporation can deduct in a taxable year. 
4W
The maximum amount of losses in excess of gains which are deductible
against ordinary income has been increased from $1,000 to $2,000 for tax
years beginning after December 31, 1976, and to $3,000 for years beginning
472. Act § 202(a).
473. Act § 202(b), effective Jan. 1, 1976.
474. Act § 301 is generally applicable to tax preferences for taxable years after Dec. 31, 1975.
475. Act § 302, amending I.R.C. §§ 1304(b)(5), 1348, effective for tax years beginning after
Dec. 31, 1976.
476. Act § 208, adding I.R.C. § 461(g).
477. This limitation is not applicable to prepayments made before Jan. 1, 1977, if made
pursuant to a binding contract which was in effect on Sept. 16, 1975.
478. Both of these conditions must be satisfied. Furthermore, the points must be "interest"
and not payment for the lender's services. I TAX REFORM AcTOF 1976, at 51 (ALI-ABA 1976).
479. Act § 209.
480. An additional $15,000 is permitted for interest paid on indebtedness incurred to acquire
stock in a corporation or an interest in a partnership by a family which has acquired or is acquiring
at least 50% of that business. Excess interest can be carried forward. The House bill also sought
to apply this limitation to personal expenses, such as residential mortgages, but the final version
covers only investment interest.
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after 1977.481 But the holding period required in order to get long-term capital
gains treatment is increased from six months to nine months for tax years
beginning after December 31, 1976, and to twelve months for tax years
beginning after 1977.482 The treatment of gain on the sale of depreciable
property transferred between related parties as ordinary income rather than
capital gain under section 1239 of the Code has been extended to sales or
exchanges between corporations controlled by the same individual.4 83 The
time for replacing involuntarily converted property with like-kind property in
order to defer the recognition of gain has been increased from two to three
years. 484 Additionally, new rules for involuntary conversion now allow tax-
payers whose outdoor advertising displays are condemned to elect to treat
them as real property. 4
85
Extensive changes were made in the limitations and requirements for real
estate investment trusts (REIT).486 These changes include an increase in the
percentage of gross income that must be derived from passive sources from
ninety to ninety-five percent, 487 a change in the definition of "rents from real
property, '-48 an increase in the distribution requirement from 90% to 95%,489
a change whereby a REIT which voluntarily disqualifies itself cannot requal-
ify for five years, 490 and a change allowing corporations to qualify as
REITs. 49l The most significant aspect of the REIT changes is the new
deficiency dividend procedure which eliminates disqualification as the penal-
ty for inadvertent failure to meet the income qualification tests. 49 The Act
also removes the prohibition against holding property for sale to customers . 493
Additionally, a REIT is now permitted a net operation loss deduction for loss
carryovers (but not carry backs), 494 and may apply ordinary losses to reduce
481. Act § 1401, amending I.R.C. § 1211(b).
482. Act § 1402, amending I.R.C. § 1222(l), (2), (3), (4).
483. Act § 2129, amending I.R.C. § 1239.
484. Act § 2140, adding I.R.C. § 1033(g)(1). The new three-year time period applies to any
disposition of converted property after Dec. 31, 1974, unless the condemnation proceeding was
started before Oct. 4, 1976.
485. Act § 2127, amending I.R.C. § 1033(g).
486. Act § 1604, adding I.R.C. §§856(f), (g), 860, and amending I.R.C. §§ 856(a), (c), (d), and
857(a)(1).
487. Act § 1604(a), amending I.R.C. § 856(c).
488. Act § 1604(b), amending I.R.C. § 856(d). Rents from real property now include
amounts received for customary services, even if separate charges are made for such services,
and amounts attributable to personal property incidental to rental of real property, if the amount
allocable to personal property is less than 15% of total rent. Also, where a prime tenant under a
percentage lease subleases to a subtenant under a percentage sublease, only a portion of the rent
received from the prime tenant fails to qualify as rents from real property.
489. Act § 1604(j), amending I.R.C. § 857(a)(1).
490. Act § 1604(k), adding I.R.C. § 856(g).
491. Act § 1604(f), amending I.R.C. § 856(a).
492. Act § 1601, adding I.R.C. §§ 316(b)(3), 859, 6697, and amending I.R.C. § 857(b)(3)(c).
Very generally, qualifying distributions may now be made in subsequent years under certain
circumstances. New rules for failure to meet the income source tests are embodied in Act § 1602,
adding I.R.C. § 856(c)(7), redesignating I.R.C. § 857(b)(5) as I.R.C. § 857(b)(7) and adding I.R.C.
§9 857(b)(5), 857(b)(2)(E). Under the new law failure to meet the income source tests will not
disqualify a REIT if (1) the REIT sets forth the source and nature of its gross income on its return;(2) any incorrect information is not due to fraud with intent to evade tax; and (3) the failure to
meet the income source requirement is due to a reasonable cause and not willful neglect. A 100%
tax is imposed on the net income attributable to the greater amount by which the REIT fails the
75% or 90% requirements.
493. Act § 1603, deleting I.R.C. § 856(a)(4) and adding I.R.C. § 857(b)(6).
494. Act § 1606, adding I.R.C. §§ 172(b)(1)(I), 172(d)(7).
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net capital gains if the alternative tax on net capital gains is not used. 495
Finally, for tax years beginning after 1979, the Act imposes an excise tax on a
REIT to the extent it fails to distribute seventy-five percent of the income it is
required to distribute during the year the income is earned.49
There were several changes in partnership tax law which will affect real
estate investments. One of the more notable changes, providing that the
adjusted basis of a partner's interest will not include any portion of any
partnership liability with respect to which the partner has no personal
liability, expressly excepts real estate partnerships other than those involved
in certain farming operations and oil and gas exploration. 497 For tax years
beginning after December 31, 1976, fees paid in connection with the organiza-
tion of a partnership must be capitalized, and after December 31, 1976, all
organizational and syndication expenses are subject to this rule. 498 Other
changes include a limitation to $2,000.00 in the aggregate on the amount of
additional first-year depreciation which a partnership can pass through to the
partners in any tax year, 499 an allocation to a partner of income or losses only
for the portion of the year he is a member of the partnership,5 0 and the
disallowance of any special allocation of a partner's distributive share of gain,
loss, deduction, or credit which lacks substantial economic effect.
50
'
Other real estate related provisions include a reinstatement of the special
five-year amortization (and an increase in the maximum amount per unit that
can qualify) for low-income housing, 2 changes allowing an elderly taxpayer
to exclude from income the entire gain on the sale of his principal residence if
the adjusted sales price is less than $35,000,503 and changes exempting from
income tax, dues, and assessments received by electing qualified homeown-
ers associations, if the dues and assessments are paid by property owners who
are members of the association and are used for the maintenance and
improvement of association property, and allowing a lending institution
which obtains stock in a cooperative housing corporation through foreclosure
to be treated as a tenant-stockholder for up to three years. 50, Effective
December 31, 1975, the Act sets forth an objective test to be applied in
determining the allowable deductions for expenses related to vacation
homes. 50 5 If a taxpayer uses the home more than fourteen days or ten percent
of the number of days in the year during which the home is rented, whichever
is greater, the deduction is limited to the amount by which the gross rental
income exceeds expenses otherwise deductible (for example, interest, taxes
495. Act § 1607, amending I.R.C. 99 857(b)(2), 857(b)(3)(A), 857(b)(3)(C).
496. Act § 1605, adding I.R.C. § 4981.
497. Act § 213(e), amending I.R.C. § 704(d). See the general "at risk" provisions under Act §
204, amending I.R.C. § 465.
498. Act § 213(b), adding I.R.C. § 709.
499. Act § 213(a), amending I.R.C. § 179(d).
500. Act § 213(c), amending I.R.C. § 706(c)(2).
501. Act § 213(d), amending I.R.C. § 704(b). This amendment incorporates the existing body
of law as to what constitutes a "substantial economic effect." See Leon A. Harris, Jr., 61 T.C.
770 (1974). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1964).
502. Act § 203, amending I.R.C. § 167(k).
503. Act § 1404, amending I.R.C. § 121(b)(l). The former limit was $20,000.
504. Act § 2101, adding I.R.C. § 528.
505. Act § 601, adding I.R.C. § 280A.
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and casualty loss). Deductible rental related expenses are further limited to an
amount based on the ratio the number of days the home is rented bears to the
total number of days during the year the home is used for either personal or
rental purposes. If the home is rented out less than fifteen days during the
year, no income or loss is included in the taxpayer's return. For taxable years
beginning after 1975, no deduction is allowed for an office in the home unless
the portion of the home is used as the principal place of business for meeting
or dealing with clients or customers in the normal course of business,
exclusively and on a regular basis."° If the taxpayer is an employee, the
exclusive use must be for the convenience of his employer. In any event, the
deductions allocated to the business use may not be more than the amount by
which gross income derived from the business use exceeds the deductions
allocated to such use otherwise allowable (for example, taxes, interest, and
casualty losses).
The Act severely curtails special farm tax rules for farming syndications in
which a substantial portion of the interest is held by taxpayers who are
motivated by a desire to shelter other income.50 7 This amendment requires
farming syndicates to deduct expenses for seed, feed, and fertilizer only
when consumed, and to deduct expenses for purchased poultry only for their
useful life (in case of inventory, only when disposed of). Additionally, the Act
requires that in the case of a farming syndicate, amounts attributable to
planting, cultivation, maintenance, or development of a grove, orchard, or
vineyard incurred prior to the tax year in which the grove, orchard, or
vineyard commences production in commercial quantities must be
capitalized and recovered through depreciation .5' Finally, the Act adds a new
provision requiring that corporations (other than certain family owned corpo-
rations and Subchapter S corporations) and certain partnerships use the
accrual method of accounting for farm operations. This provision also
requires such entities to capitalize their productive period expenses of
growing or raising crops or animals.5 9
C. The Uniform Land Transactions Act and Other Uniform Acts
In August 1975 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws approved the Uniform Land Transactions Act and recommended
it for enactment in all states.5 10 The Act in its present form would codify many
aspects of real property law in the areas of contracts, the remedies for breach
of those contracts, security agreements affecting real property, usury, and
the rights of the creditor and debtor upon default." The Act's stated
506. Act § 601, adding I.R.C. § 280A.
507. Act § 207(a), amending I.R.C. § 464 (effective for amounts paid in tax years beginning
after Dec. 31, 1975, except for syndicates in existence on that date in which there was no change
in membership during 1976, which come within the amendment after Dec. 31, 1976).
508. Act § 207(b), amending I.R.C. § 278 (effective for tax years beginning after Dec. 31, 1975,
except for groves, etc., planted on or before that date).
509. Act § 207(c), adding I.R.C. § 447 (effective for tax years beginning after Dec. 31, 1976).
510. The Act with comments has been published by West Publishing Co.
511. See generally Balbach, The Uniform Land Transactions Act: Articles I and 2, II REAL
PROP.. PROB. & TR. J. 1(1976); Kunklin, The Uniform Land Transactions Act:Article3, II REAL
PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 12 (1976).
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purposes are to provide uniformity among the states in real property law, to
modernize and simplify real property laws, and to provide special protection
to homeowners. Some of the provisions of the Act are in conformity with
existing Texas law, but many provisions would bring both uncertainty and
drastic change to Texas real property law. The Act and the official comments
thereto are derived in a very general way from the Uniform Commercial
Code, which leads to the Act's most apparent shortcoming. The flexibility
that may be important to parties who are dealing with personal property is not
so important in a real property context. Further, this added flexibility, and the
resulting uncertainty could lead to litigation in many situations where, at least
in Texas, the rights of parties have been well defined for many years. The
Texas Bar Section of Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law indicated its
interest and concern by organizing a new committee under which real
property practitioners in Houston and Dallas have been formed to study the
Act.
The Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar
Association has announced its opposition to the Act.512 The National Confer-
ence of Commissioners has requested the Section to propose written modifi-
cations to the Act by August 1977, and has agreed to consider any suggested
changes. The proposed revision of Article 2 of the Act has been assigned to
the Houston Real Estate Lawyers Council, and Article 1 has been assigned to
a group of Dallas real estate lawyers. The reader should also be aware of other
uniform acts which are in various stages of drafting, including the Uniform
Simplification of Land Transfers Act and a uniform condominium act, both of
which formed part of the working draft of the Uniform Land Transactions
Act, but were deleted from the final draft, a uniform eminent domain code,
and a uniform act for historic preservation and easements.
D. Other
By way of brief summary, some additional developments at the federal
level are deserving of mention. The Federal Trade Commission has been
showing signs of increased activity in the area of land sales. Its regulatory
power having been expanded by the Federal Trade Commission Improve-
ment Act,5 3 the agency will soon issue broad proposed rules defining unfair
and deceptive practices in land sales and spelling out the available rem-
edies.514 The proposed rules will cover sellers already subject to the Interstate
Land Sales Full Disclosure Act 515 and the filing requirements of the Office of
Interstate Land Sales Registration. 516 In addition, the Federal Insurance
Administration has promulgated new regulations, effective January 1,
1976,5'7 which contain sweeping and substantive changes in the National
512. 5 PROB. & PROP. 7 (Special Issue 1976).
513. Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637,88 Stat. 2183; see 15 U.S.C.A. §§57a, 57b(Supp.
1976). See also 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a) (Supp. 1976).
514. 41 Fed. Reg. 3322 (1976); see Land Trends, 4 LAND DEV. L. REP., Oct. 1976, at 2.
515. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-383, §§
812(a)(1), (2), 88 Stat. 633 (1974).
516. See 24 C.F.R. § 1710 (1976). Changes in the OILSR regulations will be presented for
comment. Land Trends, 4 LAND DEV. L. REP., Aug. 1976, at 3.




SEC Guide 6019 was finally promulgated, effective April 20, 1976. Guide 60
is intended to aid in the preparation of registration statements relating to
interests in real estate limited partnerships. Several changes are made from
Proposed Guide 60,520 which was originally published for comment on March
1, 1974. These changes are basically aimed at clarifying the Guide and making
the information requested more concise. The necessity for obtaining an
appraiser's consent has been clarified. If a specific appraisal is used in the
registration statement, the appraiser would have to be named as an expert.
The management section has been revised to include a description of any
substantial reliance on a non-affiliate in running partnership operations, as
well as information concerning the experience and compensation of the
non-affiliate. These changes make it clear that in certain circumstances (e.g.,
an unspecified property fund), it is inappropriate to make any statement as to
anticipated cash returns.
The Guide has also been amended to require specific disclosure about
property only at such time as there is a reasonable probability that it will be
acquired. The undertakings relating to filing information when specific
properties are to be acquired by a nonspecific fund have also been changed.
Finally, published for comment along with Guide 60 is proposed undertaking
21(C) under which the registrant mustlundertake to provide limited partners
the financial statements required by Form 10-K for the first full year of
operations of the partnership.
518. See, e.g., Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-234, 87 Stat. 975,
amending 42 U.S.C. ch. 50, noted in Wallenstein & St. Claire (1976), supra note 2, at 57.
519. SEC Guide 60, SEC 1933 Securities Act Release No. 5692; SEC 1934 Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 12224 (March 17, 1976). Both releases are reprined in SEC. REG. & L.
REP. No. 345, at F-5 (1976).
520. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5465 (March 1, 1974), reprinted in SEC. REG. & L. REP.
No. 242, at E-1 (1974).
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